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Interpreting Québec’s Exile Within the Federation
Selected Political Essays
I often repeat, half -seriously, that I am a historian of ideas and a 
teacher of political philosophy, hidden in a political science department. 
At all Québec universities, as in the rest of North America, much of the 
business of political science has to do with positivistic approaches, quan-
titative methods, and rational choice theories for explaining social behav-
iour. Within the discipline, I belong to the minority methodological and 
epistemological position. To make sense of politics, I believe one has to 
rely on an interdisciplinary approach. The insights of philosophy, history, 
literature, sociology, and law can all enrich the search for coherent and 
meaningful interpretations of political events, phenomena, and doctrines. 
Such a combination forms the spirit or, as the Germans say, Geist of a 
humanistic approach to the study of politics. This book is one example of 
doing political science in such a way, applied to the task of interpreting 
the situation of Québec and of Québecers within the Canadian federation.
The book belongs squarely to the discipline of political science with 
chapters studying the theory and practice of Canadian federalism, as well 
as analysing various aspects of nationalism in Québec. It borrows heavily 
from the domain of constitutional law in chapters dealing with Canada’s 
fundamental laws of 1867 and 1982. Intellectual history has always fas-
cinated me, and I hope that readers who share my interest will appreci-
ate the chapters that deal with the figures such as Lord Durham, Gérard 
Bouchard, Charles Taylor, James Tully, and Michel Seymour. For those 
who prefer sociology and philosophy, the book contains chapters on polit-
ical and social integration, trust and mistrust, political freedom, and com-
plex equality. Internal exile, distress, and enchantment are also of course 
literary notions, and such ideas play a central role in my reflections.
Much of Western civilization would continue to exist if Québec and 
Canada were obliterated from the surface of the earth. Our political exist-
ence thus takes place at the margins of History and at the periphery of 
dominant nation -states such as the United States, France, Germany, and 
the United Kingdom. I nevertheless believe that our political history, with 
its drama and its problems, can inform political science as a discipline and 
the international community’s learned public sphere. For thirty years, I 
Interpreting Quebec’s Exile Within the Federation
14
have lectured about this history and about these lessons at most universi-
ties in Québec and across Canada. Even in our current circumstances of 
growing indifference between our societies and scholarly communities, I 
believe that the conversation must be sustained and that efforts must be 
made to bridge gaps in our reciprocal understandings. The essays brought 
together in this book represent another personal effort towards attaining 
this goal.
The first chapter explains its title and goes to the heart of the situa-
tion facing Québecers and their place within the Canadian federation. In 
1954, Maurice Lamontagne, the late Canadian senator and Université 
Laval economist, argued that Québec’s situation within Canada is hybrid 
and ambiguous (Lamontagne 1954). Sixty years later, his reflections 
still make sense. Geography and the fundamentals of the Canadian con-
stitutional framework are here to stay. Nevertheless, Québec remains 
awkwardly integrated into the country as a whole. Québec as a political 
community, and Québecers as citizens and political actors, thus seem to 
me to be in a situation of internal exile. After explaining at greater length 
what this notion entails, I attempt to identify the precise changes that 
could be made to the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms to rem-
edy this situation. The first time I evoked this idea, a few years ago at 
a Trudeau Foundation event in Winnipeg, some civil servants from the 
federal Department of Justice told me that it was the first time, in a couple 
of decades, that they had heard such specific suggestions. I believe that 
Québec’s self -representation as an intercultural nation should be affirmed 
in the Charter’s core. It should also be used as an interpretive principle 
linked to the understanding of the concept of reasonable limits to rights 
and liberties in the first section of the Charter, in its linguistic regime 
(sections 16 to 23), and, finally, in its disposition related to promoting the 
multicultural heritage of Canadians.
My ideas concerning the contemporary challenges and utility of fed-
eralism are straightforwardly presented in the second chapter. I revised 
these pages in the weeks following the death of Richard Simeon, one 
of Canada’s preeminent scholars of federalism, who passed away on 
October 11, 2013. He will be sorely missed. In both of Canada’s offi-
cial languages, with rigour, subtlety, and respect for dissent, Simeon 
spent forty years putting his brilliant mind to the task of researching the 
theory, practice, and machinery of federalism in Canada and the world. 
He promoted the virtues of dialogue and reciprocal understanding. He 
played an instrumental role in developing the language of trade -offs in 
the relationships between Anglophones and Francophones and between 
Canada’s and Québec’s national projects. In the coming years – and in 
particular at a colloquium taking place in mid -October 2014 in Québec 
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City commemorating the 150th anniversary of the Québec Conference of 
1864 that led to the Dominion of Canada three years later, which is being 
organized by Eugénie Brouillet (the Dean of Law at Laval), Alain -G. 
Gagnon (UQAM Political Scientist), and myself – we hope to have many 
opportunities to pay homage to Simeon’s work.1 We often debated the fact 
that, although I believe that he was right in arguing that provinces profit 
from high legal, political, jurisdictional, fiscal and bureaucratic capacity, 
our political system nevertheless remains highly centralized mostly in 
the organization and management of intergovernmental affairs and in the 
workings of the judicial branch of government. We last discussed these 
matters at a conference organized in 2011 by Michael Burgess and Cesar 
Colino at Howfield Manor, near Canterbury, on the English soil where 
he was born. The topic of the conference dealt with historical legacies 
crucial to understanding federal regimes – the topic of the third chapter.
In 1998, the Supreme Court of Canada, in its Reference re Secession 
of Québec, made an insightful contribution to the discussion concerning 
Canada’s most important historical legacies. It suggested that our polit-
ical and constitutional order has four foundational principles: federalism, 
democracy, constitutionalism and the rule and law, and respect for the 
rights of minorities. Readers will find a deeper analysis of the Supreme 
Court’s judgment in a later chapter of this book interpreting the ideas 
of James Tully and Michel Seymour. Although I would never deny the 
Supreme Court’s authority, I propose a supplementary reading on the 
topic of historical legacies in the third chapter. First, I identify various 
dimensions of Canada’s past and present British heritage. I then attempt 
to delineate the idea of the centrality of the state for the development of an 
original national project, in the shadow of the United States. Hopefully, 
readers will agree that I talk about the same country as the Supreme 
Court. They will also note some nuances and differences. In agreement 
with the Supreme Court, I recognize that federalism, or the principle of 
autonomy, represents one of Canada’s key historical legacies. However, 
contrary to the Supreme Court, I do not believe that, either at the time of 
the founding or later on in the evolution of the country, it has ever been 
the equivalent of the Star of Bethlehem guiding our political leaders. On 
the topic of federalism in Canada, I also discuss the various tensions and 
interpretive prisms that were central to Simeon’s scholarly endeavours. 
1 The colloquium’s program can be downloaded at the following internet address: http://
www.conferencedequebec.org/. The colloquium belongs to the research program of 
the Groupe de recherche sur les sociétés plurinationales, whose scientific director is 
Alain -G. Gagnon at the Université du Québec in Montréal. The colloquium is spon-
sored by the Government of Québec’s Secrétariat aux affaires intergouvernementales 
canadiennes (SAIC).
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Finally, and hopefully less obliquely than the Supreme Court, I examine 
the Janus -faced dimensions of Québec for the Canadian national project. 
In my judgment, it is crucial never to forget that Québec simultaneously 
reassures and threatens the very idea of a distinct and united Canada. This 
leads me to explore the topics of English -French duality in Canada and 
of the centrality of the state for Québec in the pursuit of its own national 
project.
Astute political leaders and thinkers can make these national projects 
compatible. I argue in the fourth chapter, discussing the historical and 
legal origins of asymmetrical federalism in and around the British North 
America Act, 1867 (now the Constitution Act, 1867), that our founders 
possessed such astuteness. Meeting at Brock University in the spring of 
2014, under the presidency of my colleague and friend Alain Noël from 
the Université de Montréal, the Canadian Political Science Association 
organized a panel on the ideas of Janet Ajzenstat, whose work in political 
theory and constitutional history is indispensable to understanding the 
spirit of our founding (Ajzenstat 2014). The Canadian political experi-
ment is linked to a complex issue that has long troubled Ajzenstat: the 
question of whether or not liberal universalism can be reconciled with 
particularism (see, also, Ajzenstat 1999; LaSelva 1995; Burelle 2005; 
Noël 2006). I lay the historical ground for attempting to answer this ques-
tion with regards to Québec’s situation within Canada.
If the federal principle played a significant part in the advent of the 
Dominion of Canada in 1867, it has had a complex and storied evolu-
tion in Québec throughout the 20th century (see Gagnon 2009; Karmis 
and Rocher 2012). Many people, including myself, have lamented the 
disengagement of Québec from Canada over the last decade. Chapter five 
examines the renewed interest in the study of federalism in Québec at 
the start of the 21st century. It is only fair to recognize the leadership 
of André Pratte, chief editorialist at La Presse, in this endeavour (Pratte 
2007).2 This chapter discusses the writings of various historians, philoso-
phers, political scientists, and legal experts such as Eugénie Brouillet, 
Alain Noël, Jean Leclair, François Rocher, Alain -G. Gagnon, Michel 
Seymour, Marie -Bernard Meunier, Pierre -Gerlier Forest, Stéphane Dion, 
and André Burelle. I owe a great deal to another colleague and friend, 
François Rocher, who, like Simeon (who repeated the argument at vari-
ous conferences sponsored by the Forum of Federations), believes that in 
complex federations scholars of federalism from the majority nation tend 
2 André Pratte played a key role in creating a new think tank on federalism in Québec 
called L’idée fédérale/The Federal Idea. He remains its president. See their website at 
the following internet address: http://www.ideefederale.ca/index_a.php.
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to favour the goal of unity and the strategy of integration, while scholars 
from the minority nation favour the goal of autonomy and the strategy of 
empowerment (Rocher 2009, 121).
The next chapter is an attempt to come to terms with the emblematic 
historical figure of Lord Durham. A first version of this text was prepared 
for the re -edition of the Durham Report by McGill -Queen’s University 
Press under Janet Ajzenstat’s leadership in 2007. After summarizing Lord 
Durham’s personal trajectory and political thought, I reassess the evolv-
ing interpretation of his famous report in French Canada and Québec. 
One finds here at work the twin poles of my approach to the study of 
politics, combining intellectual history with political theory to create 
a dynamic of reciprocal enrichment and elucidation. For a good many 
years, at the Université Laval, my courses on nationalism included a com-
parative section devoted to examining and comparing the case of Québec 
with those of Scotland and Catalonia. This remains highly relevant in 
light of Scotland’s referendum on independence being held on September 
18, 2014 and the continuous deterioration of the relationships between the 
Spanish and Catalan national projects. However, interpreting the Durham 
Report has led me to explore new comparative horizons in Central and 
Eastern Europe, looking at how the cases of Poland and Hungary, among 
others, relate to nationalism in Québec. In all these cases the central chal-
lenge remains, repeating the apt formula of the late French philosopher 
Paul Ricoeur, constructing a just and happy national historical mem-
ory. This must be done in a critical manner, simultaneously keeping at 
a fair distance the sirens of post -nationalism and of anti -nationalism. In 
these matters, interpreting the Durham Report will always be a test and 
a crucial task.
The seventh chapter of the book takes stock of the Bouchard -Taylor 
Commission and its final report entitled Building the Future: A Time 
for Reconciliation (Bouchard and Taylor 2008). In 2007-2008, the 
Commission explored key issues related to managing diversity in Québec, 
concentrating on the relationships between the French -Canadian major-
ity’s heritage and that of religious and cultural minorities. This work is 
obviously related to the more recent debate on the adoption of a Québec 
Charter of Values, introduced in the late summer of 2013 by the former 
Parti Québécois government led by Pauline Marois. There is no doubt in 
my mind – a rare occurrence – that the task of defining political judgment 
in Québec, on difficult matters related to integration and the place of reli-
gion in the public sphere, consists in finding balance between considera-
tion for our particular situation in North America, on the one hand, and 
the ideals of justice and the principles of liberal democracy, on the other 
hand. I belong to a family of thinkers who argue that such is the leitmotif 
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of Québec’s entire historical trajectory (see Gagnon 2011; Létourneau 
2006; Thériault 2002). I try to go beyond the Report to understand its 
place in the intellectual evolution of each of its two co -presidents, Gérard 
Bouchard and Charles Taylor.
If it does make sense to characterize the situation of Québec and its 
citizens within Canada as a form of internal exile, this has much to do 
with the constitutional negotiations of November 1981, which led to the 
patriation of the Constitution in 1982. I have written extensively about 
this but, to reassure the readers, I hope I am doing it in an original way in 
the eighth chapter of this book (Laforest 1995a). Relying substantially on 
the writings of André Burelle, one of Pierre Elliot Trudeau’s former advis-
ors and speechwriters, whose works should be translated into English and 
published, I first explore the causes and consequences of those fateful 
events of 1981-1982. With Burelle’s help, I try to provide a better grasp 
of Trudeau’s role and his various motivations during the whole affair. 
So far, one could say, there is nothing particularly new here. I do enter 
new ground in evaluating René Lévesque and his Parti Québécois gov-
ernment’s share of responsibility for events that took place between 1976 
and 1985. In a previous book, I established a comparison between the 
rebellions of 1837-1838, considered as the failed rebellions of an imperial 
age, and the referendums of 1980 and 1995, seen as the failed rebellions 
of a democratic era (Laforest 2004, 332-333). Over the long run, I view 
this pattern as a tragic dimension of our history. From La Fontaine to 
Cartier, between 1841 and 1867, many rebels of 1837-1838 were able at 
least to attenuate (in the mind of pessimists), and possibly also bypass (in 
the mind of optimists), the consequences of our failed 19th century rebel-
lions. If the Meech Lake Accord had seen the constitutional light of day, 
at any moment between 1987 and 1990, I surmise that we would have 
entered into a similar dynamic. In contemporary Québec, could political 
figures such as the new premier, Philippe Couillard, and the leader of the 
Coalition Avenir Québec, François Legault, play roles similar to those of 
La Fontaine and Cartier in the 19th century? As I write these lines in early 
May 2014, I have not completely abandoned all hope for such changes 
during my lifetime. Of course, with regards to interpreting our key consti-
tutional struggles, I recognize that all this remains open to debate. I claim 
no imperial interpretive authority (for related views, see Gagnon 2011; 
Webber 1993; LaSelva 1995; Millard 2008).
Beyond the horizons of politicians, historians, legal scholars, and pol-
itical scientists, the last decades have also seen philosophers do their fair 
share to understand Québec’s quest for greater political freedom within 
Canada’s constitutional order. James Tully, formerly from McGill and 
now teaching at the University of Victoria, and Michel Seymour, from 
the Université de Montréal, are two of the most prominent and rigorous 
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of these philosophers. The ninth chapter explores the issue of Québec’s 
freedom within Canada. Tully (with Charles Taylor) supervised my thesis 
at McGill and I cannot overstate the size of my debt to him.3 Seymour 
is one of the most brilliant and sympathetic colleagues of my genera-
tion, and I consider his book on toleration and recognition to be the best 
political theory book written by either a Québecer or by a Canadian in 
the 21st century. Both remain my friends. In looking at their work, I ask 
whether the Canadian constitution is a straightjacket for Québec. How 
should we integrate recent Supreme Court jurisprudence into any discus-
sion of these matters? Does the Clarity Act make a difference? Tully has 
in many instances attempted to answer at least some of these questions, 
and Seymour has been quite critical of Tully. I discuss their respective 
views before moving on to some conclusions of my own.
When I started teaching political science at the University of Calgary 
almost thirty years ago, Stephen Harper was a graduate student in the 
Department of Economics where he was already quite involved in 
Canadian politics. During my stay in Calgary, he worked hard, with others, 
to found the Reform Party in 1987. In 2014, after almost a decade in 
power, he stands as the most powerful and successful Canadian politician 
of the early 21st century. In the book’s tenth and last chapter, I explore the 
uneasy relationship between Harper and Québec, which hovers between 
various shades of trust and mistrust. Considering the hopes that existed 
during the years characterized by Harper’s open federalism (or, better put, 
federalism of openness) between 2005 and 2007, it is understandable that 
the current Prime Minister should feel disappointed with the performance 
of his party in Québec. However, as I argue in the chapter, there have 
been many collisions between Harper and successive Québec govern-
ments on policy matters over the last few years. Moreover, Québecers do 
not seem to be very influential in his inner circle, with the current excep-
tion of Denis Lebel, his Québec lieutenant. What should Harper do for 
Québecers and Québec authorities so that they trust him more? I cannot 
speak for others, so I only speak for myself. In late November 2006, the 
House of Commons passed a motion, presented by Stephen Harper, stat-
ing “that this House recognize that the Québécois form a nation within a 
united Canada”.4 The use of the French word, Québécois (instead of the 
English equivalent, Québecers or Québeckers), systematically used by 
3 In late April 2014 in Montréal, the Groupe de recherche sur les sociétés plurinationales 
organized, under the leadership of Dimitrios Karmis (Université d’Ottawa) and 
Jocelyn Maclure (Université Laval), a major conference on Tully’s political thought: 
http://www.evenements.uqam.ca/?com=detail&eID=414436.
4 See the CBC News (2006) story entitled “House passes motion recognizing Québécois 
as nation.”
Interpreting Quebec’s Exile Within the Federation
20
Québec governments when it addresses itself to all citizens of Québec 
notwithstanding their origin, represents, in my judgement, an indirect 
attempt to reduce the population concerned to those of French -Canadian 
ethnic descent, as was frequently done at the peak of our constitutional 
struggles by those who advocated the partition of a sovereign Québec 
and its reduction, essentially, to the North Shore of the Saint Lawrence 
River between Baie -Comeau and the east end of the Island of Montréal.5 
If Harper meant to recognize all of us living in Québec as part of the 
Québec nation, he should say so explicitly.
5 For a similar argument, see Bercuson and Cooper (2002). The first edition of this book 
was published in 1991. Bercuson and Cooper teach at the University of Calgary, and, 
like Harper, they belong to the intellectual vanguard of the new conservatism that came 
from Western Canada in the 1980s. To the best of my knowledge, Harper has never 
clearly said who exactly he wanted to recognize in 2006. He should. The harsh tone of 
Bercuson and Cooper has not disappeared from our public sphere. Conservative guru 
Brian Lee Crowley also writes in the spirit of their Deconfederation essay. See one 
of his recent opinions in the Postmedia Network at http://www.macdonaldlaurier.ca/
crowley -in -the -citizen -toward -greater -clarity -on -Québec/ 
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chapter 1
The Internal Exile of Québecers  
in the Canada of the Charter
I begin this chapter on a personal note. More than thirty years ago, 
when the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms came into effect, 
I was living in Montréal and studying at McGill University. Among my 
professors were two great intellectuals who were also great idealists, 
Charles Taylor and James Tully.1 I learned much from them, and, over 
time, they became friends. Other professors influenced me perhaps less 
directly though just as meaningfully, namely Blema Steinberg, Daniel 
Latouche, James Mallory, and Harold Waller. Their approach was tinged 
with realism, which perfectly supplemented Taylor and Tully’s approach. 
In philosophy, the realist approach is that of liberalism without illusions 
as expounded by Judith Shklar, Raymond Aron, Isaiah Berlin, and Karl 
Popper. In politics, according to these authors, one must first and fore-
most avoid the worst and must understand that cruelty, fear, terror, and 
violence can crush a person and attack his or her dignity and privacy. 
In this respect, I share the judgment of Irvin Studin, who wrote that 
Canada is a tremendous success on the scale of humanity. As a country, 
it is among the most “peaceful, just and civilized” (Studin 2006, 184). A 
country where, to add my own voice, the strong as well as the weak can 
sleep soundly in a decent, comfortable, and humane social environment 
without fear of the worst. All of this counts, therefore, as a tremendous 
development in the history of humankind.
I start on this note because I want to provide a sense of proportion 
for the analysis that will be developed regarding the internal exile of 
Québecers in the Canada of the Charter. Like a number of other people 
in Québec, in terms of political identity and belonging, I am not a happy 
citizen in the Canada of the Charter (see Burelle 1994; Dufour 2000). 
Beyond my personal feelings, I think this is explained by the fact that 
Québec is not properly integrated into the new Canada that has arisen 
since the constitutional reforms of 1982. Paradoxically, these reforms 
saw the light of day, to a large extent, due to the dynamism and pressure 
1 For other analyses inspired by Taylor and Tully, see Gagnon (2007) and Laforest 
(2004).
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exerted by Québec on Canada in the aftermath of the Quiet Revolution. 
This chapter will argue that instead of improving the situation, the 1982 
constitutional reforms worsened it and resulted in the internal exile of 
Québecers within the Canada of the Charter. The term internal exile 
describes very well the basis of my thoughts – someone who is exiled 
from the inside is someone who feels uncomfortable and who lives like a 
stranger in his or her own country.
This chapter is divided into three sections. The first section argues that 
the first thirty years of the Charter led to the exile of Québecers within 
Canada. The Trudeau vision of the constitution embraced Canadian sover-
eignty as the means of challenging Québec nationalism and this led to the 
end of the Canadian dream that was created through the Confederation 
of the British North American colonies in 1867. The second section con-
tends that the exile of Québecers can be ended by amending the Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms to recognize the distinct status of Québec 
within section 1, the reasonable limits clause, and section 27, the inter-
pretive clause that requires the Charter to be applied in a manner consist-
ent with Canada’s multicultural heritage. The final section reflects on the 
Charter’s virtues, concluding that its implementation without the consent 
of the Québec National Assembly represents, to invoke Donald Smiley 
(1983, 78, 90), a dangerous deed – one that led to the internal exile of 
Québecers within Canada in the era of the Charter and that continues to 
be a fundamental obstacle to Canada being a just federal society.
I.  Pierre Trudeau, the Exile of Québecers,  
and the Charter
And once again, it means an even greater tendency, a greater weight on 
the side of provincialism, at the expense of a federal institution or legisla-
tion which, up until now, has given Canadians a feeling of belonging to one 
Canada. In the same way, the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms was 
important to Canadian unity, as were the patriation of the Constitution and 
the new Canadian flag. All of those things are important in the sense that they 
help Canadians to realize that they share with all other Canadians, throughout 
the country, the same set of fundamental values (Trudeau 1990a, 31).
The internal exile of Québecers is made immensely more complex 
if we add the dominant role played by Pierre Elliott Trudeau, undoubt-
edly one of the greatest political figures of Québec and Canada in the 
20th century. In terms of belonging and identity, Québecers were to some 
extent exiled by one of their own. Federalism held an important position 
in Trudeau’s life, except that a study of his actions and writings in the 
1980s, juxtaposed against the overall horizon of his political -intellectual 
life, reveals him to be a nationalist and a Canadian sovereigntist more 
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than a federalist. This is clearly illustrated in an important book that 
André Burelle (2005), philosopher and at one time a speechwriter for 
the former prime minister, devoted to Trudeau’s work. I will return to 
Burelle’s analysis in a moment.
At the end of his career, Trudeau dreamed of cementing once and for 
all the sovereignty of both the Canadian nation and the central govern-
ment. In the debate over the Meech Lake Accord, he often wondered: 
“How do you make a country stronger by weakening the only govern-
ment that can talk for all Canadians?” (Trudeau 1990b, 94). Rather than 
trying to find in federalism and its institutions a balance between a design 
for a Canadian nation and a Québec nation, he decided after the 1980 
referendum to resort to Canadian nationalism to change the country and 
to prevail over Québec sovereigntists definitively.2 The Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms was the instrument of such a plan, as political scientist 
Alan Cairns recalled in an interview with the historian Robert Bothwell:
The prime one, the obvious one, is what the Charter appears to be on its face, 
a way of protecting citizens’ rights against the state. From Trudeau’s perspec-
tive, however, the much more important goal was the attempt to generate 
a national identity, and this really meant an attack on provincialism. It was 
a way of trying to get Canadians to think of themselves as possessors of a 
common body of rights independent of geographical location, which would 
constitute a lens through which they would then view what all governments 
were doing. So it was really a de -provincializing strategy, primarily aimed at 
Québec nationalists, but also at the general centrifugal pressures that were 
developing across the federal system (Bothwell 1995, 180).
In his 2005 book, Burelle lucidly explains the political events of 1980 
that led Trudeau to break the delicate balance that had previously pre-
vailed in his mind between, on the one hand, the community -minded per-
sonalism of the Citélibrist period or the views of Jacques Maritain and 
Emmanuel Mounier that were reconcilable with the federalism of 1867 
and a certain acceptance of the difference of the Québec nation and, on the 
other hand, an ultra -individualist and symmetrical liberalism making the 
case for Canadian nation -building (Burelle 2005, 68-70). In the spirit of 
Burelle, the “one nation” federalism of the Constitution Act, 1982, draws 
upon republican unitarism and starts from the premise of an individual-
istic and anti -communitarian liberalism. According to Burelle, this is 
operationalized in the following manner. First, all individuals are brought 
into a single civic nation, which delegates to the federal parliament the 
entirety of its national sovereignty. Invested with this sovereignty, the 
2 See also Laforest (1992) and Laforest (2004: 219-236).
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central Parliament then entrusts the provinces with the functional powers 
better exercised by them (Burelle 2005, 459).
What kind of federalism flows from such logic? According to Burelle, 
a federalism that does not respect Québec’s difference and disregards 
the principle of non -subordination between two levels of government, 
both sovereign in their respective jurisdictions. In other words, a federal-
ism that moves away from what the founders of the Canadian federation 
wanted to build in 1867. Burelle feels that the spirit of 1982 flouts that of 
1867 through the intersecting operation of the following principles:
• The practice of a misguided subsidiarity, i.e., devolution of down-
ward sovereignty (top -down) from the central government;
• The existence of a senior “national” government and junior “prov-
incial” governments;
• The granting to Ottawa of the right to intervene to ensure “the na-
tional interest” in areas of provincial jurisdiction;
• The identity of law and treatment of individuals and provinces 
merged within a single, republican nation (Burelle 2005, 459).
On the whole, Burelle’s interpretation strikes me as reasonably fair to 
Trudeau’s intentions. However, he said this somewhat differently in his 
1994 book when he spoke of government by judges via a “national charter” 
and a government by the “Canadian people,” enabling Ottawa to circum-
vent the division of powers (Burelle 1994, 64). However, I would introduce 
an important nuance to this argument. A distinction must be made between 
Trudeau’s vision of the Charter and the actual content of the document.
I think Burelle understands Trudeau and his vision of the Charter 
better than the content of the Charter, since the document is not simply 
limited to individual rights. There is room in the Charter for the multi-
cultural heritage of Canadians and for the collective rights of Aboriginal 
peoples. However, there is no room for the idea of distinct treatment for 
Québec and for the principles that should flow from the legal conse-
quences of this difference. Before exploring the means that might bring 
an end to the internal exile of Québecers in the Canada of the Charter, 
I conclude here with two analyses in the spirit of 1982 by Eugénie 
Brouillet and José Woehrling, two of the best public law professors in 
Québec today.
According to Brouillet, the Charter cannot accommodate Québec’s 
differences because judicial review in a federal system results in 
centralization:
It is precisely because of the Canadian Charter’s potential to integrate that 
the federal government made it the cornerstone of the constitutional reform 
of 1982. On the political level, the recognition of super -legislative rights and 
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freedoms for all Canadian citizens would form the basis of their common 
identity and strengthen the unity of the Canadian nation (Brouillet 2005, 325).
This position is supported by Woehrling, but in a more indirect man-
ner. Woehrling argues that human rights projects are used by the majority 
culture to regulate the activities of minority groups within a federal state:
To the extent that the protection of rights by a constitutional instrument is an 
anti -majoritarian tool, it limits the political autonomy of minorities who have 
one or more territorial entities. The minority who controls such an entity sees 
its political power restricted to its own minorities and its own members […] 
The majority at the national level could give in to the temptation to use its 
power to impose on its minority the respect for excessive guarantees for the 
benefit of the minority ‘within the minority.’ One has the impression some-
times that the majority group at the national level defends its own interests 
under the pretext of human rights and minority rights (Woehrling 2005, 115).
II.  To End the Exile
Although Québec’s exile still persists, it is only fair to acknowledge 
a number of positive outcomes for Québec in Canadian politics, mostly 
between 2004 and 2008: the asymmetrical Canada -Québec Health 
Agreement signed in 2004 by the governments of Paul Martin and Jean 
Charest; Stephen Harper’s declaration of the doctrine of open federal-
ism during the January 2006 electoral campaign that led to the election 
of a Conservative government in Ottawa; the Harper -Charest Agreement 
in May 2006, accepting the principle of a special international role for 
Québec and incorporating a representative of the Government of Québec 
into the Canadian delegation to UNESCO; the House of Commons reso-
lution in November 2006 stating that the Québécois form a nation within 
a united Canada (despite the ambiguities that persist between the English 
and French versions of the text); and, finally, addressing the fiscal imbal-
ance during the February 2007 federal budget (Laforest and Montigny 
2005, 364-368).3
In my view, there is no doubt that these developments helped allevi-
ate the discomfort and changed the climate in which our political life 
operates. They do not, however, take into account the issue of Québec’s 
place in Canada’s constitutional architecture. To make progress in that 
direction, one has to amend the Constitution Act, 1982 and the Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The first section of the Charter states 
that rights are “subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as 
3 See, also, Banting et al. (2006), particularly Alain Noël’s chapter (2006, 25-37). 
Likewise, see Murphy (2007) and Gagnon (2009).
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can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.” Because 
the Supreme Court recognized federalism as the primary arrangement 
of the Canadian political community and the main normative pillar of 
our constitutional structure in the Reference re Secession of Québec, 
an amended section 1 of the Charter should refer to a “free and demo-
cratic federation” rather than a “free and democratic society.” This small 
change should have two major effects. First, it should instruct judges of 
the need to seriously consider the neuralgic nature of the federal principle 
in their understanding of the rules that govern our legal system. Second, it 
should have educational value, inviting the public to better understand the 
importance of federalism in the Canadian political identity. This action 
would additionally result in Québecers feeling less alone in taking feder-
alism seriously in their understanding of Canada!
The second change that I propose flows logically from the debate that 
marked Canadian public life in the fall of 2006 – the desirability of recog-
nizing the Québec nation. Launched by Michael Ignatieff during his can-
didacy for the leadership of the Liberal Party of Canada, the debate ended 
with a modified motion presented by Prime Minister Harper in the House 
of Commons that recognized the Québécois as a nation within a united 
Canada. To truly end the internal exile of Québecers, we need to place 
their way of defining themselves in a text that really matters to Canadians, 
the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Section 1 of the Charter 
could be amended to recognize that Québec forms a distinct society in 
Canada, as well as explicitly stating that the Government of Québec and 
the National Assembly are obligated to protect and promote Québec as a 
distinct society. This is the phrase that was preferred by Claude Ryan and 
André Laurendeau during the proceedings of the Royal Commission on 
Bilingualism and Biculturalism fifty years ago.
Some would suggest that this proposal represents the ghost of the dis-
tinct society clause from the failed Meech Lake Accord. They are not 
wrong. Many Québecers see the Charter of Rights and Freedoms – and 
principally section 1 – as an attempt to create a single great Canadian 
nation that incorporates all other affiliations, particularly those flowing 
from modern Québec nationalism. In this respect, the adoption of the 
Meech Lake Accord would have rectified the issue and thus the internal 
exile of Québecers. One day the question will resurface and it will be part 
of the constitutional doctrine of a future Québec government. It is inter-
esting to recall, on the issue of the distinct society clause and its recogni-
tion, what Stéphane Dion, former leader of the Liberal Party of Canada, 
said when he was part of Jean Chrétien’s cabinet in 1996:
What is the essence of the distinct society clause? This provision would be a 
section for interpretation, similar to section 27 of the Charter of Rights and 
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Freedoms, which recognizes multiculturalism. It guarantees that in the grey 
areas of the Constitution, in areas where it is necessary to interpret the rules, 
the Supreme Court will take into account the distinct nature of Québec in areas 
such as language, culture and civil law. This will be a useful clarification, but 
one that would not alter the division of powers under the Constitution. This is 
not a request for special status or unique privileges (Dion 1996, B7).
Since the era of British rule in the late 18th century, we have rejected 
policies of assimilation and homogenization that generally dominated the 
period of consolidating the modern nation -state in Europe. The Québec 
Act of 1774 guaranteed Her Majesty’s new subjects of French origin 
religious freedom and the maintenance of their civil law.4 When Canada 
became a federal Dominion in 1867, a similar spirit of openness, recog-
nition of diversity, and respect for minority rights was expressed in the 
division of powers. Provinces were provided jurisdiction over property 
and civil rights, and there were sections protecting religious minorities. 
This was clearly a demand not only from Canada East – Québec’s former 
name – but also from other British North American colonies that entered 
Confederation in 1867. It is quite possible to trace the historical and legal 
origins of asymmetrical federalism in Canada to the wording of section 94 
of the Constitution Act, 1867, which omitted Québec from the harmon-
ization of laws related to property and civil rights between the federal 
government and the common -law provinces during Confederation (i.e., 
Ontario, Nova Scotia, and New Brunswick).5 This Canadian originality 
in the history of the modern nation -state was notably expressed in 1982 
in section 27 of the Charter, which stipulates that “[t]his Charter shall be 
interpreted in a manner consistent with the preservation and enhancement 
of the multicultural heritage of Canadians.”
The third change that could put an end to the internal exile of 
Québecers in the Canada of the Charter deals with section 27. If the 
debate on the Québec nation has raised significant interest in the coun-
try’s English and French media, just as much can be said for the work of 
the Consultation Commission on Accommodation Practices Related to 
Cultural Differences, which was co -chaired in the province of Québec 
by Gérard Bouchard and Charles Taylor, and whose report is analysed in 
chapter seven. This history has accelerated in the second half of the 20th 
century and will not change. I believe that this social phenomenon is good 
and that it honours all of the people who live in Canada and who have had 
to confront this troubled world of ours. However, I also believe that, in its 
portrayal of the rights and obligations that flow from section 27 regarding 
4 For a philosophical view, see Tully (1999, 142-145).
5 See Ajzenstat et al. (2004, 336-337, 378). 
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the multicultural heritage of Canadians, the Charter misses a fundamental 
reality, namely that this heritage is embodied in Canada and the institu-
tional networks of two host societies. In addition to the Canadian society, 
there is a Québec host society that happens to affirm the predominance 
of the French language. Section 27 should reflect the duality of host soci-
eties in Canada. Clarifying section 27 of the Charter strikes me as being 
essential for the fair and stable integration of Québec in Canada today.
Canada is a free and democratic federation integrating Québec’s dis-
tinct national society and a multicultural heritage embodied in two host 
societies of which one lives mainly in French. This is what is lacking in 
the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, if I understand the situa-
tion, in order to go beyond the political alienation of Québecers. Such 
changes would not end political conflicts in the Canadian federal system, 
including those between Québec and its Confederation partners. Those 
who want to put an end, once and for all, to “political -constitutional 
squabbles” forget that political life will always be a matter of dialogue 
and debate that may lead to clashes. However, such changes would have 
the effect of healing an injury and restoring confidence in the Constitution 
as higher law and in Canadian institutions. I willingly admit that the per-
spective chosen for analysis in this chapter is far from exhausting the 
totality of reality. As Catalans and many federated states of the world 
have done, Québecers could also demonstrate daring and imagination by 
acquiring, in an autonomous manner, an internal constitution strength-
ening the backbone of its societal institutions (Laforest 2004, 256). 
Finally, Québecers more confident in their future and better integrated 
should be more open to the desire for change by other Canadians, which 
is certainly just as legitimate as their own desire. Québecers, who are no 
longer internally exiled, should be capable of proclaiming, in their own 
way, their allegiance to Canada and of engaging as well in joint efforts in 
the 21st century.
Conclusion
I will try one last time here to render comprehensible this notion of 
the internal exile of Québecers by recalling another historical event, 
General Charles de Gaulle’s famous cry, on the balcony of Montréal’s 
City Hall in July 1967, of “Vive le Québec libre!” It is appropriate to 
be a little nostalgic when reflecting on the events of 1967. It was the 
centenary of the so -called Canadian Confederation and the World’s Fair 
in Montréal, a time when people from here and abroad were invited to 
live with hope and idealism at the height of Saint -Exupery’s lyricism in 
Terre des Hommes. It seems to me that de Gaulle’s speech had such an 
impact because it responded to three deep aspirations of Québec society: 
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it solemnly affirmed Québec’s right to be different within Canada and 
North America, it gave a strong taste of political freedom which can take 
several forms in the modern world, and, finally, it answered a universal 
desire for recognition. In 1967, de Gaulle gave a planetary dimension to 
the Québec question. When we attempt to understand the deep signifi-
cance of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms for Canada, we realize that 
it has reinforced similar aspirations for the majoritarian nationalism of 
those Canadians living outside Québec and a substantial minority within 
Québec.
By proposing an intelligent balance between individual rights, collect-
ive rights, and rights for people within minority communities, and doing 
so in an original way when compared to the American Bill of Rights, the 
Charter represented a strong affirmation of Canadian difference within 
Western liberal democracies. Second, the Charter helped to complete, on 
the axis of political freedom, the absolute independence of the Canadian 
nation -state. Finally, both the Charter and its influence on the world have 
fuelled Canadians’ desire for recognition, in making their country the 
vanguard of a different kind of civilization for the 21st century. This is 
what we can conclude by reading the best thinkers of Canada’s idealist 
school, such as Charles Taylor, James Tully, Will Kymlicka, John Ralston 
Saul, and Michael Ignatieff. The Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of 
Canada, Beverley McLachlin, was writing in this tradition in a speech 
that she delivered on April 17, 2002, on the occasion of the 20th anniver-
sary of the Charter’s proclamation:
We have a Charter that reflects our most fundamental values, that tells us who 
and what we are as a people. We have a Charter that the world admires. Most 
important of all, we have a Charter that Canadians in the last two decades 
have come to embrace as their own. La Charte: c’est à nous. La Charte: c’est 
nous (The Charter belongs to us; the Charter is us).6
We can therefore understand that the Charter is a source of great pride 
in Canada and that many people have the urge to say, like the Chief Justice 
in 2002, that the Charter belongs to us and that the Charter is us. Except 
that, seen from Québec, this Charter was adopted in an anti -democratic 
way without our consent, in defiance of the opposition of our government 
and the National Assembly. Commenting on the patriation of the constitu-
tion without Québec’s consent, Claude Ryan stated:
We must conclude with great certainty that each time the essential preroga-
tives of the National Assembly are attacked, the people of Québec are them-
selves attacked. To be indifferent to such an attack on the powers of the 
6 This quote is taken from English version of the original speech: http://www.scc -csc.
gc.ca/court -cour/judges -juges/spe -dis/index -eng.aspx. 
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National Assembly is to be indifferent to, or to make light of, the aspirations 
and the fundamental reality of the people of Québec themselves.7
Québec’s legislative autonomy in language matters was reduced, the 
federal principle in our institutions was weakened, and, in our political 
culture, Québec’s right to difference was not included in the Charter. 
More specifically, the Canada of 1982 and the Charter do not explicitly 
recognize either Québec’s difference or the fact that this difference should 
lead to political and legal consequences. Canadian idealism, which sees 
our political system and especially the Charter as a standard -bearer for 
humanity as a whole, seems condemned to remain deeply inauthentic as 
long as we have not found a fair and reasonable way to recognize Québec’s 
difference, legally and symbolically (Dufour 2000, 114). Without being 
able to deal here with all aspects of this issue, it seems clear to me that 
Québecers have chosen to live their quest for identity and freedom from 
within Canada. Québec is in Canada to stay, even if it recognizes itself 
imperfectly in Canadian institutions.
Charles Taylor, a great mind from McGill University and Québec, 
stressed once, reflecting on Québec’s nationalism, that we need to be 
ruthless towards our essentialist myths. Canada’s majoritarian national-
ism has locked itself into a similar essentialist myth when it imagines that 
we can hide the deep political alienation within Canada, the internal exile 
of Québecers.8 Another great mind of Western humanism, Paul Ricoeur, 
wrote that the historical memory of any people must be fair and happy. 
The internal exile of Québecers, therefore, is a fundamental obstacle to 
the development of a fair and happy historical memory in Canada after 
more than thirty years of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.
7 Speech at the Assemblée nationale du Québec on September 30, 1981. Quoted in 
Bélander et al. (1994, 39).
8 For two intelligent and exemplary illustrations of this majoritarian Canadian national-
ism, see Crowley (2009) and Bricker and Ibbitson (2013).
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chapter 2
The Contemporary Meaning and Utility  
of Federalism
A hundred years ago, Europe was about to experience the upheavals of 
World War I. Naturally, in our world today, with galloping globalization, 
complex governance, technological sophistication, and a kaleidoscope 
of multiple, interwoven identities, we cannot anticipate all that the 21st 
century has in store for us. In this chapter, I wish to reflect on the contem-
porary utility of federalism by pointing out the principal challenges and 
problems that this form of political organization and governance culture 
will have to deal with in the foreseeable future. I also draw greater atten-
tion to the problems and innovations of the last decade. First, however, I 
make a few remarks on the spirit and philosophical framework in which 
I conduct this reflection.
Fernand Dumont, a major Québec intellectual, wrote that history grad-
ually breaks the institutions that it creates, but that this does not eliminate 
the need to use our power responsibly (Dumont 1987, 231). In this vein, 
I think that we should follow Isaiah Berlin, according to whom the worst 
of all evils is doctrinal dogmatism, even if it is morally well intentioned. 
Berlin reminds us that”we must engage in what are called trade -offs – 
rules, values, principles must yield to each other in varying degrees in 
different situations” (Berlin 1990, 18). This is, according to him, the first 
condition for an acceptable society. Federalism is thus not an end in itself. 
It has to be viewed as a means of establishing and cultivating a suitable, 
truly human society. This means a society that gives a major role to the 
basic foundations of individual conscience (self -esteem, effort, caring for 
others); the necessary institutional balances required to limit state power; 
the objectives of equal opportunity and distributive justice; legal and 
symbolic equity between the majority and minorities; a culture of judg-
ment and accountability for individuals and the political class; achiev-
ing, in accordance with Paul Ricoeur’s fine formulation, a just and happy 
memory of historical events; and, promoting a public sphere encouraging 
mutual criticism and open debate on possible futures for the societies in 
which we happen to live. The spirit encompassing all of this is a modest 
ethics of consideration and responsibility. I acknowledge that this spirit 
belongs to the heritage of liberal democracies, and it is in this framework 
that I situate my discussion of federalism.
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I.  The Meaning and Utility of Federalism
Federalism is a form of political governance in modern societies. 
From the political angle, it makes it possible to combine, on the part of 
federal partners, aspirations for autonomy, separation, and freedom with 
desires for unity, solidarity, and interdependence. Legally, a federal state 
is anchored in the principle of sharing sovereignty and legislative compe-
tencies between two autonomous orders of government, neither of which 
is subordinate to the other. Socially, federal society can be said to flow 
from recognizing the pluralism and heterogeneity of society. Over the last 
ten years, particularly under the personal leadership of Ronald Watts and 
the institutional leadership of the Forum of Federations, a great deal of 
research has been done on the internal diversity of federal governance. 
In -depth comparative studies have also been produced on most dimen-
sions – the constitutional framework, legislative competencies, tax rules, 
pluralism, and identity – thus encompassing all institutional characteris-
tics and political culture aspects that need to be established and respected 
for the spirit of federalism to prosper (Watts 2007). However, beyond the 
institutions and cultural dimensions dear to political scientists, federal-
ism demands a certain ethical stance, consistent with the lines by Berlin 
quoted in this chapter’s introduction. Denis de Rougemont provides, in 
his open letter to Europeans, a good description of such an ethical stance:
I propose to call the federalist problem a situation in which two contradictory, 
yet equally valid and vital, human realities face each other in such a way that 
the solution can be sought neither in reducing one to the other nor in sub-
ordinating one to the other, but only in a way that encompasses, satisfies and 
transcends the requirements of both (de Rougemont 1976, 205).
Over a decade ago, Québec political scientist Alain -G. Gagnon (1993) 
and Catalan political philosopher Ferran Requejo (1998) both reflected 
on the different faces of the usefulness of federalism. Essentially, their 
comprehensive views have not aged. In theory, as they note, federalism 
is remarkably well adapted to the requirements of complex governance 
in our globalized world. It makes it possible to combine the advantages 
of unity with those of preserving diversity, the assets of autonomy with 
solidarity and interdependence, and the benefits of both centralization and 
decentralization. It is a flexible, adaptable form of governance built on a 
series of precarious equilibriums that are in tension and force governments 
as well as individuals to constantly revise their judgments while dem-
onstrating a sense of compromise and tolerance (Levy 2007; Weinstock 
2005). In theory, once again, federalism embodies the idea of a public eth-
ics of responsibility and consideration that I have been advocating here. 
By dividing sovereignty and increasing the number of decision -making 
centres, federalism protects individual freedom and creativity against the 
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tyranny of the majority or majorities. While it protects the autonomy and 
separation of local communities, it also encourages and creates solidarity 
habits, beginning with the very real social fabric of the base communities. 
Such solidarity habits are immensely useful for appropriate management 
of the common good, which is becoming increasingly more globalized 
(Burelle 2005, 41). By allowing the spheres of deliberation to prolifer-
ate and multiply, once again on the very real basis of local communities, 
federalism can contribute to quite an edifying civic education, consolidate 
democratic values and culture, and fight against the trends towards polit-
ical fragmentation, cynicism, and anomie that Charles Taylor (1992) has 
associated with one of the great malaises of modernity.
In many states with plural nations, federalism can provide governance 
tools for managing, reducing, and reformulating, as required, all of the 
tensions associated with the diversity of belonging. Indeed, the principal 
works by Gagnon and Requejo over the last decade have focussed on this 
dimension (Gagnon and Iacovino 2007; Requejo 2005a). In the domain 
of public policy, federalism strongly encourages innovation and invent-
iveness by increasing the number of social -political testing grounds and 
by promoting emulation among the various governments operating, with 
perfect legitimacy, in their respective jurisdictions (Gagnon 1993, 34; 
Pratte 2007, 275). Certainly, there will be emulation among different fed-
erated states, which rival one another with respect to imagination in many 
areas, but there will also be emulation between a federation’s central gov-
ernment and its federated partners. Here, the basic idea is associated with 
that of Machiavelli in his Discorsi, where he described the conflicts, ten-
sions and upheavals among the various “humours” (umori) as having an 
overall positive effect on the health and freedom of the whole political 
community. In a federal regime, the various orders of government can 
each, in their own manner and in their own separate fields given that they 
are divided by jurisdictions, take actions with direct impact on individ-
uals. Federalism does more than admit that this will cause tension; it even 
goes so far as to encourage this competitive dimension.
In theoretical discussions about federalism, as in most areas of polit-
ical philosophy, we can feel the simultaneous presence of both an idealis-
tic disposition and a more realistic attitude (Noël 2006). The above quote 
from Denis de Rougemont is a good illustration of this. On one hand, in 
a realistic manner, de Rougemont acknowledges that our societies con-
tain contradictory values and phenomena that cannot be reduced to one 
another. However, he also writes that the solution is to be found in the 
theoretical constructions and institutions that encompass, satisfy, and 
transcend the requirements of both extremes. This resembles the idealist 
telos of the fusing of horizons that we find in hermeneutic philosophy, 
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from Ricoeur to Gadamer and Taylor. However, if there is one thing we 
have learned from the 20th century, it is indeed that conflicts and ten-
sions go hand in hand with political life, especially in liberal democratic 
regimes. We thus have to abandon dreams of the transcendence of a cer-
tain form of federalism tempted by messianism and eschatology. Instead, 
we must content ourselves with more modest, attainable hopes of appro-
priate federal regimes and suitable societies, in accordance with Berlin’s 
words. It is in this spirit that I approach the question of the challenges and 
problems now facing federalism.
II.  Federalism’s Challenges and Problems
In a recent essay on the contemporary relevance of the notion of fed-
eralism, Watts describes three recent innovations in the development of 
systems and regimes inspired by federalism (Watts 2007, 15-16). First, 
he points out the tendency towards the emergence and consolidation of 
hybrid systems combining elements of federal doctrine, such as shared 
sovereignty, and the confederal idea, associated with limited delega-
tion of responsibilities to a central level by partners that retain their 
full sovereignty. According to Watts, the European Union exhibits such 
a hybrid configuration. I will leave it to others to discuss the challen-
ges that it will face in the next decade. Watts adds that more and more 
countries with federal constitutions and federated bodies are engaging in 
an institutional interplay and dialogue with supranational entities. This 
is the whole question of multi -level governance, which involves simul-
taneously challenging democratic transparency, efficiency in conducting 
intergovernmental relations, and reciprocal accountability with respect 
to decision -making. Finally, Watts casts a favourable eye on the trend 
towards accepting a certain degree of asymmetry in the participation of 
federated entities with respect to the conduct of international relations 
and interactions with supranational organizations in general. From this 
perspective, I could give the example of Canada, which agreed in a 2006 
accord with Québec to the latter’s – entirely asymmetrical – participa-
tion in a major international organization, namely UNESCO.1 I will begin 
with this point to examine one of the primary contemporary challenges, 
namely the management of multiple identities.
I insist on this issue because it is crucial both in Catalonia and in 
Québec, two national societies that have occupied a great place in my 
thinking over the last decade. However, I must recognize that on the 
global scale, since the September 11, 2001 attacks, its relative import-
ance in discussions has diminished somewhat, and has yielded to security 
1 See Chapter 5 on What Canadian Federalism Means in Québec.
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concerns. In a famous text on identity, diversity, and recognition policies, 
the philosopher James Tully (2003) pointed out that today’s kaleidoscope 
of identities is composed of multiple identities that are themselves mul-
tiple, open to outside influences, constantly negotiated, and thus involved 
in continuous processes of transformation. He believes that this does not 
necessarily lead to disorder, anarchy, and complete relativism because it 
has been shown that people can, over several generations, be persuaded 
through democratic dialogue of the worth of maintaining and fulfilling 
one of their main sources of identity, for example, through their linguistic, 
cultural and national roots. In this regard, he mentions the examples of 
Scotland and Catalonia. When it comes to identity struggles and appropri-
ate dimensions of identity constellations, Tully opposes fixism, monism, 
and the quest for authenticity. He promotes identities that will be “sup-
ported rather than imposed, reasonable rather than unreasonable, enabling 
rather than handicapping, endowed with liberating rather than oppres-
sive effects” (Tully 2003, 519). However, normative theory insufficiently 
explains recent developments regarding the management practices of fed-
eral regimes regarding plural identities.
The political and intellectual communities of multinational states pro-
duce their own interpretive traditions of the federal regime in which they 
live (Weinstock 2005). On this point, as a general rule, we see major dif-
ferences at work between the interpretive traditions of majority national 
communities and those of minority national communities. Regarding 
the aspects of federalism that have to be balanced, majorities focus on 
unity and solidarity/interdependence supported by arguments based on 
efficiency, performance, uniform justice, and social integration. In con-
trast, minorities focus on autonomy, asymmetry, and their own symbolic 
and legal empowerment. One of the major challenges of federalism today 
is thus to create, on the level of political culture and civic education, 
counterweights to the dominant tendencies of both majorities and minor-
ities. The latter have to be encouraged to target autonomy less exclusively 
and look more towards solidarity/interdependence. Such efforts, however, 
will be in vain if we do not, at the same time, take actions that encour-
age the majority to see worth in promoting the autonomy and political 
freedom of national minorities. Theoretical debates about multinational 
federalism may have reached their limits. We now need to insist more on 
federal civic education and institutional counterweights. In their work on 
theories of federalism, Dimitrios Karmis and Wayne Norman mention 
this dimension when they write that, in multinational states, it is import-
ant to promote “a healthy sense of identity and loyalty of all citizens to 
both their subunit and the federal state” (Karmis and Norman 2005, 17). A 
new generation of serious work on the history of ideas is required to better 
understand the complexity and wealth of majority and minority national 
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communities’ interpretive traditions with respect to federalism. It is vital 
to identify, within each community, the foundations most likely to be of 
use in renewing their mutual dialogue given today’s dilemmas.
The classical definition of federalism is based on the idea of a state 
in which there are at least two orders of government. However, in light 
of the practices within today’s federal societies, we can say that a federal 
state is instead one in which there are only two orders of government that 
are sovereign with respect to their constitutional legislative jurisdictions. 
This relegates regions and cities to a subordinate legal and political status. 
Over the last decade, against a background of globalization’s accelerating 
processes and fluxes – think, for example, of immigration issues in cities 
such as Barcelona and Montréal – federal regimes have been confronted 
with global cities that want to become front line players in state govern-
ance and intergovernmental relations, in particular with respect to issues 
concerning poverty, security, and intercultural integration. Global cities 
certainly want more economic resources and abilities to take action with 
respect to their residents, but in the end their primary desire is no longer 
to be left on the sidelines when the two main orders of government dis-
cuss their power and future. They want to be full participants in the com-
plex governance of the globalized world. They add another dimension to 
the architecture of multilayered governance mentioned by Watts.
The United States of America has played a very important, and prob-
ably hegemonic, role in the history of federalism and its interpretation. 
Over the last decade, two contradictory trends have been seen in that 
country. First, in the wake of the September 11, 2001 attacks, the rigidity 
and complexity of power sharing in classical American federalism have 
been challenged by those who would like to see the central government as 
the principal, if not the only, player authorized to lead and take all action 
required to combat terrorism (Donohue and Kayyem 2002). As a counter-
weight to this, other experts have suggested that the division of powers 
in the United States should be adjusted so that the central government 
can concentrate on certain essential issues while micro -managing less in 
areas such as health care, education, municipal affairs, and social services 
(Nivola 2007). As we can see, in one of the first lands having constitution-
ally enshrined the principles of federalism, the debate remains lively and 
the fundamental tension between the centripetal and centrifugal forces 
goes on, even as change continues. Precarious, unstable equilibrium 
remains the fundamental characteristic of federalism in the 21st century.
Conclusion
In general, writing on federalism tends to be dominated by institu-
tional perspectives. In the last fifteen years, particularly with respect 
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to multinational federalism, political thought has been very dynamic. I 
am gambling that, at the dawn of the next decade, the utility of federal-
ism will have to be defended beyond the circles of leaders, experts, and 
intellectuals who form the primary audience of organizations such as the 
Forum of Federations. I think that, from now on, the greatest effort will 
have to be put into a true pedagogy of federalism targeting the people. 
Given the sophistication of technology and urgent political and bureau-
cratic concerns, namely, security and the environment, the objectives of 
efficiency and performance sometimes draw attention away from the 
complex dialogues that come with the practice of federalism. The citizen 
in front of her or his computer tends not to think too much about the 
subtleties of the federal division of powers between governments. Some 
education about this is required. As I have tried to show in this chapter, 
the political culture of federalism has to be promoted systematically in 
federal civic education programs. In the end, this is perhaps the greatest 




Making Sense of Canada as a Federal System
The Relevance of Historical Legacies
In honour of the late Richard Simeon (1943-2013)
In philosophy, law, history, sociology, and political science, mostly 
in English and French, an incredibly vast bibliography exists on the 
Canadian federal system, the Canadian state, and the historical and pol-
itical identities of Canada and Québec. I will start this chapter with four 
general approaches (sometimes visions, sometimes past historical con-
tributions) about the nature of the Canadian state and of the Canadian 
political identity. I supplement this introductory sketch with a brief enum-
eration and discussion of the most important years or periods that are 
essential to understanding the foundation or re -foundation of Canada. 
This preliminary sketch leads to, and helps make sense of, the four inter-
related historical legacies that I wish to discuss in this chapter.1
In the prolific conversation about the nature of Canada some voices 
have more authority than others. Of course, this does not mean that 
these voices are necessarily right. In 1998, in the famous Reference re 
Secession of Québec decision, the Supreme Court of Canada identified 
four interrelated principles, anchoring, according to its interpretation, the 
political and constitutional identities of the country: federalism, democ-
racy, constitutionalism and the rule of law, and respect for the rights of 
minorities (Réjean Pelletier 2009, 69). For the purposes of this reflec-
tion, I will only add that the insistence of the Supreme Court on the cen-
trality of federalism makes necessary the examination of this principle 
and of its double logic of autonomy -interdependence as one of the major 
historical legacies at work in Canada. A few years later Will Kymlicka 
(2003), one of the preeminent Canadian philosophers and intellectuals 
1 A first draft of this chapter was presented at a workshop dealing with historical leg-
acies in federal regimes, organized at Howfield Manor, near Canterbury by Michael 
Burgess and Cesar Colino. At this workshop, presentations on Canada were made by 
both myself and the late Richard Simeon. In revising this chapter for my book, I wish 
to pay homage to Richard’s exceptional qualities as a scholar and as a generous and 
caring human being. We shall miss him very much.
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of our times, wrote an article entitled “Being Canadian” for a leading 
British scholarly journal entitled Government and Opposition. In this arti-
cle, Kymlicka discussed both external and internal sources characterizing 
the modern Canadian identity. Interestingly, commenting on his list of 
external sources, Kymlicka started by mentioning the fact that Canadian 
identity means being non -American, disassociating ourselves from the 
great southern republic that is our only neighbour. He also added that 
Canadians can be characterized as citizens of the world sympathetic to 
cosmopolitan and multilateral projections, and as members of Western 
civilization without the missionary zeal of the United States regarding 
the ideas of the liberal Enlightenment and the project of securing the tri-
umph of democracy. He concluded by arguing that Canadians are also 
part of the New World, identifying themselves more with the promises of 
the Americas than with the heritage of Europe. Looking at Canada from 
within its frontiers, Kymlicka argued that Canada’s political identity owes 
a great deal to the fact that the political system has to deal simultaneously 
with three layers of deep diversity: a territorially concentrated national 
minority in Québec, Aboriginal peoples distributed across the land, and a 
substantial immigrant population associated with the politics of multicul-
turalism. If we isolate and compare one by one the dimensions suggested 
by the Supreme Court and the characteristics singled out by Kymlicka, I 
believe readers will indeed agree that both talk about the same country. 
However, those are rather contemporary voices. Let me now turn to 19th 
century voices, to the views of three people associated with Canada’s 
federal founding between 1864 and 1867, to the three leaders of the Great 
Coalition of the government of colonial United Canada: George Brown, 
John A. Macdonald, and George -Étienne Cartier (Ajzenstat et al. 1999).
Brown and Macdonald did not agree on everything, as will become 
clearer at a later stage of this chapter, but they did agree on a couple of 
essential matters. They agreed on the necessity of uniting British colonies 
north of the United States to create an autonomous and powerful federal 
Dominion within the British Empire. Cartier, the French and Catholic 
leader of what was then called Canada East (contemporary Québec, also 
previously known as Lower Canada), shared these essential insights and 
projects of Brown and Macdonald. However, he enriched them by adding 
that, in the words of my colleague André Burelle, this union should be 
brought about without fusing the founding groups partaking in the discus-
sions about political reconfiguration (Burelle 2005, 442).2 Cartier, at the 
same time, promoted the idea of a new Canadian political nationality and 
2 At the time, and in the scholarly literature, many words can have been used to describe 
these groups: founding races, communities, peoples, nations, cultures, distinct soci-
eties. The key idea here remains “union without fusion.”
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defended the kind of political autonomy, within federalism, that would 
enable Canada East to maintain and enhance its distinct identity. The four 
historical legacies I further identify and discuss in this chapter flow from 
the combined insights of both the older and contemporary figures men-
tioned here. Tables I and II , which follow here, facilitate the interpreta-
tion of these realities.
Table I: Founding Dates, Moments, and Periods
Date(s) Significance
5000 BC to 
1500 AD
Presence of Aboriginal peoples on the territories of contemporary 
Canada.
1492 and 1534 Cabot in Newfoundland and Cartier in Gaspé. Original encounters 
between Aboriginal peoples and European explorers.
1608 Founding of Québec by Champlain and permanent French-European 
colonization seen as the founding of Canada.
1763 Treaty of Paris and British Royal Proclamation, the latter seen as a 
major constitutional document for Canada.
French cession and British conquest provide the legal anchors for the 
rights of Aboriginal peoples and fiduciary relationship between them 
and British Crown.
Assimilationist policy vis-à-vis new French and Catholic subjects, 
les Canadiens, combined with the promise to give them the same 
legal and political rights prevailing in Britain, including the right to a 
legislative assembly.
1774 Quebec Act, 1774. Major British constitutional document for Canada, 
enlarging the territory of the colony and establishing a policy of 
tolerance and acceptance of diversity.
French civil law re-established.
Elimination of barriers for Catholics as a new modus vivendi with the 
Catholic Church is established.
Greater toleration for French language but arbitrary and discretionary 
political colonialism.
No promise of an assembly in the foreseeable future.
1780s In the context of the American War of Independence, arrival of British 
Loyalists who would, in time, become Canadians.
1791 Constitution Act, 1791 partitioning the colony into Lower Canada 
and Upper Canada and establishing a parliamentary assembly in each 
colony, preserving substantial elements of discretionary and arbitrary 
political colonialism at the executive level.
1840-1841 Fusion of Lower Canada and Upper Canada into the Province of 
Canada, following the failed rebellions of 1837-1838.
Seen as permanent subjugation of les Canadiens. 
Hailed as civilizational victory by some (e.g., Lord Durham) 
Lamented by others as the beginning of la survivance or melancholy 
nationalism in French Canada.
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Date(s) Significance
1848 Advent of Responsible Government.
Enlightened British colonial elites (e.g., Lord Elgin) and Canadian 
political leaders (e.g., La Fontaine and Baldwin) combine to gain 
control of the executive branch in most colonial legislatures, selecting 
the executive from legislative ranks..
Re-establishment of the legal and political legitimacy of the French 
language in governmental and parliamentary institutions.
Progressive-reformist government elected in the Province of Canada.
Acceptance of the idea that Canada East (formerly Lower Canada, 
soon the Province of Québec) with its distinct cultural and social 
identity is a permanent feature that merits continued existence.
1867 Creation of the federal Dominion of Canada with the union of three 
colonies: the Province of Canada, New-Brunswick, and Nova Scotia.
The Province of Canada is once again subdivided with the creation of 
the provinces of Ontario and Québec.  
First combination of British parliamentary and federal forms of 
political governance.  
From Manitoba in 1870 to Newfoundland and Labrador in 1949, six 
additional provinces are eventually added to the federation.  
1897-1901 As Prime Minister, Wilfrid Laurier protects, during the Colonial 
Conferences in London, the new autonomy of the Canadian Dominion 
from British aspirations to re-centralization of British Empire in the 
context of greater German power.
1931 Statute of Westminster consolidates Canada’s political independence 
and autonomy from British governments and legislations.
Establishment of an autonomous and distinct Canadian crown.
Federal government gains autonomy over defence and foreign affairs.
Statement by British authorities that they will not legislate in Canadian 
affairs unless asked to do so by Canadian authorities.
1947 Establishment of autonomous and distinct Canadian Citizenship.
1949 Appeal procedure to the Judiciary Committee of Privy Council in 
London abolished. Supreme Court of Canada becomes truly supreme.
1982 Constitution Act, 1982 terminates the British government and 
Canadian Parliament’s authority in matters of constitutional revision.
Enshrinement of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.
Table II: Four Historical Legacies
Number Legacy
1 British connection, British heritage.
2 Centrality of the state for the preservation and development of a Canadian 
national project.
3 Federalism: bipolar equilibrium, tensions, and interpretive prisms.
4 Québec, English-French duality, French language and culture, and the 
role of state in Québec.
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I.  Historical Legacies: Their Nature, Role, Interrelations, 
and Contemporary Significance
In this section, I identify and discuss the four major historical legacies 
stemming from Table II. At this early stage, I only begin to address the 
issues of their interrelations and of their contemporary significance.
A.  British Connection, British Heritage
At the time of Canada’s federal founding, between the years 1864-
1867, the British connection was paramount in the minds of colonial 
leaders. It would soon become the most fundamental, overarching char-
acteristic of the 1867 Constitution, its institutions, and its political cul-
ture. The federal Dominion of Canada was created as a constitutional 
monarchy within the British Empire, operating within the Westminster 
system’s conventions and the legal parameters of cabinet and parliament-
ary government. As applied in Canada, this system is as valid for provin-
cial governments and legislatures as it is for their federal counterparts. We 
can immediately see that this system has a number of consequences for 
the functioning of federalism in Canada. As Simeon (2006) and Smiley 
(1980), among others, have observed, this system brings tight inter-
connectedness between government’s legislative and executive branches, 
tilted towards executive dominance. Within the executive, leadership and 
initiative have evolved towards much greater concentration of power in 
the hands of the Prime Minister or Premier, once again both in central and 
provincial capitals. Simeon aptly summarizes the meaning of all this for 
understanding the dynamics of intergovernmental relations in Canadian 
federalism:
It is executive federalism, in which the primary contacts are between the First 
Ministers (Prime Minister and Premiers), ministers and senior officials of the 
two orders of government. It is a government -to -government relationship that 
has also been called ‘federal -provincial diplomacy.’ Legislators and legisla-
tures play little role in the system (Simeon 2006, 2).
Much of the 1867 Constitution’s originality had to do with combin-
ing the Westminster model with federalism. I shall explore this in greater 
detail while examining more systematically federalism as a historical leg-
acy in its own right. At the time of Canada’s founding, the British con-
nection extended way beyond the institutions of the Westminster system. 
Canada claimed for itself the British idea that this system was also an 
ideal means for securing individual freedom, carrying with it a political 
culture of moderation, gradualism, and evolutionism. Canada inherited 
the British anti -radical attitude towards political modernity. This clearly 
distinguishes Canada from French and American political cultures. From 
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1867 to 1982, the long process leading to the full legal autonomization of 
Canada from the British state has been characterized by the spirit of this 
anti -radical political culture. I use the expression “Quiet Decolonization” 
to characterize this process. Constitutional transformations in Canada are 
governed by this same element of the British heritage. Whereas France, 
for instance, needs to demolish the previous house to erect a constitu-
tional reform or “new home”, Canada, as it did in 1982, adds a new floor 
or level to the existing edifice. In its capacity to act, as we shall see with 
the next historical legacy, the Canadian state is indeed a very important 
institution. However, following the British tradition, it remains a limited 
liberal state. The most important customs and traditions inherited from 
Britain – rule of law, constitutional monarchy linked with a central role 
for Parliament, and the system of responsible cabinet government – com-
bined to protect Canada substantially from the perils of authoritarianism 
well before the enshrinement of the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms in 1982.
This British heritage was also central in 1867. At that time, about 60% 
of Canadians claimed British descent, whereas about 31% were of French 
origins. In the early 21st century, Canadians of British stock constitute 
about 34% of the population. Diversification through massive immigra-
tion has thus reduced, at least in demographic terms, the importance of 
this aspect of the British connection. Nevertheless, 60% of Canadians still 
recognize English as their mother tongue, and English remains the dom-
inant language of about 78% of Canadians (Gagnon and Simeon 2010, 
110, 113).
The next historical legacy I wish to consider is the contribution of the 
Canadian state towards the development of a distinct Canadian national 
project in the Americas. In one important aspect, this second legacy is 
closely associated with the British heritage. In the fifty years following 
the federal founding in 1867, the administrative elite of the Canadian 
federal or central government followed colonial precedent in main-
taining extremely close links with the British imperial and state bureau-
cracy. When I insist on the idea of a strong state (or, to speak like the 
Spanish, a vertebrated state) as a major characteristic of the Canadian 
system, I also have in mind the contribution of a competent, dedicated 
bureaucracy cultivating the virtues associated with public service, but 
also carrying in their relations with their provincial counterparts the pre-
sumption of cultural and epistemic superiority which has long been a 
trademark of the British imperial bureaucracy. I also wish to claim that 
this dimension bears consequences for the practice of intergovernmental 
relations at the heart of Canadian federalism – the third historical legacy 
to be examined.
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B.  The Centrality of the State for the Preservation and 
Development of a Canadian National Project
The key argument in this section is that the Canadian state has 
always played a central role in distinguishing the country from the 
United States and fostering a specifically Canadian national identity. 
Whereas the American dream is structured around a principled individ-
ualism and a deep mistrust vis -à -vis the state, in Canada the state has 
mostly been perceived as a benevolent protector of the community. In 
the United States, the founding documents sacralize individual projects 
and the protection of life, property, liberty, and the quest for happiness. 
In Canada, as can be found in the preamble of section 91 of the 1867 
Constitution, whose objective was to broaden the powers of the central 
government, the state was deemed responsible for the preservation of 
peace, order, and good government. In order to construct and develop 
an autonomous and distinct country north of the United States, the idea 
of an East -West statist voluntarism was essential. This grand ambition 
was implemented and renewed in a series of national policies from the 
19th century until now: Canadian tariff policy and the building of rail-
ways, massive immigration in the new Western provinces, the establish-
ment of the welfare state and the consolidation of national institutions 
from the late 1930s to the late 1950s (e.g., federal control over transport 
and telecommunications, new economic and social programs, Canadian 
citizenship, full judiciary autonomy, establishment of national cultural 
institutions, and the renewal of national symbols in the 1960s such as 
the anthem and flag), and full constitutional independence in 1982 com-
bined with the enshrinement of the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms.
It is my contention that the centrality of the state, as a major legacy, 
has maintained its importance since the federal founding in 1867 and 
throughout the 20th century. I recognize that some experts could ask that 
this argument be reconsidered in the context of the libertarian and at times 
anti -statist philosophical orientation of Canada’s current Prime Minister 
and Conservative leader, Stephen Harper. Since 2006, Harper has led gov-
ernments that have given some indications (e.g., reducing the Department 
of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development’s budget for cultural diplo-
macy and promotion of Canadian studies, as well as reducing Statistics 
Canada’s ability to gather data concerning the identities and social mores 
of the Canadian population) that a more serious attack on the Canadian 
statist tradition could be in store.
I would now like to examine a key dimension of the Canadian statist 
tradition: the fiduciary role of the federal or central government in safe-
guarding the identities and rights of minority communities. Many aspects 
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of the key 19th century constitutional document (i.e., the British North 
America Act, 1867) illustrate this role. Although education belonged 
to the sphere of provincial jurisdiction, section 93 of the Constitution 
offered substantial protections to minority Catholic and Protestant com-
munities in the provinces. This included the authority of the federal 
government to pass remedial laws. The English -speaking minorities in 
Québec found additional protections in the role of the English language 
in the province’s legislative and judiciary institutions as well as in the 
crafting of senatorial districts. Generally speaking, it can be argued that 
the reservation and disallowance powers enabling the central govern-
ment to act against provincial jurisdictions were at the time seen as addi-
tional protections for minorities. In the 19th century, French minorities 
outside Québec did not benefit from the same provisions and protections 
established for the English -speaking minority in Québec. This is relevant 
for one pole of the last historical legacy I shall examine in this chapter, 
English -French duality. However, it can also be argued that the adoption 
of federalism (my third legacy) constituted in itself a strong protection 
for the majority French and Catholic population of Québec, representing 
about a third of the overall Canadian population at the time. Québec, like 
the other provinces, obtained substantial jurisdictional autonomy over 
key aspects of its distinct societal autonomy (e.g., over education, family, 
municipal and cultural affairs, and property and civil rights). At least 
indirectly, through the workings of section 94 of the Constitution, Québec 
was protected from standardizing interventions by the federal govern-
ment in the field of property and civil rights. In sum, the Canadian state, 
in the 19th century, mattered in legal and economic affairs at the begin-
ning of the quest towards a strong Canadian national project increasingly 
autonomous within the British Empire It also mattered because it acted 
as a legal protector for minority communities. Standing at the end of a 
long process of consolidating a Canadian national identity owing much 
to the interventions of the federal government, the constitutional reform 
of 1982 and the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms have con-
tinued this tradition.
The Charter enshrined various rights for at least three distinct (though 
interrelated) minority communities: linguistic minorities (Anglophones 
in Québec and Francophones elsewhere), securing mostly symmetrical 
protections through sections 16-23 of the Charter; Aboriginal peoples 
(section 25 of the Charter and Parts II, section 35, and IV - Constitutional 
Conferences with Aboriginal peoples, abrogated after the failure of these 
conferences in the 1980s); and, rights for ethnic communities through an 
interpretive provision requiring respect for the objective of promoting the 
multicultural heritage of Canadians. I believe it has now become a received 
idea in the scholarly community, everywhere in Canada, that this reform 
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was a major act of Canadian nation -building and that the enshrinement 
of minority rights symmetrically distributed across Canada to relevant 
groups was a key part of this project (McRoberts 1997, 137). The simple 
fact that all these rights remain beyond the reach of the notwithstanding 
clause (section 33), enabling governments to limit the exercise of some 
rights for a limited period, reinforces this argument (Woehrling 2009, 89). 
This constitutional reform was achieved at a time of great, exacerbated 
conflicts between the Canadian and Québec national projects. Scholars 
of all stripes have abundantly studied this chapter of our history. Among 
others, Michael Keating (2001) and Montserrat Guibernau (2007) have 
looked at this from the perspective of a conflict between nation -building 
projects in political sociology and, although Keating possesses an import-
ant Canadian background, I believe that taken together they offer us a 
reasonably objective narrative. So I deem the Canadian statist tradition 
to be a very important historical legacy. It is at work in social, economic, 
and cultural affairs. I believe it is coherently related to a strategy of nation 
building in these matters and, with striking clarity, regarding the role of 
protector of minorities. I shall come back to this aspect while discussing 
the third and fourth historical legacies. The two following excerpts, from 
the writings of Will Kymlicka and Sujit Choudhry, help me to make the 
transition to the third legacy:
English -speaking Canadians have a deep desire to act as a nation, which they 
can do only through the federal government; they also have come to define 
their national identity in terms of certain values, standards, and entitlements 
that can be upheld from sea to sea through federal intervention in areas of 
provincial jurisdiction. In short, the only way for English -speaking Canadians 
to express their national identity is to undermine the provincial autonomy 
that has made it possible for Quebecers to express their national identity. The 
problem in Québec -Canada relations, therefore, is not simply that Quebecers 
have developed a strong sense of political identity that is straining the bounds 
of federalism. It is also that Canadians outside Québec have developed a 
strong sense of Pan -Canadian identity that strains the bounds of federalism 
(Kymlicka, 1998: 166).
The impact on federalism of Canada’s increasing ethnic diversity and the 
concentration of that diversity in Canada’s urban centres is a question that 
has largely remained unexplored. My sense is that federalism is in for a bit 
of a shock, because many recent immigrants do not identify with Canada’s 
self -description as a federal political community. They have not taken to fed-
eralism in the same way that they have embraced other aspects of our con-
stitutional identity, such as rights and the rule of law. The difficulty here is 
that federalism offers up a conception of the Canadian political community 
with which immigrants find it difficult to identify (Choudhry in Studin 2006, 
122-123).
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C.  Federalism: Bipolar Equilibrium, Tensions,  
and Interpretive Prisms
Federalism is about balancing and the scholarly literature has offered 
many suggestions about what needs to be balanced: unity and diversity, self - 
rule and shared rule, autonomy and solidarity/interdependence, coming 
together and coming apart, association and dissociation, integration into a 
national community and empowerment of national minorities, centraliza-
tion and decentralization. My first remark will be about the nature of the 
federal founding in Canada, starting with the perspective of the key partici-
pants from United Canada. Macdonald, who would become Canada’s first 
Prime Minister, was in favour of a strong central government, his first pref-
erence being a legislative union between the colonies. However, he recon-
ciled himself with the idea of a federal design, acknowledging, in his own 
words, that his compatriots from Lower Canada (contemporary Québec) 
“would not consent to the absorption of their nationality” (Ajzenstat et al. 
1999, 279). For Macdonald, the federation should be as centralized as pos-
sible, considering the compromises that had to be made. George Brown 
and Maritime leaders also pushed for the federal idea, defending self -
government for colonies and provinces and supporting sufficient decen-
tralization for the protection of local identities. Like Macdonald, Brown 
tried to balance in his own way the promotion of autonomous local identi-
ties and the requirements of unity to create a strong economic power north 
of the United States. Cartier provided the social glue between most of the 
participants at the federal founding, including Macdonald and Brown. He 
advocated for Québec’s political renaissance, securing a strong sphere of 
self -government and a substantial array of competences linked to the pres-
ervation of Québec’s local identity. However, he also defended the idea 
of a strong government at the centre, fostering in time its own political 
nationality. It must not be forgotten that these arrangements were arrived 
at within the overall structure of the British Empire. Through the emer-
gence of the Dominion of Canada, British colonies, by coming together, 
became collectively more autonomous than before. However, in a number 
of key matters, they remained subordinate to the British government in 
London and to the Westminster Parliament (e.g., judicial hierarchy, legal 
validity, defence and foreign affairs, constitutional evolution, and over-
all coordination). Thus, we need an additional bipolarity to make sense 
of the federal founding in Canada: autonomy and subordination. This 
dimension characterized the relations between the Dominion of Canada 
and the British Empire; it also characterized the relations between this 
Dominion and the newly crafted provinces. This triple hierarchy was not 
a static affair. It did change over time, as I have already noted with the 
relations between Canada and the Empire passing through a long process 
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of “Quiet Decolonization.” It has changed as well with regards to the rela-
tions between the Canadian central government and the provinces. This 
complex reality is well summarized by David Cameron:
Canada was founded in 1867 as a centralized federation, with the key powers 
of the day vested in Ottawa, and a strong, paternalistic oversight role assigned 
to Ottawa vis -à -vis the provinces. Despite its origins, however, Canada has 
become highly decentralized. This has occurred due to a number of factors. 
First, judicial interpretation of the division of powers broadly favored prov-
incial governments over the federal government. Second, the country’s cen-
tral institutions have been unable to represent adequately Canada’s regional 
diversity, and there has consequently been popular support for the assertion 
of provincial power, especially in the stronger provinces. Third, provincial 
areas of responsibility, such as health, welfare and education, which were of 
little governmental consequence in the 19th century, mushroomed in the 20th 
century, thus greatly enhancing the role of the provinces. Finally, post -World 
War II nationalism in Québec has helped to force a process of decentraliza-
tion from which other provinces have benefited. The result is that Canada has 
powerful and sophisticated governments both in Ottawa and in the provinces, 
engaged in competitive processes of community building, and social and eco-
nomic developments at both levels (Cameron 2002, 108).
Cameron’s analysis was prepared for the Handbook of Federal 
Countries issued in 2002 by the Forum of Federations. His views are 
nicely supplemented by those of the late Richard Simeon, in my judg-
ment the preeminent scholar of Canadian federalism, in a paper entitled 
“Federalism and Decentralization” and also available on the Forum of 
Federations website. Like Cameron, Simeon considers that Canada ranks 
among the most decentralized federations in the world. Simeon justifies 
this view succinctly and coherently as follows:
Provincial governments have high ‘political capacity’ in the sense of a strong 
presence in the identities and loyalties of citizens; high jurisdictional capacity 
in the sense of their assigned responsibilities; high fiscal capacity in the sense 
of their ability to raise and spend public revenues; and high bureaucratic cap-
acity, in the sense of their ability to design and deliver public services. Canada 
combines a high degree of autonomy for its constituent governments with 
a high degree of interdependence among them, with the resulting need for 
intergovernmental cooperation and coordination if the needs of the citizens 
are to be met effectively. It is an example of ‘divided federalism’, rather than 
‘shared’ or ‘integrated’ federalism. The design creates two separate orders of 
government, each free to act in its own areas of jurisdiction […] It combines 
high levels of cooperation in specific areas of public policy with considerable 
competition among governments for political strength and public support. It 
combines an emphasis on nation -wide standards in critical public services 
with wide variation among provinces as each seeks to meet its own needs in 
its own way (Simeon 2006, 1-2).
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This sub -section, discussing federalism as a historical legacy in its 
own right, suggests that federalism is characterized by the search for 
equilibrium between poles, by the persistence of tensions, and by the 
plurality of interpretive prisms. Anglophone and Francophone experts, 
both in Québec and elsewhere in Canada, have through the passage of 
time and over generations provided different interpretations about the 
nature and meaning of Canadian federalism. Generally speaking, the pre-
vious excerpts from the works of Cameron and Simeon portray Canada 
as a very decentralized federation, with autonomous and powerful cen-
tral and provincial governments engaged in a competition of equals with 
shifting equilibriums over time. Generally speaking, once again, scholar-
ship from Québec has tended to disagree with this evaluation (Kelly and 
Laforest 2004).3 Cameron seems to suggest that Ottawa’s paternalistic 
oversight role vis -à -vis the provinces has disappeared. Many in Québec 
would argue that it has not. It is true that some of the quasi -unitary fea-
tures present, according to Smiley, at the heart of the 19th century consti-
tution have fallen into disuse without ever being abrogated (e.g., powers 
of reservation and disallowance of provincial legislations). However, the 
emergence of a Canadian welfare state after World War II, and persistent 
rhetoric up to this day in Canadian politics advocating a leading role for 
the central government in reinforcing a Canadian economic and social 
union (see Kymlicka’s quote above), would have been impossible with-
out a kind of constitutional preference or supremacy given to the federal 
government initially in 1867 through these quasi -unitary features. Thus, 
the preamble of section 91 of the 1867 Constitution and some of its pro-
visions (e.g., the peace, order, and good government interpretive clause) 
are, despite being contested in Québec, the legal basis of the so -called 
federal government’s spending power, which is absolutely essential for 
the existence of the Canadian welfare state. Thirty years ago, Smiley had 
this to say about this spending power:
This power provides a way in which the federal authorities can, as they 
wish, insert themselves in almost any matter within provincial jurisdiction 
where significantly large expenditures are involved […] The federal spend-
ing power and p.o.g.g. [peace, order and good government in the preamble 
of Section 91] offer the federal authorities considerable opportunities to ex-
tend their activities beyond the enumerated headings of Sections 91 and 95 
(Smiley 1980, 24-25).
Smiley also believed that Canada’s judicial system, vesting in the fed-
eral government the power to nominate and elevate judges to the three 
top courts in all provinces including the Supreme Court, was essentially 
3 See Chapter 5 on What Canadian Federalism Means in Québec. 
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unified. If this becomes the dominant criterion, Canada is among the most 
centralized federations, not among the most decentralized. This dimen-
sion became much more important with the patriation of the Constitution 
in 1982 and with the enshrinement of a Canadian Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms. I have already mentioned this issue while discussing my 
second historical legacy in this chapter, the centrality of the state for the 
preservation and development of a distinctive Canadian national project. 
Federalism is not absent from the content and legal environment of the 
Charter. It plays an important role in the amending formula and in the 
workings of the notwithstanding clause. However, it is absent from the 
document’s crucial first disposition, which recognizes the existence of 
reasonable limits to rights in a free and democratic society, thus presenting 
Canada as a unitary or unified society rather than as a federal political 
community. Interpreted by a centralized judiciary branch, the Charter is 
an agent of centralized nation -building in three ways: at the symbolic 
level, it offers rights and a discourse of shared values to Canadians from 
coast to coast; at the level of public policy, it promotes homogenizing 
national standards including in the key jurisdictional field of language 
legislation; and, with regards to identifying the most legitimate level or 
unit for political deliberation, it moves issues from regional or provincial 
communities to the pan -Canadian national community (Woehrling 2009, 
124-125; Russell 1993, 21-22).
In the fuller passages from which I have taken the quotes above, 
Cameron and Simeon desire smooth intergovernmental collaboration 
between the central and provincial authorities in search of equilibrium 
between real autonomy and complex interdependence. In analyzing, with 
Martin Papillon, the Canadian conference of leaders of federal and provin-
cial governments, which is the institution at the apex of intergovernmental 
relations in Canada, Simeon concluded that it is possibly the weakest 
link in our institutional network. It is very poorly equipped to provide 
smooth, efficient, and rational coordination. Consider the following ele-
ments highlighted by Simeon and Papillon. The conference works in an ad 
hoc way, without consensual rules and procedures between partners, with 
below average (by Canadian standards) bureaucratic preparation, without 
clear legal or political relationships to other institutions and the normal 
functioning of legislative and executive politics at the center and in the 
provinces, without much transparency, and mostly beyond parliament-
ary control (no committee of the House of Commons in Ottawa controls 
the government of the day on its conduct or management of intergovern-
mental relations). Let me add that these conferences take place only when 
the Prime Minister decides that they should take place, that the agenda is 
unilaterally prepared by the federal government (Ottawa consults prov-
inces most of the time but has the last word), and that the conferences are 
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chaired solely by Prime Minister (Papillon and Simeon 2004, 125-126; 
Laforest and Montigny 2009, 134). It would seem to me somewhat exag-
gerated to extend to this institution the image of a dialogue and competition 
between equal partners. This institution of coordination, however flawed, 
has been totally ignored by Harper since he became Prime Minister of 
Canada in 2006. All in all, is the Canadian federation quite centralized or 
quite decentralized? In my judgment, there can be no definitive answer to 
this question. The system is indeed dynamic. It depends upon the criteria 
being selected. And it could prove to be that Canada is simultaneously 
both quite decentralized and substantially centralized, with the appropri-
ate nuances flowing from the various positions or interpretive prisms of 
those providing the judgment. I shall conclude my assessment of this third 
historical legacy with an additional note on these interpretive prisms.
Anglophone and Francophone scholars from Québec and elsewhere 
in Canada have interpreted our experiment with federalism from the per-
spectives of philosophy, constitutional law, history, and political science, 
often combining approaches from several of these disciplines. In each 
linguistic community one can find hegemonic, dominant interpretive nar-
ratives alongside more minor or subordinate ones. For instance, the idea 
that the Canadian federation is mostly a pact among provinces or a pact 
between founding peoples or nations has long been dominant in French 
Canada and Québec, but it has been far from absent in Anglophone 
interpretations throughout Canada in general and in Québec in particu-
lar (see Vipond, Romney, Taylor). By and large, English Canadian his-
toriography has privileged centralist, nation -building narratives focusing 
on a combination of my first two historical legacies (i.e., British herit-
age and the role of the state in sustaining a Canadian nation as seen in 
the work of Creighton, Cook, Lower, Scott, and Bliss). Very interesting 
recent developments in the history of ideas include the work of Québec 
political scientists and historians who have attempted to identify more 
precisely, and to take a greater critical distance from, the dominant nar-
ratives in Québec and elsewhere in Canada. Stéphane Kelly, Alain Noël, 
Alain -G. Gagnon, and François Rocher are the most important figures 
in this critical reappraisal and I have contributed to this genre in some 
of my own writings. The key idea of this interpretive historiographical 
reappraisal seems to me to be the following: well before, but even more 
consistently since, the Report of the Tremblay Commission in the early 
1950s, French Canadian and Québec assessments of Canadian federalism 
have been dominated by the twin desires to ascertain whether this system 
allowed for, on the one hand, the securing and enlarging of Québec’s 
political autonomy or self -government and, on the other hand, whether 
it offered a meaningful recognition of Québec’s distinctiveness within 
Canada’s constitution and political institutions. If federalism is about a 
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dynamic, tense, but nevertheless real equilibrium between various polar-
ities, including unity -diversity and autonomy -solidarity/interdependence, 
there is not much of it in the dominant Québec interpretive tradition. 
Rocher has explored the nature of this phenomenon in depth and some of 
its consequences for contemporary politics:
For the Québec governments, the Québec -Canada dynamic is illustrated 
through several concepts: attachment to the principle of autonomy, respect 
for and expansion of provincial jurisdictions, achieving a distinct status and 
asymmetrical federalism […] It is remarkable to note that this construction 
has taken place, both at the discursive level and concerning the Québec -
Canada state relations, on the basis of the non -participation of Québec in 
the building of the Canadian political community. In other words, Québec’s 
relationship with the rest of Canada is primarily utilitarian (Premier Robert 
Bourassa spoke of ‘profitable federalism’) […] From the point of view of 
political institutions and the normative project of federalism, the dominant 
approach is problematic in many ways. First, the emphasis on notions of 
pluralism, autonomy and non -subordination is clearly disproportionate to the 
scant attention paid to the concept of interdependence. This imbalance was 
present in the work of the Tremblay Commission and has seen been consist-
ently reproduced. The desire to construct a ‘complete’ Québec society has 
privileged the expansion of the spheres of sovereignty of the Québec state 
and sought disassociation from the Canadian political space. In this context, 
the necessity of a double loyalty within the federal space proves impossible 
to articulate (Rocher 2009, 107, 109).
I began this chapter identifying four major historical legacies, exam-
ining in detail the character and contemporary significance of three of 
them, examining their relations to others and assessing, at least in a pre-
liminary fashion, their overall impact on the contemporary federal polity. 
Much work remains to be done with regards to the distinction between 
the existence of historical legacies and their political uses and abuses. I 
shall now turn to my fourth, and last, historical legacy: Québec, English - 
French duality, French language and culture, and the role of state in Québec.
D.  Québec, English -French Duality, French Language  
and Culture, and the Role of State in Québec
It would be wrong to argue that Québec is located at the geographical 
centre of Canada, but a strong case can be made that it has been, for decades 
at least since the federal founding, its historical heart. Would it be correct 
to make the same point in the current era? I believe that is a very debat-
able issue, which we could explore at greater length. Notwithstanding 
our answer to this question, the fact of the matter is that the very exist-
ence of a predominantly Francophone province provides Canada with a 
substantial element of distinction vis -à -vis the United States. As far as 
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the Canadian national project is concerned, this is Québec that conforts 
Canada. This massively Francophone society is the primary anchor for 
the considerable scope of English -French duality that many have seen as 
a, if not the, fundamental characteristic of the Canadian national project. 
Unimaginable without Québec’s presence and historical role, this dualis-
tic dimension finds contemporary expression in the legal recognition of 
two official languages since 1969 and further constitutionally entrenched 
in 1982 (see sections 16-23 of the Constitution Act, 1982). Strictly speak-
ing, this dimension is legally, politically, and symbolically much stronger 
than it was in the 19th century. An analysis studying the differences, with 
regards to the linguistic proficiencies and communities of origin, between 
the members of the Canadian public service in Ottawa in the late 19th 
century, in 1950 and today, would be quite striking in this regard. In sum, 
the Canadian central state operates in two of the most important idioms 
associated with Enlightenment ideas and the ambitions of modernity, 
English and French. Just prior to the federal founding, in 1866, Québec 
proceeded with the codification of its civil law, adding another dimension 
to the edifice of duality by providing Canada with a second major system 
of law alongside British common law. In large part due to the distinctive-
ness of Québec, Canada possesses two global and substantially complete 
societal networks, two major frameworks for the welcoming of immi-
grants (multiculturalism and interculturalism), two networks of often 
interrelated civil society associations, two sophisticated technological 
and communicational networks, two scholarly communities, two popular 
cultures, and two literatures. In sum, Québec society and English -French 
duality have been, and still are, substantial assets for the promotion of a 
Canadian national project north of the United States.
In Québec and elsewhere, many are worried about the capacity of 
Québec, and of Canadian Francophonie in general, to maintain, deep 
into the 21st century, its importance in Canada and in Canadian debates. 
Consider for instance the contemporary demographical reality. Today, the 
population of Québec, roughly 8 million people, represents about 23% of 
the overall Canadian population of 34 million. The following numbers, 
taken by my colleague Réjean Pelletier from the 2006 data compiled by 
Statistics Canada, feed the pessimism of those who lament the irreversible 
decline of Québec and French -speaking Canada. In 1941, French was the 
mother tongue of 29.2% of Canadians. In 2006, this figure had dropped 
to 22.1%. In 1971, French was the main language of daily use for 25.7% 
of Canadians. In 2006, this figure had dropped to 21.4%. In 1931, the 
population of Québec represented 27.7% of the overall Canadian popula-
tion. In 2006, this figure had dropped to 23.9% (Pelletier 2008, 63-64, 
69). Obviously, a half -empty glass can also be seen as half -full. From 
1960 to 2000, while English was making considerable progress towards 
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becoming the lingua franca of the modern world, with the immense help 
of technological and communicational revolutions, the French language 
consolidated its position as the predominant language in Québec. Over 
these forty years, there has been a slight decline in the proportion of 
people claiming French Canadian origins in the population of Québec 
(from 81% to 78%). However, whereas about 83% of Québecers claimed 
French as a primary language of use in the early 1960s, this figured has 
climbed to about 86%. And whereas approximately 86% of Québecers 
in the early 1960s could use French in their daily lives even if they were 
not necessarily speaking it at home, this figure has also climbed to about 
94%. To repeat the point, in the context of North America, and consid-
ering the steady progress of English in the world, these figures are noth-
ing if not remarkable.
Looked at from the perspective of the Canadian national project, 
Québec can be reassuring, though it can also appear quite worrisome. 
In the past forty years, Québec and its own nation -building project have 
been at the vanguard of a group of non -sovereign political communities 
which have deeply troubled the central states of complex federations, 
their political elites, and their majority populations (Gagnon and Tully 
2001; Keating 2001; Gagnon 2007). From 1960 to 2000, the formidable 
pressures exercised on the Canadian state by Québec’s own state -driven 
path towards modernization and by the sovereignty movement have been 
at the centre of Canadian political debates and struggles. To get at the 
importance of this dynamic, I provide two lists summarizing the most 
important results and achievements obtained by the Québec and Canadian 
nation -building projects (see Table III and Table IV ).
Table III: Achievements of the Québec National Project Since 1960
Achievement
Establishment of a Québec welfare state, substantially autonomous from but also partly 
integrated in the Canadian welfare state.
Québec’s health-insurance card (carte-soleil); a potent symbol in the same category as 
Canadian citizenship and the passport.
Québec’s Pension Plan (Caisse de dépôt).
Public daycare program.
Hydro-Québec and the nationalization of hydro power.
Consolidation of a Québec controlled extensive communicational network operating  
in French.
Role of the state in the development of a public system of education from kindergarten 
to universities (this system is not exclusively French-speaking).
Charte des droits et libertés de la personne du Québec.
Language laws consolidating the role of French in all aspects of social life and a 
network of state institutions to promote their spirit and rules.
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Achievement
Public policies related to citizenship, including Québec’s own approach towards the 
integration of immigrants – interculturalism.
Cultural and scientific public policies.
Promotion of a Québec-centered network of civil society associations.
Québec’s international relations policy.
The consolidation parliamentary legitimacy, a representative liberal regime which 
promotes in the public space a political culture of pluralistic and democratic 
deliberation. Navigating through the websites of the Government of Québec and 
of l’Assemblée Nationale du Québec provides a very good understanding of the 
importance of this latter dimension.
Table IV: Achievements of the Canada National Project Since 1945
Achievement
Establishment of a Canadian welfare state from 1940 to 1950.
Canadian Citizenship and Canadian passport.
Consolidation the Supreme Court of Canada’s role as ultimate national tribunal.
Consolidation of a Pan-Canadian communicational network (the primary one works in 
English, but there is one in French as well).
New national hymns and flags.
Official languages policy.
Pluralisation of citizenship through the framework of multiculturalism to provide more 
equitable integration.
Promotion of a Canadian-centered network of civil society associations (working in 
English but also in French).
Various policies to reinforce the Canadian social and economic union.
Cultural and scientific innovation strategy and national higher education national.
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.
Canada’s foreign relations policy and its intellectual tradition of liberal 
internationalism.
Last but not least, consolidating the legitimacy of a parliamentary, 
representative liberal regime publically promotes a political culture of 
pluralistic and democratic deliberation. Navigating through the websites 
of the Government of Canada and of the Canadian Parliament provides a 
very good understanding of the importance of this latter dimension.
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Conclusion
After looking carefully at these two lists, one can arrive at the conclu-
sion that these two nation -building projects are almost Siamese twins. 
I am not sure what Macdonald, Brown, and Cartier would say about 
the way in which the institutions and political culture of our federal 
founding have been transformed over almost 150 years. I nevertheless 
believe they would be struck by the qualitative deepening of the English - 





The Historical and Legal Origins of Asymmetrical 
Federalism in Canada’s Founding Debates
A Brief Interpretive Note
Asymmetrical federalism is a horrible expression, typical of the jar-
gon of political science, belonging to the same family as, say, consocia-
tional democracy. With good reason, neither expression really sells on 
the streets. An informed discussion can be made easier by the use of 
synonyms. Asymmetrical federalism means lack of uniform treatment 
for the various federated units within the political community. Canada 
has had various experiences with such absence of uniformity since 1867. 
Asymmetrical federalism is also a way to convey the idea of distinct 
or special status for federated units, particularly for Québec. This brief 
interpretive note is essentially concerned with this last layer of mean-
ing. I shall argue that Canada’s constitutional founders were explicitly 
conscious that the resolutions adopted at the Québec Conference in 1864 
and substantially reproduced in the British North America Act, 1867 
(Constitution Act, 1867, in contemporary parlance) granted the newly 
established Province of Québec a significant form of distinct or special 
status. They contributed to the creation of what we, as historians and pol-
itical scientists of the 21st century, call an asymmetrical federation, though 
they obviously did not use the expression at the time.
Two preliminary remarks precede my main argument. First, Canadian 
political theorists often portray the country abroad as an asymmetrical 
multinational federation.1 My arguments here will support their con-
tention, but with a caveat. They are right about one pillar of our fun-
damental law, the Constitution Act, 1867. However they are wrong, at 
least with regards to Québec, if one takes into consideration only the 
Constitution Act, 1982. I shall come back to this point in my conclusion. 
Second, my work here supports a strand of interpretive revisionism in 
Canadian historiography, attacking the nationalist ultra -centralist read-
ings of Creighton and F.R. Scott. With Stéphane Kelly, I am trying to 
1 See, for instance, Kymlicka (2001, 108-109.)
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make the work of these revisionists available in French Canada and 
Québec.2
Revisionist historiography has fostered a reconsideration of the cen-
trality of George -Étienne Cartier, George Brown and Oliver Mowat, 
alongside John A. Macdonald, in the business of founding Canada as a 
federal Dominion under the British Crown between 1864 and 1867. Led 
by Brown and later by Mowat, the Upper Canadian Reformists were the 
strongest political force in what was then called Canada West and they 
wanted substantial provincial autonomy for Ontario. Maritime leaders also 
fought for local autonomy but, as Paul Romney has shown, they did not 
play as crucial a role as Brown or even Mowat in the wording of the key 
resolutions at the Québec Conference (Romney 1999, 105). As the heir to 
La Fontaine, Cartier was the key player in what was then called Canada 
East, formerly Lower Canada and the “born -again” Province of Québec 
after 1867. To fit Cartier’s purposes, the new constitutional arrangement 
had to allow him to present himself to his compatriots in Québec as a 
strong defender of the motto common to La Fontaine and Étienne Parent: 
“Notre langue, notre nationalité, nos lois” (our language, our nationality, 
our laws). Insofar as the political landscape of United Canada in 1864 was 
concerned, the new order had to be federal because such was the desire of 
the two key players in the East and in the West, respectively, Cartier and 
Brown. In many respects, Macdonald is the pre -eminent person among 
our Fathers of Confederation. He played the leading role in the Québec 
Conference, in the drafting of key resolutions, and in the process of par-
liamentary ratification. In addition to all this, he became our first Prime 
Minister and, thus, he was the first political beneficiary of Confederation. 
However, he entered the Great Coalition with Brown and Cartier in 1864 
as the minor player and the federal idea was clearly imposed on him. His 
own way of recognizing this, in the parliamentary debates of 1865, is my 
first step in demonstrating the existence of a Québec -based asymmetrical 
federalism at the time of Confederation:
But, on looking at the subject in the conference […] we found that such a 
system was impracticable. In the first place, it would not meet the assent of 
the people of Lower Canada because they felt that in their peculiar position – 
being in a minority, with a different language, nationality, and religion from the 
majority – in case of a junction with the other provinces, their institutions and 
their laws might be assailed, and their ancestral associations, on which they 
prided themselves, attacked and prejudiced; it was found that any proposition 
2 Janet Ajzenstat et al. (2004), French edition prepared, introduced and supplemented by 
Stéphane Kelly and Guy Laforest. In addition to the aforementioned authors, Robert C. 
Vipond, Sam LaSelva and Christopher Moore belong to this revisionist school.
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which involved the absorption of the individuality of Lower Canada […] 
would not be received with favour by her people (Ajzenstat et al. 1999, 279).3
Whatever else our founders wanted to accomplish, they quite clearly 
were not seeking a constitution that would absorb the individuality of 
Lower Canada. From Cartier’s perspective, the chief political obliga-
tion was to secure the protection of this individuality. At the time of 
Confederation, Cartier was the Attorney General for Canada East. One 
of his most important duties in the early 1860s was to preside over the 
deliberations of a commission whose task it was to codify the French -
originating civil law of this section of the colony. Through the Québec 
Act of 1774, the British Crown had formally granted to its new subjects 
the continuation of their French laws concerning property and civil rights. 
This aspect of the colony’s identity had been maintained at the worst of 
times, i.e., in the aftermath of the 1837-1838 rebellions. In 1840-1841, the 
Act of Union had expelled the French language from the life of political 
and public institutions, but it had not attacked the French civil law herit-
age. The codification exercise was completed in 1866 and, at roughly 
the same time, provinces were given jurisdiction over property and civil 
rights in the Québec Resolutions (resolution 43, subsection 15) and in the 
Constitution Act, 1867 (known at the time as the British North America 
Act, 1867, section 92, subsection 13). McGill historian Brian Young has 
this to say about the relationship between codification and Confederation:
Confederation and codification were bedfellows in the crucial juncture of the 
1860s when the form of Canadian federalism was being negotiated. In the 
process by which Québec became one province among others and in which 
French Canadians became a minority element in a federal state in which 
English would be the dominant language, codification institutionalized and 
reconfirmed Lower Canada’s separate legal culture (Young 1994, 16).
A key merit of the Confederation settlement for Cartier was the res-
toration of Lower Canada. Québec became a self -governing political 
community endowed with the institutions of responsible government. 
This represented real progress on the axis of political freedom. As the 
job of codification was being completed, Cartier could also rejoice in 
the provision that squarely placed property and civil rights within the 
realm of provincial powers and local autonomy. This provision had to 
be seen as a safeguard for the autonomous legal identity of all provinces. 
It certainly went together with the federal idea, although it did not offer 
Québec any distinct, asymmetrical status. In order to find a basis for a 
Québec -based asymmetrical federalism in 1864-1867, one would have 
3 Thus spoke Madconald in the Parliament of United Canada on February 6, 1865.
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to look elsewhere. The strong, unmistakable historical and legal founda-
tion for such a principle of asymmetry is to be found in the following 
passage of the Québec Resolutions (resolution 29, subsection 33, slightly 
reformulated in section 94 of the Constitution Act, 1867):
Rendering uniform all or any of the laws relative to property and civil rights 
in Upper Canada, Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, Newfoundland and Prince 
Edward Island, and rendering uniform the procedure of all or any of the courts 
in these provinces; but any statute for this purpose shall have no force or au-
thority in any province until sanctioned by the legislature thereof (Ajzenstat 
et al. 1999, 468).
At the time of the Rowell -Sirois Commission in the late 1930s, 
F.R. Scott – legal scholar, essayist, poet, and strong voice of the emer-
ging centralist and nationalist left – formulated what would become the 
hegemonic reading of this provision in English -Canadian historiography. 
Section 94 came to be seen as a legal avenue towards centralization, 
allowing the federal government to standardize the field of property and 
civil rights in common law provinces. In Scott’s own grand interpretive 
scheme, this was a key element in his attacks against the decentraliz-
ing thrust of the constitutional jurisprudence coming from the Judiciary 
Committee of the Privy Council. We shall leave aside here the related mat-
ter of the relevance of this section for the issue of constitutional amend-
ment.4 As Sam LaSelva has argued, Scott neglected one dimension of the 
provision: no standardization would ever occur without the explicit con-
sent of the provincial legislature involved in the operation (LaSelva 1995, 
56-57). For my purposes here, it is interesting to point out what Scott, 
despite his unimpeachable centralist credentials, had to say about the rela-
tionship of Québec with regards to this provision. On numerous occasions 
in his famous piece on section 94, Scott (1977, 114-122) reiterated that it 
did not apply to Québec. In the field of property and civil rights, the prov-
ince of Québec could not relinquish its legislative powers. Now this has to 
be seen as a clear legal manifestation of asymmetrical federalism. Recent 
revisionist historiography, such as the work accomplished by Ajzenstat 
et al. (1999), unmistakably supports this dimension of Scott’s interpreta-
tion. On the matter of property and civil rights, our founders thought that 
Québec, with its civil law tradition, could never be rendered uniform with 
the other provinces, not even if it gave its own consent to such standard-
ization! The following excerpts of speeches given respectively by M.C. 
Cameron (Canada West) and Christopher Dunkin (Canada East) in the 
United Canadian Parliament in 1865 lend support to such a reading of this 
dimension of our constitutional arrangement:
4 On this topic, see LaSelva (1995, 56ff). See, also, Laforest (2004, 201ff).
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Such being the guarded terms of the resolution, why is it not made applicable 
to Lower Canada as well as to the other provinces? I can easily understand 
the feeling of the French people and can admire it – that they do not want to 
have anything forced upon them whether they will or not. But they will not 
allow you to contemplate even the possibility of any change taking place for 
the general weal, and with their own consent, in their laws […] I do not under-
stand (Cameron, quoted by Ajzenstat et al. 1999, 305-306).
The other provinces may have their laws made uniform, but an exception 
in this respect is made for Lower Canada, and as if to make it apparent that 
Lower Canada is never to be like the rest of the Confederation, it is carefully 
provided that the general parliament may make uniform the laws of the other 
provinces only – that is to say, provided those provinces consent to it, but by 
inference it cannot extend this uniformity to Lower Canada, not even if she 
should wish it […] They may become uniform among themselves, but Lower 
Canada, even though her people were to wish it, must not be uniform with 
them […] Thus, in one way and another, Lower Canada is to be placed on a 
separate and distinct footing from the other provinces, so that her interests 
and institutions may not be meddled with (Dunkin, quoted by Ajzenstat et al. 
1999, 346).
There were many aspects to Confederation, and many sides to Cartier’s 
political career. I do not wish to over -simplify either of these complex real-
ities here. Obviously, there were many centralizing aspects in the Québec 
Resolutions and in the Constitution Act, 1867 – many of which Cartier 
approved. For instance, as the person with the broadest social connec-
tions among the Fathers of Confederation, Cartier supported the powers 
of reservation and disallowance as a means of offering safeguards to the 
English -Catholic and Protestant groups in Québec (Ajzenstat et al. 1999, 
435). This notwithstanding, Cartier’s central achievements were the res-
toration of Québec’s political existence and autonomy, with legislative 
control over local matters and affairs related to communitarian identity 
such as property and civil rights. Through the well -understood meaning 
of section 94, at least for our Founders, at the time of Confederation and 
of civil law codification, Québec re -emerged as a self -governing polit-
ical community with substantial legislative powers and a unique, distinct, 
asymmetrical constitutional identity in Canadian federalism. We should 
not be surprised to read that similar arguments were employed when 
Cartier, Taché, Belleau, and others had to defend the proposed constitu-
tion in Québec:
What Confederation did was to break up that united province, and to cre-
ate a separate province of Québec and a separate province of Ontario. The 
pro -Confederation editorialists, speech -makers, and pamphleteers pushed 
that aspect of the arrangement – that Québec was going to be separated, that 
French Canadians were going to have a state of their own which would have 
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complete control over all matters of provincial jurisdiction, and that it was a 
move towards greater separation. That was the selling point in Québec… It 
was justified to nationalist -minded French Canadians as a kind of liberation: 
at least on provincial issues they would be able to follow their own inclina-
tions and not to have to seek cooperation from the English (Arthur Silver as 
quoted in Bothwell 1995, 38-39).
Conclusion
There was indeed a strong, coherent, and logical historical and legal 
basis for asymmetrical federalism in Canada’s founding debates, in the 
Québec Resolutions as well as in the Constitution Act, 1867. It was a 
peculiar kind of asymmetry. It was an indirect, oblique, and tacit sort 
of asymmetry. It had to be read through “inference ”and “induction”, as 
those who spoke about it at the time saw it. I shall call this asymétrie à 
l’anglaise or “English -inspired asymmetry.” It was the kind of reason-
ing to which a sharp legal mind, trained in English or British common 
law, such as Oliver Mowat, was accustomed. Less than twenty years after 
extremists burnt the Canadian Parliament in Montréal, there was possibly 
politically no other way to write in the new constitution a distinct special or 
asymmetrical status for the re -established Province of Québec. Inasmuch 
as the Constitution Act, 1867 is still part of our fundamental law, polit-
ical theorists like Kymlicka are thus correct to write that Canada belongs 
to the family of asymmetrical multinational federations. However, our 
constitutional law and corresponding political culture have been substan-
tially transformed by the addition of the Constitution Act, 1982. The main 
author of this reform, Pierre Elliott Trudeau, did not regard favourably 
the principles of asymmetrical federalism or special status for Québec. 
His vision of liberal democracy propounded symmetrical equality for 
individuals as well as for provinces. On this issue, there are differences 
between Trudeau’s personal vision and the content of the reform’s most 
important aspect, the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The 
Charter, for instance, recognizes indirectly that Canada is a multinational 
federation through its provisions concerning Aboriginal peoples. But the 
main point for me here is the kind of political culture fostered in the land 
by Trudeau’s vision and by the reform. The 1982 reform has moved us 
into an age of solemn, symbolic constitutional declarations. I shall call 
Trudeau’s vision of clear, solemn, symmetrical equality for all Canadians 
and all provinces within Canadian federalism symétrie à la française or 
“French -inspired symmetry”.
In our Constitution, the 1867 principle of English -inspired asym-
metry, granting Québec distinct status within the Canadian federation, is 
opposed by the 1982 principle of French or Cartesian or Trudeau -inspired 
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symmetry, rejecting any substantial and legal distinct status for Québec. 
Canadians have not yet found their way to French -inspired asymmetrical 
federalism. Although history remains open, the debates provoked by 
the signature of the health agreement a decade ago in September 2004, 
including a parallel Canada -Québec Accord on asymmetrical federalism, 
have taught us that getting there will not be an easy or safe journey for 
anyone. Between 2014 and 2017, the celebrations surrounding the 150th 
anniversaries of the Charlottetown and Québec City conferences of 1864, 
and of course those more directly linked to the advent of our federal con-
stitution in 1867, will provide us with numerous opportunities to further 




What Canadian Federalism Means in Québec
As a teacher, in my instructions to students as they prepare their term 
papers, I often remind them that they should never abdicate their judg-
ment to the authority of one single source. In the worst of circumstances, 
it is much better to articulate one’s own ideas and convictions than to sur-
render to a single book or article. In the same spirit, I would urge readers 
not to rely solely on my pronouncements about the meaning of federalism 
in Québec. In truth, this chapter’s title should include a question mark, 
and its content will illustrate, I hope, the richness and diversity of cur-
rent Québecois thinking on the subject. There are many ways as well to 
approach the topic at hand. I have chosen a path that reflects my academic 
identity as a political theorist and an intellectual historian, keenly inter-
ested in the relationship between philosophy and constitutional law in 
Canada, hidden in a political science department. As a reader of Gadamer 
and as a former student of Charles Taylor, I start with some interpretive 
or hermeneutical precautions. Beyond the undeniable relevance of cur-
rent reflections about the theory of federalism in its most general aspects, 
the real question of this chapter deals with the contemporary meaning of 
Canadian federalism in Québec.
Constitutional experts, ever attuned to the country’s mood, are all too 
aware that, after decades of wide -ranging discussions and reform projects 
concerning the fundamental law of the land, Canada now suffers from a 
broad constitutional fatigue (Gibbins 2009, 113). The idea of constitu-
tional reform appears dated, passé, rendered almost unattainable through 
the legal and political rigidities surrounding the amending formula. Other 
issues now dominate the political agenda such as global environmental 
sustainability, securing rights in a multicultural society, and economic 
challenges. In Québec, something else must be added. The dream of full 
political sovereignty, which has occupied so many people and utilized so 
much energy over the past four decades, appears increasingly improbable 
as time goes on. Daniel Jacques and Alain Dubuc, a philosopher and a 
journalist respectively, and two of our most prominent public intellec-
tuals, have recently written about the consequences of granting continued 
prominence to the ideal of sovereignty while its realization appears ever 
more unlikely. They suggest that it encourages a spirit of bad faith in 
Canadian politics. Witness the contradictions of the Bloc Québécois and 
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how the party is perceived elsewhere. It fosters an attitude of self -contempt 
in younger generations attached to Québec as a nation but disappointed 
by the inability to realize the ultimate objective of sovereignty. Moreover, 
it yields to arcane idealism instead of facing lucidly and responsibly the 
challenges of current times (Jacques 2007; Dubuc 2008). In addition to 
the constitutional fatigue it shares with the rest of Canada, Québec now 
also seems to exhibit a kind of political exhaustion. Full nation -state 
status eludes sovereigntists, while federalists remain unable to achieve 
the kind of meaningful reform that would allow Québec to become a fully 
consenting partner in Canada’s constitutional order. Québec is staying 
in Canada but its situation, as I suggest in this book, is akin to that of an 
internal political and constitutional exile. People are, indeed, moving to 
other, more pressing issues like reasonable accommodations and the chal-
lenges of diversity, the role of the state in a rapidly aging society burdened 
by soaring health costs and a huge provincial public debt, crumbling road 
infrastructures, the social consequences of religious disaffection centrally 
(but not exclusively) in the French -speaking majority, and the hardships 
of a public education system ill -equipped to promote the virtues that lead 
to academic excellence in a post -modern, hedonistic, and relativistic cul-
tural, social, and global environment.
Beyond this introduction, in the chapter’s next section, I specify 
how I understand the topic, thereby providing an interpretive context. In 
the second part, I survey contemporary trends and current scholarship 
regarding federalism in Québec. This incorporates critical reflections 
going beyond the description of this current literature on topics such as 
multinationalism and plural identities, trust and loyalty, and the whole 
matter concerning the rebalancing of our federal regime.
I.  Interpretive Context
The task of interpreting the meaning of Canadian federalism in Québec 
is manifold. In academia, it certainly involves integrating the methods and 
approaches of various disciplines such as history, constitutional law, phil-
osophy, and political science. Interest towards this topic, not surprisingly, 
goes far beyond academia, reaching a wider public through the media ever 
since the Confederation debates of 1864-1866 (Bellavance 1992; Silver 
1997). At least up until the 1995 referendum in Québec and its immediate 
aftermath, the meaning and fate of federalism in Québec has commanded 
the attention of numerous scholars and intellectuals from English -
speaking Canada (e.g., Black 1975; Moore 1997; McRoberts 1997; Silver 
1982; Smiley 1980). It is an impoverishment of the topic to ignore this lit-
erature here, as I proceed to do. The same remark applies to the sustained 
interest in the broad topic of Canadian and comparative federalism in 
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the English -speaking scholarly community throughout the land. The dean 
of scholars on this broad topic, Ronald L. Watts, has reprinted the third 
edition of his book Comparing Federal Systems (Watts 2008). In 2000, 
the late Richard Simeon delivered the Kenneth R. MacGregor Lecture at 
Queen’s University, reflecting on the relationship between political sci-
ence and federalism, encompassing seven decades of scholarly engage-
ment (Simeon 2002). In 2004, the Institute of Intergovernmental Relations 
at Queen’s University published a major collection, part of the Canada: 
State of the Federation Series, devoted to, and aptly titled, Reconsidering 
the Institutions of Canadian Federalism (Meekison, Telford, and Lazar 
2004). Working respectively out of Montréal and Ottawa, Dimitrios 
Karmis and Wayne Norman published a major collection, providing a 
reader on theories of federalism in the world (Karmis and Norman 2005). 
Interestingly, there are three chapters by Canadians in this book, written 
by Ronald Watts, Pierre Elliott Trudeau, and Will Kymlicka. Obviously, 
the meaning of federalism in Québec is deeply related to the meaning of 
federalism throughout Canada, so beyond this chapter it would be quite 
foolhardy to ignore the multiple contributions of Canadian scholars on 
federalism. Incidentally, this Canadian proficiency has now reached a 
global stage through the immense erudition provided by the Forum of 
Federations in the last decade.
The meaning of federalism in Québec has evolved over time and the 
various travails of our common history. The classical compact theory, in its 
pact -of -provinces, pact -of -peoples, or combination -of -both formulae, is 
of course an interpretive construction that has undergone various reformu-
lations (Kelly and Laforest 2004). Here, I only provide a few glimpses of 
this immensely rich literature. Around the time of our Centennial, in the 
mid -1960s, Jean -Charles Bonenfant, an important Laval constitutional 
law scholar, reflected upon the meaning of Confederation. He concluded 
that often in history, peoples or nations live together less out of recipro-
cal affection than through their inability to live separately. In 1990, in the 
aftermath of the Meech Lake Accord’s demise, Léon Dion, co -founder 
of Laval’s Department of Political Science, and father of Stéphane Dion, 
former leader of the Liberal Party of Canada, had this to say in his testi-
mony to the Bélanger -Campeau Commission:
Québec must at long last obtain an absolute right of veto over any amendment 
to the Canadian Constitution. I had not hitherto seen one of the consequences 
that derives from these Québec demands. In the final analysis what I am re-
jecting is the 1982 revision of the Constitution in its entirety. English Canada 
ascribes great importance to the Charter of Rights enshrined by that revision. 
The Charter suits it well. We should not propose to amend it in various ways; 
we should reject it root and branch. We have had our own Charter of Rights 
for years. It suits us. We should strengthen its legal validity. Each person and 
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group would thus appeal to a single Charter of Rights. Everybody would be 
better off for it (quoted in Laforest 1995b, 105).
Throughout his entire life, Léon Dion was a passionate promoter of 
the Canadian dream of duality. More than twenty years ago, at the height 
of our debate over ratifying the Meech Lake Accord, I gave a lecture 
about his thought in the Department of Political Science at the University 
of Alberta. In the passage just quoted, one can sense the immensity of his 
disappointment over the demise of Meech Lake and the constitutional 
stalemate it provoked. In a way, as I shall develop further in my conclu-
sion, this stalemate is still with us.
The matter of federalism’s meaning in Québec and throughout Canada 
is of course the business at hand, and many would hasten to add that 
it is primarily the intimate domain of constitutional law scholars. This 
chapter will also stay outside the technical discussions about relevance 
and relative strength of federalism as a constitutional principle in our fun-
damental law and particularly in the era of Charter dialogue (Kelly and 
Manfredi 2009). Constitutional jurisprudence, from the lofty statements 
of the Judiciary Committee of the Privy Council, to the Laskin Supreme 
Court in the era of Patriation, to the Lamer Supreme Court’s historical 
reconstruction in the case of Reference re Secession of Québec, are only 
indirectly discussed. Historians, for their part, would be quick to invite us 
to consider the interpretation of Canadian federalism in a number of key 
commissions of enquiry over the last century, some of them in Québec, 
all of them involving Québec thinkers, judges, or politicians like Rowell 
-Sirois, Tremblay, Laurendeau -Dunton, Pépin -Robarts, MacDonald, 
Bélanger -Campeau, and Erasmus -Dussault. Each and every one of these 
commissions had something important to say about the meaning of feder-
alism in Québec and in Canada.
Interpreting the meaning of Canadian federalism in Québec must 
take into consideration the fact that the country has changed a lot since 
Confederation. This is one of the arguments put forward by André 
Pratte, chief editorialist at La Presse and one of the key contributors in 
the Québec debate over the meaning of federalism, as I shall illustrate 
at greater length in the next section. For now, I will limit myself to a 
few major facts mentioned by Pratte. There are 47 times more people in 
Alberta today than at the time of Confederation, and in British Columbia 
the figure is 120 times. In 1901, the population of Québec was 7 times 
higher than the combined population of these two provinces. As mat-
ters currently stand, there are now more people in Alberta and British 
Columbia combined than in Québec. Within my lifetime, roughly speak-
ing, Québec’s share of Canada’s total population will have declined from 
about 30% to 20%. Comparatively speaking, it is accurate to speak of 
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Québec’s steady demographical and economic decline in modern -day 
Canada. However, for the foreseeable future, Québec will continue to 
play an important role in Canada’s political and constitutional make -up. 
This much can be expected of a distinct national society of close to eight 
million people, operating predominantly in French, culturally and eco-
nomically dynamic on the world stage, and integrating immigrants in an 
autonomous educational, communicational, and institutional network, in 
an English -French bilingual federal country called Canada. The reality of 
English -French duality, anchored first and foremost but not exclusively in 
Québec, is a major part of Canada’s past, present, and future.
From the mid -1990s onwards, when I was working on the Institute 
for Research on Public Policy’s Beyond the Impasse project with Roger 
Gibbins, now president of the Canada West Foundation, I coined an 
expression that owed a lot to my experience in Calgary: “I’d much pre-
fer to be governed in a federal way by a unilingual Albertan, than in a 
quasi -imperial way by a fellow Québecer.” Like many people in my prov-
ince, I was disenchanted by the way in which, at least in my eyes, the 
Canadian government, led by Prime Minister Jean Chrétien, showed little 
respect for the institutions and principles of federalism in its fiscal poli-
cies, higher -education initiatives, and more generally towards its rather 
arbitrary and unilateral way of coordinating our political regime. As 
many Québecers were gradually moving away from the idea of seriously 
considering the sovereignty option, they had some reason to believe that 
Canadians beyond their province were gradually moving away from the 
idea of federalism as an ethical, institutional, and constitutional pillar of 
our system.
There is a short, simple answer to the question about the meaning of 
federalism in Québec, and it has been reformulated in recent years by pol-
itical scientists such as Alain -G. Gagnon, Alain Noël, François Rocher, 
and myself: liberty and identity, autonomy and recognition. Canadian 
federalism, at its best, provides Québec with a substantial degree of pol-
itical freedom while preserving and promoting its distinct identity. It fos-
ters autonomy and offers an authentic form of recognition.
A quarter of a century after Lord Durham’s Report and after the 1840 
Act of Union, the emergence of a federal Dominion in Canada in 1867 
meant, in the eyes of George -Étienne Cartier and those who sided with 
him, nothing less than the political renaissance of Québec and its resurfa-
cing as an autonomous, distinct, self -governing political community. The 
following two passages coherently illustrate this line of interpretation. 
The first passage is taken from a parliamentary speech made by John A. 
Macdonald, while the second summarizes Arthur Silver’s views about the 
French -Canadian idea of Confederation:
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I have again and again stated in the house that, if practicable, I thought a 
legislative union would be preferable… But on looking at the subject in the 
conference […] we found that such a system was impracticable. In the first 
place, it would not meet the assent of the people of Lower Canada because 
they felt that in their peculiar position – being in a minority, with a different 
language, nationality and religion from the majority – in case of a junction 
with the other provinces, their institutions and their laws might be assailed, 
and their ancestral associations, on which they prided themselves, attacked 
and prejudiced. It was found that any proposition which involved the ab-
sorption of the individuality of Lower Canada […] would not be received 
with favour by her people. (Macdonald in the Legislative Assembly of United 
Canada on February 6, 1865, quoted in Ajzenstat et al. 2000, 279)1
Here was the very heart and essence of the pro -Confederation argument in 
French Lower Canada: the Union of the Canadas was to be broken up, and the 
French Canadians were to take possession of a province of their own – a prov-
ince with an enormous degree of autonomy. In fact, separation (from Upper 
Canada) and independence (of Québec within its own jurisdictions) were the 
main themes of Bleu propaganda. “As a distinct and separate nationality,” 
said La Minerve, we form a state within the state. We enjoy the full exercise 
of our rights and the formal recognition of our national independence (Silver 
1997, 41).
These two passages remind us of what Canadian federalism meant in 
Québec in 1867. The length of this section shows that many hermeneut-
ical precautions need to be taken before attacking head -on the heart of 
the matter of what federalism may mean for us in the contemporary era.
II.  Contemporary Trends and Scholarship:  
Critical Reflections
In political, intellectual, and academic circles in Québec, a federalist 
revival is currently occurring. I believe it is useful to start with a collec-
tion of essays put together by André Pratte. It is entitled Reconquérir le 
Canada: un nouveau projet pour la nation québécoise, and was released 
in English with the title Reconquering Canada. Reading this book, many 
came to the view that Canadian federalism had finally found its voice anew 
in Québec. Pratte and the book’s contributors share four premises: it is in 
Québec’s long term interests to remain within Canada; Québecers must 
change their approach towards Canada, moving beyond the language of 
grievances and constitutional demands; Québecers should be more active 
1 The French version of this book, Ajzenstat et al (2004), has an additional chapter writ-
ten by Kelly and Laforest, which provides a broad overview of the evolution of inter-
pretive perspectives on Canadian federalism in Québec from the time of Confederation 
to the late 20th century. 
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participants in the political life of the country; and, Québec already pos-
sesses all the required tools to meet its contemporary challenges (Pratte 
2007, 10). In short, Québec must move beyond isolationism, Québecers 
must be more enthusiastic Canadians, and federalists must abandon their 
dogmas and vanquish their fear to act and speak out forcefully on behalf 
of their option. In his own contribution to the book, “Faire table rase: 
Voir notre passé autrement pour mieux bâtir notre avenir”, which trans-
lates as “Starting from the ground up: Reading our past differently in 
order to better construct our future,” Pratte offers a lucid reassessment of 
Québec’s situation and fate within Canada. With words echoing those of 
André Laurendeau at the time of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism 
and Biculturalism fifty years ago, Pratte invites his fellow Québecers to 
become more involved and take more risks in the human and social experi-
ment called Canada. Québecers should learn more about other provinces 
and other Canadians, they should learn the language and the spirit of com-
promise, and extend a generous hand to their allies and partners in the 
business of this country. Québecers have constructed a distinct society, 
which they should be proud of, and that allows them to control their own 
destiny. They should act responsibly and affirm themselves through their 
economic progress, their dynamism, and their creativity.2 Canada has 
changed significantly since 1867. Its governance is now extraordinarily 
complex, and in this context Québecers must abandon their past -oriented 
approach and the rhetoric of victimhood (Pratte 2007, 232). Invoking in 
his writings a historical tabula rasa as a strategic orientation for a more 
rewarding future, Pratte joins a number of contemporary historians and 
philosophers who have systematically criticized the rather nostalgic and 
melancholical brand of nationalism that has occupied a prominent place 
in Québec since the Quiet Revolution (Létourneau 2004a; Maclure 2003; 
Weinstock 2005).
In her chapter, “Apprendre à jouer le jeu: le défi du Québec au sein du 
Canada”, in English “Learning the rules of the game: Québec’s challenge 
within Canada,” Marie Bernard -Meunier puts forward an appeal to the 
politics of reason. The complexity of federal governance is such, accord-
ing to her, that such regimes can only be the choice of necessity (recall 
the reference to Bonenfant and the spirit of 1867 in the previous section). 
She sees four principles at work in the logic and nature of federalism: the 
locus of equilibrium in a federation will always be unstable; the cohesion 
of a federal regime rests on its ability to reconcile two fundamental needs, 
the wish of the partners to preserve their identity (rester soi -même) and 
their desire to pull together (s’unir); such regimes are marriages of reason, 
2 See Pratte (2006, 132; 2007, 252-253) and Dubuc (2008, 229).
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and thus, in Canada, Québecers should restrain their crippling desire to be 
recognized and loved; and, finally, perhaps at least partly in contradiction 
with the previous principle, federations require dual loyalties and senses 
of belonging (Bernard -Meunier 2007, 133-134). In her careful compari-
son of Canadian and German federal institutions and practices, she notes 
that in both countries a kind of natural logic towards centralization needs 
to be counterbalanced, and that Germany is better equipped than Canada 
to do this. However, in German federalism all partners play the game with 
an authentic, bona fide desire to share and cooperate with the others. In 
Canada, she concludes that Québec has broken the equilibrium between 
autonomy and solidarity -participation, pursuing its sole interests in an 
instrumental/utilitarian approach (Bernard -Meunier 2007, 140).
Relying on his vast knowledge of health politics in Canada, Pierre -
Gerlier Forest invites Québecers and their political leaders to imagine 
more boldly the institutions and practices of interdependence adapted to 
the 21st century. In health as in other matters, he argues, Québec must 
move beyond the blind and mechanical repetition of its traditional 
demands and grievances. In his chapter, entitled “Santé: en finir avec la 
chaise vide”, which translates as “Health policy: renouncing the empty 
chair approach,” he proposes a typology of current understandings of 
federalism in Québec and elsewhere in Canada, overlapping the pole 
of centralization -decentralization with the symmetry -asymmetry axis. 
Traditionally, in Québec, the hegemonic approach towards federalism has 
privileged strong asymmetry with substantial decentralization. Although 
the interpretive panorama is somewhat more complex in Canada -beyond 
-Québec, Forest believes that since the advent of the 1982 Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms, greater centralization and greater symmetry have 
been put forward through a redefinition of Canadian nationalism. Forest 
makes an insightful point about the logic of change in a federal regime. 
He concludes with most experts that the burden of proof belongs to those 
wishing to secede from a federation. He then proceeds to add that the 
burden of proof should also belong to those wanting to consolidate cen-
tralizing and symmetrical dimensions (Forest 2007, 272). Justifying in 
pragmatic terms the respective presence of our provincial and federal 
governments in the field of health, in an era characterized by the primary 
authority of science and knowledge, Forest adds that this burden of proof 
should also belong to those wanting to restrain our ability to innovate and 
experiment with different approaches.
Much of the public interest surrounding Pratte’s edited volume at 
the time of its publication centred on Jean Leclair’s brilliant, thought -
provoking, polemical, and at times inflammatory chapter, entitled “Vers 
une pensée politique fédérale: la répudiation du mythe de la différence 
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québécoise radicale” or, in English, “Towards a federal political theory: 
repudiating the myth of Québec’s radical difference.” Not since Pierre 
Elliott Trudeau penned the chapters and articles that found their way into 
his own collection of articles in the 1960s entitled Federalism and the 
French Canadians (1968) has any Québec intellectual written such an 
eloquent pamphlet about the theoretical and practical merits of federal-
ism. In truth, some parallels could be established between Leclair and 
his former Université de Montréal colleague, Stéphane Dion. Both march 
in the footsteps of Alexis de Tocqueville and Pierre Trudeau, crafting a 
philosophical defence of federalism for the benefit of individual freedom 
and multiple identities. Both see federal governance as an exercise in 
counterbalancing forces, promoting a political culture marked by a spirit 
of compromise and moderation. Beyond theory however, Dion’s “Straight 
Talk” for contemporary Canada, to paraphrase the title of his book, is 
dominated by his own brand of coherent anti -separatism (Dion, 1999). 
His ethics and praxis of federalism look like overtures in this greater 
symphony. Leclair’s essay, in contrast, is first and foremost an essay in 
praise of Canadian federalism in Québec. According to him, the under-
standing of Canada propounded by Québec nationalists and sovereigntists 
has been deterministic and totalizing, vastly exaggerating the strength of 
centralizing elements in the political and legal systems. He believes that 
these writings have also been premised on a monistic approach towards 
“nation” and “culture” that disregards the authentic possibility of multiple 
identities and develops a culturalizing pathos over -simplifying social 
reality. “One can only adhere to a single nation, everything is cultural 
in social life, and Québec is fundamentally and radically different from 
the rest of Canada.” Such would be my summary of Leclair’s overview 
of the premises and deficiencies of much contemporary thinking about 
Canadian federalism in Québec.
In order to develop a serious theory and practice of federalism in 
Canada, Leclair believes that it is necessary to accept a series of premises 
and spiritual preconditions, which are listed here:
• there are differences between human beings but, in addition, each 
human being is traversed by a plurality of forms and modes of 
belonging;
• cultural dimensions are far from exhausting the whole of reality;
• the function of federalism is to limit the power of the state as well 
as to peacefully structure relations between various communities;
• federalism requires a combination of autonomy and solidarity;
• a climate of tension is inescapable in any federal regime, in politics 
in general, and in democratic politics in particular;
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• federalism is not a zero -sum game. Canada and the central govern-
ment do not win whenever Québec and its government lose, and 
vice versa;
• a majority of Québecers remain substantially attached to the 
Canadian state (Leclair 2007, 63).
Constitutional law professors, and their students, would no doubt 
appreciate Leclair’s efforts to elaborate a balanced reading of the cur-
rent state of Supreme Court jurisprudence concerning the meaning and 
the importance of federalism in Canadian constitutionalism. He discusses 
such issues as the legal anchoring of the central government’s spending 
power, the “national dimensions” and “national emergencies” theories 
of interpretation, the federal jurisdiction over the regulation of trade and 
commerce, and over communications and concerning the implementation 
of treatises. On these matters, his main academic interlocutor in Québec 
is my young colleague Eugénie Brouillet, who is fast becoming one of 
Québec’s pre -eminent authorities on federalism and the Constitution. Her 
views will be discussed further on in this chapter.
Leclair concludes his contribution with a series of reflections on what 
needs to be done in order to foster a greater federal spirit or political 
culture of federalism in Québec and in Canada as a whole. I shall limit 
myself here to what he says about Québec. In Québec, this would require 
abandoning an essentialist and totalizing approach towards culture and 
identity. It would require a better equilibrium between autonomy and soli-
darity (Leclair 2007, 65-66). Finally, it would be greatly helped by relin-
quishing an overly narcissistic approach on public policy dialogue. This, 
by the way, was one of the ideas I developed ten years ago in the Beyond 
the Impasse project with Roger Gibbins, advocating that federal associ-
ates should place themselves in the shoes of the other partners (Laforest 
1998b, 51-52).
Ever since Confederation, as I have begun to argue earlier in this chap-
ter, the dominant paradigm regarding Canadian federalism in Québec has 
been about Québec’s identity, its liberty within Canada, and its autonomy 
(from Canada) and recognition (by Canada and/or other partners within 
Canada). François Rocher, a political scientist at the University of Ottawa, 
has written one of the most recent enlightening pieces about Canadian 
federalism. He believes that in both Québec and English -speaking 
Canada, interpretive developments are still heavily dependent, respect-
ively, on the reports of two mid -20th century commissions of enquiry: 
the Tremblay Commission in Québec and the Rowell -Sirois Commission 
across Canada. I shall quote at length from Rocher’s chapter:
In Québec the dominant understanding of federalism and federal institutions 
has its origins in the Tremblay Report, named for the chairman of the Québec 
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Government’s Royal Commission on Constitutional Problems, published 
in 1956. Since then, while evidently being adapted for particular political 
conjunctures, the Québec -Canada debate has taken place almost exclusively 
within the argumentative framework set out in that report. Similarly, the lit-
erature in English on Canadian federalism, as well as the practice of federal-
ism by the general government, follows the argumentation advanced by the 
Rowell -Sirois Commission, informally so named for its co -chairmen, in the 
Report of the Royal Commission on Dominion -Provincial Relations, pub-
lished in 1940.
To summarize my central argument in a few words: the dominant understand-
ing of the English -language literature on Canadian federalism pays no heed 
to the notion of autonomy but emphasizes the notion of efficiency, while 
Québec Francophone scholars and the practices of the Québec government 
have not adequately taken into account the notion of interdependence (Rocher 
2009, 98).
Healthily practicing federalism requires a form of equilibrium, of 
balance, between the requirements of autonomy on one side and those 
of solidarity -interdependence on the other. Interestingly, this remark 
has been recently reasserted both in a polemical fashion by Leclair, in a 
book quite critical of Québec sovereigntists and ultra -autonomists, and 
by Rocher, in the first textbook about Canadian federalism published in 
a long while in Québec.3 Rocher’s essential point is that ever since the 
Report of the Tremblay Commission in the mid -1950s, there has been 
no such equilibrium in the work of Québec’s Francophone scholars, the 
vast majority of whom now privilege securing and enhancing Québec’s 
autonomy while neglecting the importance of solidarity and interdepend-
ence. I do not dwell here on the fact that the topic of Québec’s autonomy 
was first and foremost in the Tremblay Commission’s work, considering 
that others have adequately dealt this this subject (Noël 2007; Rocher 
2009). I shall rather illustrate the preservation and strength of the same 
perspective in the current work of Francophone scholars in Québec, stem-
ming from a variety of academic disciplines and working with a variety 
of methodological approaches.
In a work of synthesis published in 2008, summarizing three decades 
of teachings on Canadian federalism, my Laval colleague Réjean Pelletier 
squarely espouses the autonomist approach of the Tremblay Commission 
as depicted by Rocher. The book, entitled Le Québec et le fédéralisme 
canadien: un regard crique (Québec and Canadian federalism: a critical 
assessment), starts with the classical interpretation highlighting the 
3 Gagnon (2009). Gagnon, Rocher and myself belong to the Groupe de recherche sur les 
sociétés plurinationales (research group on plurinational societies), based at Université 
du Québec in Montréal (UQAM).
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centralizing aspects of the 1867 Constitution, placing the provinces in 
general and Québec in particular in a subordinate position (Pelletier 2008, 
14). All constitutional and institutional developments coming in the after-
math of the founding moment are essentially examined from the perspec-
tive of their consequences for the preservation and promotion of Québec’s 
autonomy (Pelletier 2008, 54). Pelletier’s book has high pedagogical 
value. The chapters on intergovernmental relations, bilingualism, Senate 
reform, the Council of the Federation, and Harper’s “federalism of open-
ness” are solid and insightful (note that I discuss some of the same issues 
in chapter ten of this book. Pelletier’s chapter on asymmetrical federalism 
is an excellent example of the contemporary relevance of the Tremblay 
Commission’s hegemonic autonomist paradigm. Supplementing the insti-
tutional development work done by Alain -G. Gagnon (2009) on the nor-
mative foundations of asymmetry, Pelletier (2008, 150) laments the fact 
that Québec has never been adequately recognized as a minority nation or 
as a distinct society within Canada. The book ends on a rather pessimistic 
note, observing that Canada’s demographical and economic centers are 
moving further and further away from Québec. As minorities get weaker, 
Pelletier observes, they get less and less attention.
The study of Canadian federalism in Québec is successfully attracting 
a new generation of scholars. This is nowhere more evident than in the 
field of constitutional law, with the recent contributions from figures 
such as Jean Leclair (previously discussed), Jean -François Gaudreault 
-Desbiens (2005), and Eugénie Brouillet who co -authored the most 
important French -language Canadian constitutional law textbook 
(Brun, Tremblay, and Brouillet 2008). Brouillet has also published a 
book exploring Canadian federalism’s legal dimensions with regards to 
Québec’s autonomy and cultural identity (Brouillet 2005). Entitled La 
négation de la nation: l’identité culturelle Québécoise et le fédéralisme 
canadien (The negation of the nation: Québec’s cultural identity and 
Canadian federalism), her book modified, at least in part, the traditional 
Québec interpretation focusing on the centralizing trends at work in the 
1867 founding document. While not denying the institutional thrust of 
this analysis, Brouillet suggests that the 19th century federal Constitution 
had much to offer for the defence and development of Québec’s cultural 
identity. I cannot do justice here to the richness of the sections of her book 
that focus on the founding debates, the principles of the division of pow-
ers between the federal government and provinces, and the ways in which 
Québec’s autonomy and cultural identity were originally secured and 
later enhanced by constitutional jurisprudence since 1867. Nor can I con-
sider her rigorous treatment of the jurisprudential evolution in the periods 
1949-1982 and 1982-2005, which she characterizes as a steady dilution 
of the federative principle’s importance in cases and matters pertaining 
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to Québec’s cultural identity. What I find particularly striking is the fact 
that, in the same spirit as found in Pelletier’s monograph, Canada and its 
federal traditions, laws, and institutions are examined quite exhaustively, 
but solely, from the perspective of Québec’s autonomy and distinctive-
ness. In a key development, Brouillet approvingly quotes the Report of 
the Tremblay Commission4 in support of the idea that key matters deal-
ing with culture and societal identity were left to provinces and thus to 
Québec in 1867, before synthesizing an argument about the centrality 
of the principle of autonomy of spheres of jurisdiction to understand the 
relationships between orders of government (Brouillet 2005, 154-156). 
In these pages, she thoroughly vindicates Rocher on his point about the 
contemporary relevance of the paradigm clearly defined by the Report of 
the Tremblay Commission in Francophone scholarship in Québec.
What Pelletier and Brouillet represent, and have accomplished 
respectively within the spheres of political science and constitutional 
law, is brilliantly completed in the universe of political philosophy by 
my Université de Montréal colleague, Michel Seymour. In a remark-
able synthesis published in 2008, entitled De la tolérance à la recon-
naissance: une théorie libérale des droits collectifs (From toleration to 
recognition: a liberal theory of collective rights), Seymour builds on the 
work of Charles Taylor, Will Kymlicka, and John Rawls in an attempt 
to justify philosophically and legitimize politically the existence of col-
lective self -governing rights for non -sovereign peoples (Seymour 2008). 
Kymlicka’s approach remains insufficient for Seymour because it cannot 
go beyond moral individualism in its defence of minority rights within 
liberal theory. Seymour’s argumentative strategy consists in extending 
to non -sovereign peoples the collective rights that the last Rawls – the 
Rawls of Political Liberalism and The Law of Peoples – is willing to 
grant to independent nation -states.5 All in all, Seymour has produced the 
decade’s most sophisticated philosophical argument in support of greater 
autonomy (i.e., self -government) for non -sovereign peoples in general 
and Québec in particular. In 1999, at the height of a particularly acrimoni-
ous period in Canada -Québec political and intellectual debates, Seymour 
published a book that clearly replicated the traditional Québec perspec-
tive on Canadian federalism: an existential approach towards Québec 
(its autonomy and its recognition) coupled with an instrumental/utilitar-
ian stance towards Canada. In a key passage of his 1999 book, Seymour 
reflects on the meaning and consequences for Canada of recognizing the 
4 Government of Québec (1956), Royal Commission of Inquiry on Constitutional 
Problems, four volumes, Québec: Éditeur official du Québec. 
5 For these two books, see Rawls (1993; 2001).
Interpreting Quebec’s Exile Within the Federation
80
existence of the Québec people. He summarizes these consequences in a 
list of ten points of what must be done:
1) Officially recognize the existence of the Québec people in the 
constitution;
2) Accept that the principle of provincial equality does not apply to 
Québec;
3) Accept the general principle of asymmetry in the distribution of 
powers and spheres of jurisdiction;
4) Formally accept the responsibilities of the Québec government in 
the promotion of the French language;
5) Accept that the Québec government is the only one in charge of cul-
ture, communications, and the internet on the territory of Québec;
6) Limit the spending power of the federal government;
7) Grant Québec a veto right on constitutional modifications;
8) Recognize that Québec has special responsibilities with regards to 
its national economy;
9) Give Québec the right to participate in the nomination of three of 
the nine judges on the Supreme Court; and,
10)  Accept that Québec should have an enhanced presence on the 
international stage. (Seymour 1999, 95-96).
Recall Rocher’s point about the lack of equilibrium in Québec’s 
Francophone federalist scholarship between the goal and value of auton-
omy, on one side, and the goal and value of solidarity/interdependence, on 
the other. It seems to me that the previous list and relevant passage from 
Seymour’s 1999 book perfectly illustrate this equilibrium. Supposing that 
Canada would consider accepting Seymour’s various points, all enhan-
cing Québec’s perennial objectives of greater autonomy and meaningful 
recognition, how would this transform the way Québec and its citizens 
understand Canada and what would be the specific consequences with 
regards to obtaining more authentic forms of solidarity and interdepend-
ence within the Canadian political community? Seymour remained silent 
on these matters in the bitter political context of 1999. In De la tolérance 
à la reconnaissance, previously mentioned here, he deals mostly with 
strictly philosophical matters, only incidentally referring to Canada -
Québec issues to reinforce the thrust of the argument. It is, nevertheless, 
unequivocally a philosophical work devoted to issues of autonomy, rec-
ognition, and self -government, rather than cooperation and interdepend-
ence, as the following central passage clearly establishes. Note that the 
translation is mine.
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Peoples without states possess in my understanding a general, unilateral and 
primary right to internal self -determination, i.e. they have the right to de-
velop themselves, economically, socially, culturally within the larger state 
[État englobant in French],and the right to determine their political status 
within this larger state. A secession right should be admitted only as a right for 
reparation. If the larger state refuses the representation of the minority people 
within its institutions, if it quashes the rights and freedoms of the citizens of 
the minority people, if it annexes the territory of the minority people, the lat-
ter has the right to secede. More importantly, the minority people is endowed 
with a right to secede seen as a right for reparation if the larger state violates 
the principle of internal self -determination of the minority people (Seymour 
2008, 624).
Whether the emphasis is placed on approaches used in political science, 
constitutional law, or political philosophy, the same conclusion appears to 
be warranted. Francophone Québec scholarship studies Canadian federal-
ism with an existential and Québec -centric ultra -autonomist focus, adopt-
ing an instrumental/utilitarian stance towards Canada. This orientation 
carries with it a number of consequences clearly discussed by Rocher:
Following from the recognition of the need for the general government to 
respect provincial jurisdiction, the Québec government during the Quiet 
Revolution demanded the recasting of Canada’s Constitution in order to ob-
tain powers that it judged to be indispensable to the affirmation of the Québec 
identity in all spheres of activities – economic, social, political and cultural 
[…] For the Québec governments, the Québec -Canada dynamic is illustrated 
through several concepts: attachment to the principle of autonomy, respect 
for and expansion of provincial jurisdictions, achieving a distinct status, and 
asymmetrical federalism […] It is remarkable to note that this construction 
has taken place, both at the discursive level and concerning the Québec -
Canada state relations, on the basis of the non -participation of Québec in the 
building of the Canadian political community (Rocher 2009, 106-109).
In all these affairs pertaining to trust, loyalty, and equilibrium, it is cer-
tainly wrong to put exclusive focus on one of the partners. Considering, 
as I do in this chapter, the evolving meaning of Canadian federalism in 
Québec, I could encourage readers to become blind to the fact that if 
indeed the federative principle’s importance has been diluted in Canada’s 
institutions and political culture, accompanied by a certain abandonment 
of what Rocher has called the ideal of federalism in recent decades, it is of 
course not only because of Québec, its political leaders, and its intellec-
tuals. Rocher himself, in his seminal analysis, recalls that the ideal of fed-
eralism has also been abandoned by English -speaking Canada ever since 
the Rowell -Sirois Commission. Contemporary behavior by political elites 
and corresponding scholarly studies have reproduced the abandonment 
of autonomy – with an exclusive emphasis put on the instrumental logic 
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of performance and effectiveness, which characterized the Commission’s 
work. Notwithstanding this remark, my subject matter remains evolving 
ideas about Canadian federalism in Québec. Reflecting on the work of 
the past decade, I would suggest that, although Rocher remains correct in 
asserting the hegemony of the interpretive paradigm associated with the 
Tremblay Commission, a number of cracks exist in this model, lending 
credibility to the idea that a paradigm shift could occur in the foresee-
able future. The work of André Pratte and his colleagues does not simply 
amount to an exceptional event in the quiet air of still interpretive times.
In 2005, one of Prime Minister Trudeau’s former speechwriters and 
advisors, and a philosopher in his own right, André Burelle, published a 
major book in which he offered a critical re -assessment of Trudeau’s intel-
lectual and political trajectories. Marching in the footsteps of Emmanuel 
Mounier and Jacques Maritain, Burelle recalled the four principles of a 
federalist political philosophy steeped in the categories of “communitar-
ian personalism,” coined by Denis de Rougemont and others in the after-
math of the Second World War and the dawn of Europe’s reconstruction. 
These principles are summarized as follows:
1) In a liberal -democratic federal regime, the ethical anchor of just 
relations between citizens and federated communities should be 
the principle of equivalent treatment rather than identical (uniform, 
symmetrical) treatment, because whenever we treat in a uniform 
way beings and agents who are not identical, we negate their dif-
ference and we cease to pursue the federal goal of union without 
fusion;
2) Subsidiarity should be entrenched as a founding principle to es-
tablish the sharing of jurisdictions between federal governmental 
partners. In order to maintain the exercise of power as close as pos-
sible to human beings and communities of close proximity, matters 
should be allocated or transferred to the central authorities only 
when they cannot be dealt with appropriately (in a just and effi-
cient way) at the local level;
3) Non -subordination should be entrenched as a founding principle 
with regards to the sharing of sovereignty. The establishment of 
peaceful and creative cohabitation between federal partners re-
quires that none of the orders of government should be subordin-
ated in law or in practice to the other in the exercise of their 
respective constitutional powers; and,
4) Co -decision should be established as the founding principle for 
the management of interdependence between partners in the 
federation. In order to respect the previous principle (i.e., non -
subordination), federal partners should decide jointly the nature 
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and scope of the constraints that each is prepared to accept in the 
exercise of one’s sovereign powers to solve the problems that they 
also share jointly when their respective jurisdictions meet one an-
other (Burelle 2005, 44).
Interestingly, Burelle shares many of the critical judgments concern-
ing Canada’s evolving federation that can be found in many contempor-
ary studies faithful to the traditional Québec autonomist interpretive 
canon, such as Pelletier, Brouillet, and Seymour. Like most analysts, 
Burelle believes that there was greater respect for the principles he cher-
ishes in the 1867 Constitution than when Canada was constitutionally 
re -founded in 1982. However, he is much more vocal and lucid than any-
body else about the need for a new equilibrium between the requirements 
of autonomy and those of solidarity -interdependence. Over the past dec-
ade, without concrete results much to his chagrin, Burelle has advocated 
that Québec governments should open talks on this idea of a new equi-
librium, demanding the constitutional recognition of Québec’s right to 
national difference (a difference that comes with legal and political con-
sequences beyond simply symbols), while at the same time accepting the 
aforementioned principle of co -decision in the management of economic 
and social interdependence (Burelle 2005, 467).
In many ways, Burelle remains an idealist about federalism as a doc-
trine and in his understanding of Canada’s 1867 Constitution. Thus, I 
find it useful to read his prose alongside that of Christian Dufour, who 
has been intelligently studying the histories and collective identities of 
Canada and Québec for twenty years. While Rocher and Burelle talk 
about equilibrium between autonomy and solidarity/interdependence, 
Dufour, without relinquishing the need for such balance, prefers to talk 
about the twin projects of sharing and separation (Dufour 2000, 105). 
Without a doubt, federal partners indeed need to share, but they also 
require separate rooms in their joint political home where they have 
enough space to conduct their own affairs. Because the language of sep-
aration is stronger than the vocabulary associated with autonomy, Dufour 
remains suspicious about Burelle’s principle of subsidiarity, considering 
that it may yield too much in the name of greater efficiency. Dufour, 
however, becomes a nice companion to Burelle’s reflections when he 
notes that Québec’s lack of participation in the Canadian state over 
the last twenty -five years has contributed to the weakening of the fed-
eral principle across the country, importantly recognizing as well that 
Québec’s approach to the Canadian federal project is partly out -dated 
(Dufour 2000, 106-108).
Dufour also brings a welcome touch of historical realism to the 
whole discussion when he recalls the intertwinement of Canadian and 
Québécois collective national identities, and the key role of Québecers 
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in the founding and development of both of these identities. The contem-
porary Canadian national identity has been created and transformed ever 
since the 18th century through historical events that took place largely, if 
not exclusively, on Québec’s territory. Particularly following the Quiet 
Revolution, a Québec national identity came to dissociate itself to a 
substantial extent from the Canadian national identity, though the latter 
has kept much greater relevance in the hearts and minds of Québecers 
than many, especially in the sovereigntist intelligentsia, have been will-
ing to recognize. In Dufour’s words, most contemporary Québecers are 
also the deepest -rooted Canadians, and this explains why it has remained 
extremely difficult to make them renounce their Canadian allegiance. If 
this is the source of profound misunderstanding in Québec, the equivalent 
elsewhere in Canada takes the shape of an immense difficulty, in light of 
Québec’s role in the transforming of Canada, in embracing Québec’s right 
to difference and the idea that this should have meaningful political and 
legal consequences. Both Dufour and Burelle were advocates and admir-
ers of the ill -fated Meech Lake Accord. They believe that the Accord was 
the best attempt to modernize the Canadian federal project in agreement 
with the principled ideals of federalism and the realist surroundings of our 
historical trajectories. Taken together, Burelle and Dufour provide a nice 
starting -point for those who would attempt to modernize the paradigm of 
the Tremblay Commission.
It would be impossible to revisit the developments of the last dec-
ade without attempting to assess the ideas and the contributions of the 
former Liberal Québec government led by Jean Charest. First elected 
in 2003, reduced to minority status in 2007, and having climbed back 
to an albeit modest but real majority position in December 2008, the 
Charest government inherited Québec’s traditional autonomist position 
and demands in the Canadian federal dialogue. Benoît Pelletier, consti-
tutional law scholar and Québec’s Minister of Intergovernmental Affairs 
between 2003 and 2008, claims that the Charest government attempted 
to respect the federalist tradition of the Québec Liberal Party using three 
principles:
Affirmation –because Québec has every reason to be proud of its identity 
and to want to reinforce it and have it resonate both in Canada and around 
the world.
Autonomy –because being a federalist means believing in autonomy. Indeed, 
federalism postulates that the provinces’ autonomy is just as important as 
that of the federal order of government. Québec is an autonomous entity 
within the Canadian federation. The Government of Québec is committed 
to defending this autonomy, and even extending it, in part through non -
constitutional means, such as the signing of administrative agreements. The 
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current Québec government defines the term ‘autonomy’ from a resolutely 
federalist perspective.
Leadership –because Québec must resume the leadership position that it 
held historically within Canada, both in its relations with other provinces – 
namely interprovincialism – and in its dealings with Ottawa (Benoît Pelletier 
2009, 471).
Almost a decade after their first electoral victory, how can we assess 
the performance of Jean Charest’s Liberals in revitalizing Canadian fed-
eralism? The results are far from insignificant. They include: the 2003 
creation of a new body aimed at streamlining horizontal interprovincial 
and intergovernmental relations, the Council of the Federation; a major 
agreement towards the financing of the health system with the central 
government in 2004; formally recognizing the principle of asymmet-
rical federalism in a parallel deal with Québec in 2004; a 2006 Canada -
Québec agreement paving the way towards the participation of Québec 
in UNESCO forums; the motion adopted by the Canadian Parliament 
in 2006 recognizing that the Québécois form a nation within a united 
Canada; and, the partial overhauling of fiscal relations between the cen-
tral government and its partners in 2007. Experts have analysed in depth 
most aspects of this performance.6 Beyond these segmented evaluations, 
it is worth noting that the Liberal Government in Québec between 2003 
and 2012 modified this federalist rhetoric in their last years in power. 
In a major speech delivered in Toronto during the October 2008 federal 
election campaign, entitled “Reinventing Canada: the Challenges of our 
Country for the 21st century,” former Minister Pelletier clearly modified 
the structure of Québec’s traditional federalist discourse. Habitually, this 
discourse is “existential” about Québec, emphasizing the twin mottos 
of autonomy and recognition, while simultaneously adopting an instru-
mental/utilitarian stance towards Canada. In his Toronto speech, Pelletier 
started with a reference to Canada as a country that “we build and share 
all together” (Pelletier 2008, 2). Obviously, he did not neglect the object-
ives of autonomy and recognition, but he started by talking about the 
management of interdependence and cooperation. With regards to the 
national identities of Canada and Québec, Pelletier insisted that they did 
not need to conflict and that they could enrich each other inasmuch as the 
“affirmation of Québec’s distinct national character could be conciliated 
with the pursuit of a Canadian common project” (Pelletier 2008, 5).
Just over a decade ago, Alain -G. Gagnon and James Tully published a 
major collection on multinational democracies (Gagnon and Tully 2001). 
At the crossroads between comparative political science and political 
6 See, Pelletier (2008) and Laforest and Montigny (2009).
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philosophy, this research endeavoured to study political and constitu-
tional developments mostly in advanced democracies such as Belgium, 
Canada, Spain, and the United Kingdom. Gagnon has produced signifi-
cant academic outputs in running major inter -university collaborative 
efforts out of Montréal.7 In the deliberative public spheres of complex 
democracies, the flagship of multinational federalism is often carried with 
greater enthusiasm by academic leaders within minority nations, as seen 
in the cases of Alain -G. Gagnon in Québec -Canada debates and Ferran 
Requejo in Catalonia -Spain debates (Gagnon 2007; Gagnon and Iacovino 
2007; Requejo 2005a). Logically, it would be only normal to expect these 
academic leaders to reproduce in debates surrounding multinational fed-
eralism the hegemonic categories of internal debates within their respect-
ive national communities. Keeping in mind what Rocher had to say about 
Québec’s interpretive federalist traditions, let us consider the following 
excerpts from a book by Gagnon and Iacovino:
As this overview of Canadian constitutionalism will show, Québec’s position 
with regards to its place in Canada has survived generational shifts, inter-
national political transformations, and mostly, domestic social currents both 
in the larger Canadian context and in Québec, demonstrating remarkable con-
sistency with regards to its existential standing. From both a socio -historical 
and historical -institutional perspectives, Québec’s place in Canada has rarely 
shifted, and when it has, it has been a matter of degree as opposed to a whole-
sale reconceptualization (Gagnon and Iacovino 2007, 22).
It is time for both parties to take the high road […] Canada must understand 
that Québec’s affirmation is not inimical to the preservation of the country. It 
is not a zero -sum game. The extent of association, however, must be negoti-
ated before the level of mutual confidence and trust that bind the political 
communities together are severed beyond repair. This is a key step, since 
the will to live together may not be sufficient once that symbolic threshold 
is crossed. The high road is a two -way street. Québec must make additional 
efforts to assure that its minorities are represented in the process of formally 
constituting itself. Its relationship to the rest of the country ought to be delib-
erated in a more legitimate procedure than a mere referendum question would 
imply. And its solid record in respecting liberal democracy ought to remain 
unblemished. The formal constitution process puts all of this on the table. 
With regards to Canada, whatever negotiating partner emerges, whatever pro-
cedure is adopted, one clear principle must take precedence; it must internal-
ize the notion that it is not ratifying and subsequently negotiating a new deal 
7 Among other members of the Groupe de recherche sur les sociétés plurinationales (re-
search group on plurinational societies), previously mentioned here, and the Centre de 
recherche interdiscipinaire sur la diversité et la démocratie (Interdisciplinary research 
Centre on diversity and democracy). These groups are better known by their respective 
acronyms in French: GRSP and CRIDAQ.
87
What Canadian Federalism Means in Québec
as a majority. It must begin to see itself as a partner, in the spirit of dualism 
to which Québec has always adhered. They may not ratify the document, or 
reject the process altogether, but in the scenario outlined here, this would only 
hasten the rupture (Gagnon and Iacovino 2007, 174-175).
I believe that the tensions and contradictions that can be perceived 
in these passages reinforce the idea that the ground is slowly but effect-
ively moving in Québec and that the current era could indeed witness an 
important paradigm shift. The first passage is all about continuity, much 
in the spirit of the Tremblay Commission and of its legacy as critically 
analyzed by Rocher. The second passage does not totally depart from this 
view. Consider, for instance, that the Canadian partner must accept the 
dominant Québec view of dualism. It nevertheless does also insist that all 
players in this democratic deliberation should take the high road, that the 
whole matter is a two -way street insisting on the key notion of reciprocity, 
with everything on the table, and that all partners should display imagina-
tion and courage. These latter elements were more consistently present 
in the introduction and conclusion of Gagnon’s book published under 
the auspices of the Institut d’Estudis Autonomics in 2007, for which he 
obtained the first Josep Maria Vilaseca I Marcet Prize (Gagnon 2007, 15, 
179). Our political and intellectual communities will be hard -pressed to 
display such imaginative boldness in the 2010s.
Conclusion
I have argued in this chapter that interpreting the meaning of Canadian 
federalism within Québec is at a crossroads. While the traditional, strictly 
autonomist paradigm of the Tremblay Commission still dominates in 
key disciplines like political science, constitutional law, and political 
philosophy, rich internal debates within these disciplines indicate that a 
major paradigm shift could be looming (Graefe 2009). Quite naturally, 
as often happens in the humanities and social sciences, not everything 
will change simultaneously. In both Francophone Québec and English -
speaking Canada, the dominant interpretive traditions are deeply rooted 
and will not be easily displaced. If it were possible to muster sufficient 
space and intellectual resources, it would be interesting to see if Rocher’s 
argument about federalist traditions in Canada can also be applied to the 
political and intellectual lives of other multinational societies in places 
such as Belgium, Spain, and the United Kingdom. My hunch is that it can, 
allowing us to see that, in the dialogue between minority and majority 
national political communities, most authors (scholars, intellectuals, and 
politicians) have formulated their interpretation of their shared tradition 
of federalism or partnership, broadly speaking, with an instrumental (or 
thin) perspective if they are part of the majority and with an ontological 
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identity -defining, thick perspective if they are part of the minority. This 
explains some of the major misunderstandings between interpretive 
communities.
Focusing mostly on the Francophone interpretive community in 
Québec, I have examined here, following Rocher’s groundbreaking 
work, some of the intellectual shortcomings of this tradition. Of course, 
as Gagnon and Iacovino adequately insist, this whole affair is a two -way 
street and the English -speaking interpretive tradition is not devoid of 
its own shortcomings. Moreover, as Alain Noël has argued in his own 
assessment of current scholarly debates about multinational federalism 
in Canada, these debates are always complex affairs, combining norma-
tive considerations and power politics between governments and between 
majorities and minorities. They always are, simultaneously, associating 
the power of arguments with the arguments of power (Noël 2006, 422). 
Considering all the constraints that limited their capacity for action and 
innovation, Noël suggests that 19th century politicians from Canada and 
Québec did a reasonable job in their own deliberations and that these 
could possibly inspire us in our own times:
For all its democratic limitations, the constitutional politics of the late nine-
teenth century followed a path that was neither ‘analgesic’ nor ‘agonistic.’ 
Anchored in the immediate preoccupations of politicians and informed by the 
need to find workable accommodations, the process nevertheless displayed a 
tension between the principled search for uniformity typical of modern con-
stitutions and the equally principled demands for recognition and for the pres-
ervation of diversity that were anchored in the country’s ancient constitution. 
This tension pitted the idea of a new nation against the protection of estab-
lished ways of life, and confronted the elites of the new state with the complex 
requirements of popular consent in a multinational federation […] Like all de-
liberative processes of significance, the Canadian constitutional debate never 
was a nice and polite conversation, carried by well -meaning participants who 
had previously checked their interests and their advantages at the door. It 
often involved tough bargaining or verged on plain domination, was always 
less than perfectly democratic, and incorporated many restrictions and con-
straints that disadvantaged some or many constituents. This debate, however, 
was also anchored in principles about democracy, continuity and consent, and 
it contributed to the establishment of important rights and relatively satisfying 
institutions and practices. This deliberative process was, in other words, a real 
political process. And it mattered very much (Noël 2006, 438).
This deliberative process is still going on and it still should matter to 
us in 2014, with all kinds of new constraints in a transformed Canada, a 
transformed Québec, and a globalized world. Be they majorities or min-
orities, national communities are always structured around the equilib-
rium between the pull of the past, of heritage and memory, and the pull of 
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their projected futures. Will these futures be characterized by the mech-
anical repetition of the dialectic of conquest and reconquest, premised 
on the idea of domination, or a by a more edifying politics of concord 
and reconciliation? We can never be completely certain about these mat-
ters in human affairs. However, I am quite convinced that if the politics 
of concord and reconciliation are to prevail in Canada -Québec debates, 
the political leaders of these societies and the scholars of the two major 
academic communities must agree, respecting Burelle’s principle of co--
decision, on the appropriate disentanglement between utilitarian issues 
that can be governed by the categories of thin, instrumental rationality, 
and existential matters that will demand the ability to speak the thick lan-
guage of authentic allegiance for their shared and intertwined collective 
national identities. It will not be a simple process. As Noël reminded us, 





Lord Durham, French Canada, and Québec
Remembering the Past, Debating the Future
It remains immensely worthwhile in our times to read Lord Durham’s 
Report, for social scientists as well as for anyone who has a general or 
scholarly interest in politics, philosophy, and history. Its edifying power 
is first aimed towards a global public, reflecting in vexing circumstances 
upon the appropriate remembrance of a troubled past and seeking ways 
of delineating the moral and political consequences flowing from specific 
ways to interpret historical facts and events. We deal here with the con-
tours of a perennial philosophical debate, attempting to make sense of 
the relationship between history, memory, and politics. To show why the 
Durham Report is as indispensable as ever for political theorists of all 
stripes, I will slightly reformulate a question that is a recurrent theme 
in Janet Ajzenstat’s introduction to the 2006 edition of Lord Durham’s 
Report. Can the universalistic pull of liberal modernity be reconciled 
with the preservation of particular identities and cultures? In the past 
twenty years, this question has been a central issue in the Republic of 
Letters. It is no mere coincidence that Canadians have played leading 
roles in such a debate (Beiner and Norman 2001). For quite obviously 
to the readers who have journeyed through this book, the pedagogical 
value of the Durham Report is nowhere more important than in Canada 
and Québec.
In 1963, when the Report was last edited in English, Québec was going 
through the political process of late and brutal modernization, known 
as the “Quiet Revolution” (Gagnon 2003a; Simard 1999; Cook 2005). 
Canada as a whole was a country moving equally rapidly, on the eve of 
the 1967 Centennial of Confederation, towards its own national identity 
increasingly separated from Britain. Readers will recall that it was in 1963 
that the Government of Canada, led by Prime Minister Lester Pearson, 
put together the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, 
co -chaired by Davidson Dunton and André Laurendeau and whose man-
date was based on the idea of an equal partnership between Canada’s 
French -speaking and English -speaking founding peoples (McRoberts 
1997, 38-41). It is naturally beyond the scope of this chapter to address 
at length the political evolution of Québec and Canada from 1963 to the 
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present day, although I do not completely ignore it either.1 It will suffice 
at this stage to mention that this new edition of the Report, in its own right 
a commemoration of Durham’s legacy in these lands, came out at about 
the same time as two major historical celebrations. The first was the 400th 
anniversary of both Québec City’s and Canada’s foundings by Champlain 
in 1608. The second was the 25th anniversary of the 1982 Constitution, the 
last step in Canada’s adventure of quietly decolonizing from Britain and 
the dawn of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms era. Today, as 
in 1963 and in the epoch of Durham, the historical paths of Canada and 
Québec remain intertwined as they jointly struggle for greater political 
freedom and to secure distinct identities in the Americas.
My argument here is thus premised on the idea that the Durham Report 
has universal and particular meanings. As debatable and contradictory as 
these meanings may prove to be, I do not pretend to close the debate. But 
is my hope that fifty years from now, readers will still find in my reflec-
tions useful notes and arguments to make up their own minds.
I will logically start with the fate of the Report in French Canada and 
Québec, attempting to assess how it has been viewed by previous genera-
tions and how it is being discussed in current historiographical debates. 
Variations are aplenty, but the basic idea remains the same. Lord Durham 
and his Report are causally connected to the emergence and the develop-
ment of a specific form of national self -consciousness. After looking at 
this, I discuss and attempt to complete some technical points on the views 
put forward in the introduction of Janet Ajzenstat (2006), starting with the 
key figure of Étienne Parent. Much of what my colleague says throughout 
her introduction about the meaning of the Durham Report for Canadian 
history and the evolution of federalism is very enlightening. I will add my 
perspective to her general view. Following some notes on Durham as a 
human being and as a thinker, I shall focus on two themes: (1) the place 
of the Durham Report in one of Québec’s most important ideological and 
intellectual strands, “melancholy nationalism” (an expression developed 
by political philosopher Jocelyn Maclure), and (2) the fundamental ten-
sion between universalistic and particularistic aspects in the tribulations 
of modernity, a key feature of the Report, and how it is being played out 
in Canada and Québec (Maclure 2003, 19-59).2
1 Up -to -date political science textbooks are the right place to start addressing this ques-
tion. See MacIvor (2006) and Pelletier and Tremblay (2005). For my own views, see 
Laforest (2004, 325-355).
2 As Maclure acknowledges, it must be said in fairness that Jocelyn Létourneau had pre-
viously and critically established a link between misery and melancholy in Québec’s 
historiography. See the essays collected in Létourneau (2004a).
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I.  Coming to Terms with Lord Durham’s Report  
in French Canada and Québec
Canada is a member of the elite G8 group of industrialized states in 
the global internet age. Québec is a majority French -speaking province in 
a federal, highly developed country that prides itself on official bilingual-
ism. A key aspect of this is the existence of two autonomous but equally 
interconnected public spheres with two communication and scientific net-
works operating in these great languages of Western modernity, English 
and French. The march of this societal environment, from 1963 to now, is 
bound to have produced greater academic and scholarly sophistication in 
all fields. History, the art of understanding the past, has not been left behind 
in this evolution. The task of revisiting the Durham Report has been made 
even more challenging by the complexity and vigour of historiographical 
debates throughout Canada and singularly in Québec.3 There has also 
been, since the last English edition of the Report, a quantum leap in the 
international academic community’s level of interest in Canadian affairs. 
To highlight the perennial importance of Lord Durham and of the con-
stitutional blueprint springing at least partly from his Report, I start with 
one such foreign voice, that of Dresden -based Professor Ingo Kolboom:
For French Canadians, it was the genesis of a historical trauma. The repres-
sion of the Patriotes and the sanctions on French Canadians, institutionalized 
by the Union Act in 1840, have been their true historical defeat, inasmuch 
as these events were perceived by them as a traumatizing deception vis -
à -vis the British, who revealed themselves to be the Conquerors of 1763. 
French Canadians re -lived through the sanctions of 1840 the defeat of 1760 
(Kolboom 2001, 192)4
I consider Kolboom’s interpretation in this passage as the hegemonic 
view about Lord Durham and his influence throughout French Canada 
and Québec’s history and intellectual life. Durham’s legacy has been 
made even more present in academia in the last decade, due to a rejuven-
ated interest in political history and a corresponding decline of a more 
positivistic and technically oriented economic and social history.5 On 
3 To grasp the basic trends in the historiography of Québec, see Rudin (1997) and 
Gagnon (1982; 1985). 
4 I find a clear and coherent expression of this dominant view in Dufour (1990, ch. 3). 
Even those who disagree with this paradigm agree on its centrality. See, Létourneau 
(2004b).
5 This recent development is discussed in Kelly (2003, 1-11). See, also, Kelly and 
Laforest (2004). The return of political history is illustrated and discussed in a series 
of new journals that have emerged in Québec in the last decade: Argument, Bulletin 
d’histoire politique, Mens: revue d’histoire intellectuelle de l’Amérique française, 
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Durham as on other matters, Québec and other Canadian historians now 
engage in more frequent and energetic debates, searching for insightful 
challenges to the historical myths at work in their respective communities 
(Meisel et al. 1999).
I shall now briefly consider two questions stemming from these recent 
exchanges. The first issue is defined by attempts to establish the primary 
cause of the 1837-1838 rebellions. Was the crisis fundamentally linked to 
political reasons or was it rather, as Lord Durham forcefully argued, the 
apotheosis of a long -standing and insurmountable ethnic conflict? Allan 
Greer, historian at the University of Toronto and an expert on the rebel-
lions in Lower Canada, has this to say about the archival evidence on this 
matter:
An influential school of thought in Canadian historiography that dates back 
to Lord Durham and others says that all fine phrases about political rights and 
freedom spouted by the patriots were a cover for an essentially xenophobic 
movement, and that what is fundamental in Lower Canada is the conflict of 
English and French. Everything else is secondary. I would argue that the argu-
ment is almost exactly the reverse of reality […] The conflict that came to an 
acute stage in 1837 and 1838 had everything to do with the breakdown of pol-
itics as usual and a crisis of the state, which called forth a mobilization of the 
majority of the population […] The really acute strife and conflict between 
English and French came after that; it followed from that fundamentally pol-
itical conflict […] What seems to have resulted is something that happens in a 
lot of revolutionary crises in other parts of the world and other eras of history. 
Ethnic and linguistic minorities became quite uncomfortable, as a reaction to 
the revolutionary process itself.6
The myth that Greer helps dismantle regarding the source of the con-
flict is not the only one to have survived until quite recently. Obsessed 
by Durham’s scathing language throughout his Report and by the cold 
severity of his prescription concerning assimilation, French Canadians 
and Québec thinkers have tended to portray him as a formidable figure. 
Fernand Dumont poignantly summarizes this trend when he character-
izes Lord Durham’s implacable logic and “remarquable hauteur d’esprit” 
(remarkable elevation of spirit) as nothing short of immense (Dumont 
1993, 128). Durham as a spiritual semi -God? John Ralston Saul begs to 
differ with this judgment:
Cahiers d’histoire du Québec au vingtième siècle. For developments throughout 
Canada, see Owram (1997).
6 These excerpts are taken from an interview with Allan Greer in Bothwell (1995). A 
lengthier discussion can be found in Greer (1992).
95
Lord Durham, French Canada, and Québec
In a way our attitudes can be summarized through our relationship to Lord 
Durham. We have turned his four -month visit during 1838 into the touchstone 
of the Canadian condition […] The words aimed at francophones have been 
particularly retained by part of their elite as a sore to be scratched open on 
a regular basis. But consider the real Durham, beyond mythology. He was 
neither a great figure nor a great aristocrat. He inherited money and through 
political activity was paid off with a title. He was of marginal junior -minister 
importance […] His one original idea – the union of the two provinces would 
provoke the assimilation of the francophones – was completely wrong […] 
This is the context in which Durham’s gratuitous insults must be seen. It was 
just the sort of language you’d have expected from an immature graduate of 
Eton in the nineteenth century […] The combination of personal privilege, 
marginal success, an unstable personality and class prejudice are enough to 
perpetuate this sort of juvenile wilfulness in a man who cannot engage with 
reality (Ralston Saul 1997, 363-365).
Ralston Saul has indeed a point, although I do believe that there is 
room for greater nuance in assessing Lord Durham as a human being and 
as a thinker. The goal of such a careful re -examination requires a journey 
through current historiographical developments. McGill Professor Yvan 
Lamonde is Québec’s pre -eminent historian of ideas and the road towards 
a more balanced evaluation of Lord Durham’s Report passes through 
his scholarly accomplishments. Lamonde (2000) has notably written a 
masterful synthesis on the 19th century.7 Aside from his impeccable bib-
liographical work, Lamonde’s essential contributions include a precise 
chronicling of the mounting dissatisfaction of Lower Canada’s colonial 
elites vis -à -vis metropolitan authorities in the 1830s; a much needed iden-
tification of the intellectual climate of the rebellions through a detailed 
examination of the printed sources at the disposal of Lower Canadians 
in order to establish their knowledge of contemporary developments and 
struggles in the Americas and Europe; a deep analytical and context-
ual analysis of the political thought of Étienne Parent and Louis -Joseph 
Papineau (their personal intellectual evolutions, the transition from their 
close collaboration to their estrangement in the camps of moderation 
and revolution, and their opinions on Lord Durham’s mission during his 
sojourn in the Canadas and their reactions to his Report); and, finally, 
7 For an annotated introductory bibliography on Québec, start with Gagnon (1998). 
For a summary of Lamonde’s own bibliographical progress on the history of ideas in 
Québec, see Lamonde (2003, 11). Étienne Parent (the learned journalist and moderate 
constitutionalist) and Louis -Joseph Papineau (the great Parliamentarian turned rebel 
and exiled radical republican) are the most important of Durham’s contemporaries in 
Lower Canada. Lamonde has rendered it much easier to comprehensively understand-
ing their intellectual evolution. See Étienne Parent’s Discours in an edition prepared 
by Yvan Lamonde and Claude Couture (2000). See, also, Lamonde and Larin (1998).
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a lucid understanding of the complex reasons explaining the failures of 
the rebellions (Lamonde 2000, 183-282).8 Indispensable on any topic, 
Lamonde makes one key point about Lord Durham that can easily be 
neglected by 21st century readers. Durham did not belong to a neutral, fact 
-finding commission of the International Court of Justice in The Hague 
trying to assess the causes of a conflict, to impart responsibilities, and 
to devise the contours of a durable and just institutional peace respect-
ing the premises of human rights conventions. Rather, Lord Durham was 
first and foremost a British imperialist, culturally and politically biased 
about the matters he had to enquire and report about. This is particularly 
obvious, according to Lamonde, in his lack of critical judgment towards 
the Legislative Council, the one colonial institution that Lower Canadians 
had constantly identified, starting with Pierre Bédard in 1814, as an essen-
tially English ethnic structure, in contradiction with the spirit of British 
constitutionalism (Lamonde 2000, 261).
French Canada (rather than Lower Canada, this is a fundamental 
distinction) as a self -conscious national community begins with Lord 
Durham’s Report and its political consequences. Starting with the nostal-
gic, quasi -Romantic figure of François -Xavier Garneau, and all the way 
to the post -1945 Montréal School (Maurice Séguin, Guy Frégault and 
Michel Brunet, a generation obsessed by the negative consequences of 
the Conquest which has set the stage politically for Québec’s post 1960 
independence movement) and its Laval counterpart (Fernand Ouellet, 
Jean Hamelin, pioneers of a more positive evaluation of the British regime 
and of Canadian Confederation), historians have dated back to the early 
1840s the birth of an ideology or doctrine of national survival in French 
Canada. This ideology gave priority to the conservation of the com-
munity’s cultural, linguistic, religious and other traditional institutions, 
fostering a program of survival that seems to confirm Lord Durham’s 
verdict by delineating a national life mostly away from the struggles of 
liberal politics and from the challenges of market economic practices in 
America. Lord Durham and his Report have remained alive in all phases 
of this historiographical saga. Beyond academia’s walls, for those who 
would venture to enquire about the centrality of Lord Durham’s legacy 
for contemporary Québec society, I now summarize books by the late 
Fernand Dumont and by Gérard Bouchard, two major thinkers who have 
acted as public intellectuals while enjoying wide respect from their peers.
Both Dumont and Bouchard have supported or do support the project 
of political sovereignty for Québec. For both thinkers, philosophically, 
8 Two recent and enlightening essays attempting to further Lamonde’s work in his areas 
of originality are Harvey (2005) and Bellavance (2004).
97
Lord Durham, French Canada, and Québec
independence is the political telos of political modernity. Nations are 
fully normal and healthy when they are completely sovereign. Trained in 
anthropological philosophy, psychology, and sociology, Dumont, in his 
own master narrative entitled Genèse de la société québécoise (Genesis 
of Québec society), has emphasized Lord Durham’s role in the production 
of key pathologies of individual and collective historical consciousness 
in French Canada. Dumont integrates all the elements that led Durham 
to his prescription of forced assimilation: the spirit of contempt and dis-
respect for most things French Canadian and the disparaging compari-
sons and the prophecies of inevitable doom in America. He thus places 
Durham at the loftiest level of the British (later Canadian) Other par 
excellence of French Canada and French Canadians. This negative dis-
course of assimilation, based on irrevocable inferiority, has been slowly, 
subtly, and systematically internalized by French Canadians venturing to 
formulate their own discourses of national self -consciousness (Dumont 
1993, 123-138).9 The Durham Report led to their permanent political 
subordination and to the development of a profound minority complex. I 
will discuss in the next section some problems associated with Dumont’s 
narrative. My argument here is simply to reiterate that Lord Durham is 
directly linked by Dumont to the existence of a deep problem of false con-
sciousness in the historical trajectory of French Canada and of Québec – 
the kind of problem that could only be cured by sovereignty. Whatever 
one may think of the validity of its thesis, Dumont’s book remains quite 
useful for comprehensively discussing historical materials, particularly 
regarding the generation of François -Xavier Garneau who lived in the 
immediate aftermath of Lord Durham’s Report and had to interpret – nay, 
in truth, had to invent narratively – French Canada in his shadow. I now 
turn briefly to the work of Gérard Bouchard.
Trained in sociology and history, Bouchard provides a nice complement 
to Dumont’s approach. Whereas the latter is fascinated by the unfolding 
dramas of subjective consciousness, Bouchard is more interested in the 
apparently more objective comparative analysis of the structural patterns 
at work in the evolution of modern societies. In his magnum opus, Genèse 
des nations et cultures du nouveau monde: Essai d’histoire comparée 
(Origins of the New World nations and cultures: an essay in comparative 
history), published in 2000, Bouchard studies the historical trajectories 
of Canada and Québec by contrasting them with movements and trends 
in Australia, Latin America, the United States, and New Zealand. His 
excellence in the art of synthesizing intellectual doctrines is illustrated 
9 For a critical yet sympathetic introduction to Dumont’s project, see Beauchemin 
(2001). See also, “L’hiver de la mémoire” in Warren (1998).
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in his very useful analytical summary of the doctrine of la survivance 
for French Canada, the paradigm of survival for a national culture and 
a collective memory (Bouchard 2000, 107-110). For Bouchard, Québec 
is essentially the sole exception in a pattern that saw the full political 
emancipation, most often through processes of radical rupture, of all New 
World collectivities subordinated by European empires. In this narrative, 
Lord Durham and his Report stand at a critical historical juncture, one 
which saw a definitive bifurcation in Lower Canada’s march towards full 
societal and political maturity (Bouchard 2000, 98-99). There is indeed 
a teleological philosophy of history at work in Bouchard’s reflections, 
one which sees Québec’s sovereignty as a normal end -point fulfilling the 
promises of its roots and destiny on the American continent.10 How does 
Lord Durham fare, ultimately, in the works of these two widely admired 
figures of Québec’s sovereigntist intelligentsia? In Fernand Dumont’s ele-
gant prose, the figure of Durham is respected, critically dissected without 
being demonized. In Gérard Bouchard’s more coldly scientific yet equally 
compelling narratives, Lord Durham is almost completely ignored but the 
consequences of his thoughts and actions are omnipresent. In both cases, 
all in all, his name remains associated with the dark side of the past.
II.  Janet Ajzenstat’s Introduction: Debating Lord 
Durham’s Influence on Canada and Assessing  
Him as a Human Being and as a Thinker
Janet Ajzenstat (2006) is quite right to insist in her introduction on the 
exemplary role of Étienne Parent, editor of the newspaper Le Canadien in 
the 1830s and arguably Québec’s first real intellectual (Bergeron 1994). 
Throughout the decade, Parent attempted to articulate for himself the view 
of the reasonable middle ground, marching in the footsteps of Bédard and 
thus embracing British constitutionalism, while attempting to balance his 
support for Enlightenment liberalism and a defence of Canadian national-
ity (la nationalité canadienne, as it was referred to in pre -Durham years). 
In April 1837, when it became clear following the Russell Resolutions 
that metropolitan authorities in Britain would remain deaf to the griev-
ances of Lower Canada, Parent advocated renewed prudence. He warns 
his compatriots that they should beware of suffering a fate similar to that 
of Poland in 1831 at the hands of despotic Russia. In some circumstances, 
writes Parent, “there is first such a thing as an honourable submission 
10 This interpretation is shared by both sympathetic and more critical readers of 
Bouchard. This is demonstrated, respectively, by Beauchemin (2002, 142-143) and 
by Létourneau (2004a, 55-64). To gain a sense of Bouchard’s position among Québec 
historians, see Bédard (2001).
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and secondly a dishonourable domination” (Parent 1999, 100). In the 
aftermath of Lord Durham’s Report, as Ajzenstat remarks, Parent had 
indeed his great moment of despair, coherently contemplating the inevit-
able disappearance of la nationalité canadienne and the assimilation of 
his compatriots. The history of Canada would not have unfolded in the 
same manner if Parent had not found ways of reconsidering this bleak 
judgment, as Ajzenstat (2006) clearly articulates. She fails however to 
mention that Parent lived through his darkest hour while he was in jail. 
He remained in custody, from late December 1838 onwards, for a period 
about as lengthy as Durham’s own stay in the Canadas. The conditions 
of his imprisonment were what they were at the time in a tough, colonial 
winter and he became deaf. Parent was jailed, not on Durham’s orders, for 
he had gone back to Britain two months earlier, but because of an article 
he had written in Le Canadien, arguing in quasi -Lockean terms that the 
real conspirers, those who carried primary responsibility for the disturb-
ance of order, were the persons in authority who had multiplied provoca-
tions, pushing the people from excesses to new excesses with harshness 
and renewed harshness.11 Parent despaired after repressive terror was used 
to crush and subjugate him. Durham and his era are more than a chapter 
in the history of the liberal doctrine. These were dark times and Parent, as 
Greer remarks, was not the only one to suffer from the politics of terror.
There was another version of terror, the counter -revolutionary terror, that oc-
curred after the patriots were defeated, and that took very harmful forms. 
Houses were really burned down, by the dozens, possibly by the hundreds 
in the wake of the fighting in 1837-1838. People were killed, people by the 
hundreds were thrown into jail. Many were taken into custody, probably thou-
sands, for shorter periods, although it was not well recorded. So the popula-
tion in the District of Montréal, in the rural areas, was well and thoroughly 
frightened into submission by these tactics (Bothwell 1995, 33).
Near the end of her introduction, Ajzenstat seems to suggest that Lord 
Durham, trying to preserve the safeguards of the parliamentary system, 
coherently dismissed the potential intolerances of the French majority 
and the flaws of Lower Canada’s colonial regime. In this logic, she writes, 
“Unconstrained rule by the French majority would soon become as intoler-
ant as unconstrained rule by Governors and their cronies” (Ajzenstat 
2006, xxxvi). However, and this question seems to me as poignantly rel-
evant in 2014 as it was to those who first had to live with the Report in 
1839, how could Durham have been so utterly certain about, in the con-
text of his studied and complete ignorance, throughout his Commission, 
11 I am trying here to render as concisely as possible a key passage; a longer excerpt can 
be found in Lamonde (2000: 267).
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of those like Étienne Parent and Louis -Hyppolite Lafontaine, who 
represented the camp of moderate Canadian patriotism and support for 
British constitutionalism?12 Lord Durham, preceded by his reputation as 
a liberal reformer, was greeted with sympathetic anticipation when he 
disembarked in Québec City in late May 1838. The turning point in the 
gradual disenchantment towards Lord Durham and his mission was his 
hiring of Adam Thom, also known in Lower Canada under his pen name 
of “Camillus,” the author of a series of “Anti -Gallic Letters” in the pages 
of the Montréal Herald (Bindon 1966). Ajzenstat persuasively argues that 
Durham was a coherent and far -reaching liberal thinker. If his attitude 
with Lower Canadians of French background – to coin a new category – 
gives us an accurate measure of the man we have to evaluate, fair -
mindedness (otherwise put, the key humanistic concept of Audi Alteram 
Partem) was not one of his cherished principles.
Beyond the doctrine of responsible government, has Lord Durham 
left other structural legacies to the architecture of the Canadian state and 
to the spirit of Canadian federalism? On this matter, I would like to add 
a couple of notes to Ajzenstat’s remarkably instructive remarks. With 
regards to responsible government, she is trying to reassess whether Lord 
Durham wanted to maintain “the crucial powers of control and compli-
ance” in Great Britain at the same time as he was envisaging greater polit-
ical autonomy for the Canadian colonies (Ajzenstat 2006, xxv). Regarding 
the division of powers in Canadian federalism, she is attempting to por-
tray him as the forefather of a coherent, overarching principle for such an 
allocation of responsibilities: the central government would take care of 
general matters, representatives in the federal Parliament would debate 
in the language of liberal universalism the issues of concern to all cit-
izens without consideration for their origins, whereas provincial govern-
ments would take care of local matters, with legislative representatives 
embracing the language of human particularities in their debates, pay-
ing primary attention to the interests of their citizens as these pertained 
to their cultural or national origins (Ajzenstat 2006: xxviii –xxviv). On 
the first matter, I would surmise that the Dominion of Canada in 1867 
was indeed in the middle of a three -tiered hierarchical structure. Some 
crucial powers of control and compliance remained with Westminster 
(legislative paramountcy, organization of courts and ultimate judiciary 
arbitration, foreign and defence policies, and overall coordination of the 
political association). At the same time, the Dominion enjoyed greater 
autonomy than before while remaining subordinate. Correspondingly, the 
12 Lamenting Lord Durham’s failure to hear the voices of Lower Canada’s French major-
ity representatives is a perennial theme. See Desrosiers (1937, 123). See, also, Viau 
(1962, 163).
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Dominion government and Parliament retained substantial powers of con-
trol and compliance in precisely the same fields in their relationship with 
their provincial counterparts. Provinces also claimed greater autonomy 
while remaining subordinate in key areas. If some validity to this meta -
interpretation exists, then I would certainly add my voice to Ajzenstat’s 
when she writes that we in Canada have forgotten this scheme as well as 
Lord Durham’s role in its conception. On the second matter, concerning 
the division of powers, I simply wish to emphasize that this principled 
distribution’s logic is precisely the way in which the project of federal 
harmony is made sense of for French Canada and Québec around 1867 
in two recent, seminal essays written by André Burelle (2005, 433-469) 
and Eugénie Brouillet (2005, 192-198). At least in Québec, this particular 
scheme has not been forgotten. But Ajzenstat does not lose everything. 
Lord Durham’s role in its formulation is being completely disregarded.
What conclusion should we have about Lord Durham as a human 
being and as a thinker? Paradoxically, I think that in the above -mentioned 
passages of his book on Canada, Ralston Saul has been too harsh on him. 
The man who arrived here with the promises of spring in 1838, and even 
more so the one who departed with the bitterly cold rains of November, 
was in the end too tired, too sick, too engulfed with sadness in his personal 
life, and considerably weakened as a political animal. In a word, he was 
thoroughly diminished and thus incapable of moving beyond the prejudi-
ces associated with his own complex identity as a doctrinaire liberal pol-
itician, an English aristocrat, and a self -conscious British imperialist. On 
a more theoretical plane, the most thought -provoking evaluation of Lord 
Durham and his times comes, in my judgment, from Stéphane Dion’s 
pen. According to him, it served Durham’s purposes to arrive at the view 
that it was the French in Canada who espoused the principles and practi-
ces of anti -liberalism. This apparently objective sociological assessment 
allowed him to reconcile his liberal ideas with his geo -political preoccu-
pations. As Dion rhetorically asks himself,
Would Durham have recommended the autonomy of Lower Canada if he had 
considered sincere the professed liberalism of the patriots? We shall never 
know, because Durham and Alexis de Tocqueville were thinkers and polit-
icians who formulated their arguments in ways that enabled them never to 
have to choose between Empire and Liberty (Dion 1990, 75).
So far, I have been mostly preoccupied with what could be called a 
critical hermeneutics, privileging an understanding of the past for the 
sake of the past. In the next section I take much greater consideration of 
the present and of the future. For Lord Durham and his Report remain 
quite significant for Canada and Québec, and for humankind in general.
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III.  A Critical Hermeneutics for the Present  
and for the Future
In a key philosophical essay on the theories and histories of identity 
in Québec, Jocelyn Maclure (2003, 8-15) has given life to the idea that 
people in the majority French -speaking province, and first and foremost 
the intelligentsia, remain obsessed by the spirit of Lord Durham and have 
not liberated themselves from his shadow. In Maclure’s methodological 
approach, discourses on the matter of collective identity are narrative 
projects. These narratives contribute substantially to the emergence and 
consolidation of national communities. The fundamental standard for 
judging the importance of such narratives is their durable presence in the 
writings and minds of interpreters. Beyond the contributions that Lord 
Durham and his Report have made to the nature of the Canadian state and 
of Canadian federalism, as these have been presented in Ajzenstat’s intro-
duction, they are shown by Maclure to have had a strong influence on the 
dominant ideological doctrine underpinning interpretations of the past in 
Québec. This all -encompassing feature of intellectual life in Québec is 
what Maclure characterizes as “melancholy nationalism.” We stand here 
at the meeting point of history, memory, and politics. Discussing the rami-
fications of melancholy nationalism enables me to start addressing the 
broader significance of Lord Durham’s Report beyond French Canada 
and Québec, moving towards the idea of an inescapable tension between 
particularistic and universalistic dimensions of reality. To delineate as 
precisely as possible the phenomenon of melancholy nationalism, I begin 
with two quotations: one from Jocelyn Maclure’s essay, and one from 
Jocelyn Létourneau’s critical work on the narrative construction of mem-
ory and identity in Québec.
There exists in Québec a whole discourse about the fragility, the precarious-
ness, the tragic existence, the fatigue, the modesty, the philistinism, the medi-
ocrity, the immaturity and the indecision of the Québécois people. Those who 
intone this sombre national chant are drinking from a stream with many con-
fluents. By searching a little and by adopting a certain relationship to the past, 
one can indeed find in the genesis of Québec society, as well as in its recent 
history, the fuel for a major depression – or more precisely, a case of col-
lective melancholia. In Freud’s terms, melancholia is experienced as a kind 
of mourning whose sources elude us, which we cannot ascribe to a specific, 
identifiable loss. That is, melancholia is an elusive, diffuse, latent feeling of 
grief. From generation to generation, Québec intellectuals and writers have 
attempted to follow the thread of this melancholia, in the belief that they can 
work back to the origins of Québec’s modern -day ills (Maclure 2003, 20).
This sad view of the past was created by the great French Canadian and 
Québécois intellectuals, from Garneau to Dumont, loyally and in good faith – 
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albeit with varying degrees of modulation, subtlety and complexity […] For 
these pioneers of historical consciousness, the inherent fragility of the com-
munity required that they carry the country as one holds a child. Thus, for 
them memory had to be at the beginning of method, misery had to structure 
the purpose, melancholy had to set the tone, and the text had to nurture mem-
ory (Létourneau 2004a, 101-102).13
According to the narrative of melancholy nationalism, the vast major-
ity of the people remain fully unconscious of their alienation because 
they have “internalized in their identity the belittling, traumatizing, even 
insulting gaze of the other” (Létourneau 2004a, 101). Their imaginary is 
perpetually haunted by this gaze. The highest literary expression of this 
perspective of melancholy nationalism can be found in Hubert Aquin’s 
essays and novels. Aquin coined a famous expression, “the cultural 
fatigue of French Canada,” to describe the psychological traits which 
emerged, at the level of individual and collective consciousness, as con-
sequences of Lord Durham’s verdict of permanent minorizing: “self -
punishment, masochism, a sense of unworthiness, ‘depression’, the lack 
of enthusiasm and vigour” (Aquin 1977, 88; 1988, 35).14 The highest 
theoretical, philosophical, and historiographical expression in the trad-
ition of melancholy nationalism is the narrative articulated by Dumont 
in Genèse de la société québécoise. The introjection and appropriation 
of the Other’s degrading contempt has led to the installation of a state of 
permanent mental colonization in French Canada, carrying with it indi-
vidual and collective dimensions. According to Dumont, the vicissitudes 
of this colonization are still at work in contemporary Québec (Maclure 
2003, 41-44). While doing research, I could not help but think that Lord 
Durham symbolically was, and remains to this day, the first significant 
Other under whose gaze the narrative of melancholy nationalism per-
petually unfolds. Consider the following passages near the end of the 
Report, when Lord Durham vividly recapitulates, for our edification, the 
gist of his analysis:
I know of no national distinctions marking and continuing a more hopeless 
inferiority […] There can hardly be conceived a nationality more destitute of 
all that can invigorate and elevate a people, than that which is exhibited by 
the descendants of the French in Lower Canada, owing to their retaining their 
peculiar language and manners. They are a people with no history, and no 
literature (Lord Durham’s Report in Ajzenstat, 2006).
13 In the second chapter of his essay, Maclure critically engages with Létourneau’s work 
and with my own. As he remarks, Létourneau began to focus on the centrality of this 
melancholical dimension in two important articles. See, Létourneau (1998a; 1998b).
14 I am following here the analysis found in Maclure (2003: 25-28).
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The fate of such a destitute nationality in the Americas could only 
be that of permanent political subordination under the rule of law, or, in 
Durham’s own words, obliteration through the workings of a numerical 
majority of a loyal English population reinforced by a systematic like - 
minded immigration (Lord Durham’s Report in Ajzenstat, 2006:153). 
With these passages in mind, it does make sense to view Lord Durham 
as the true Other of melancholy nationalism. Aside from the works of 
Aquin and Dumont, I find persuasive illustrations of this connection in 
essays written by André D’Allemagne (2000, 20) and Jean Bouthillette 
(1972, 50-51) in the 1960s, the period in Québec history that witnessed 
the apex of French Canada’s collective alienation in the context of global 
decolonization.15 Lord Durham’s fate as the historical embodiment of 
the British or English Other is not restricted to the narratives of melan-
choly nationalism. I take it that “Anti -Durhamism” plays a fundamental 
role in a number of ideological statements supporting Québec’s aspira-
tions for full political sovereignty. Denis Monière, a political scientist 
at the Université de Montréal, argues that sovereignty is necessary first 
and foremost because, since 1867, Canada has fulfilled Lord Durham’s 
vision, chaining French Canadians in Québec to all the social and psycho-
logical consequences of a debilitating and paralysing minority political 
identity (Monière 2001, 138-140). In an attempt to rekindle support for 
Québec sovereignty, Bouchard makes explicit the links between Lord 
Durham’s heritage, the vocabulary of melancholy nationalism, and the 
ideal of political independence. Bouchard advocates the need for Québec, 
as a Francophone and American nation, to be master of its own des-
tiny. He supports the goal of granting greater nobility to the status of 
Francophone Québécois through the means of redressing nationally and 
internationally all areas of collective life as well as the will to re -make 
the identity of French Canadians, to repudiate the heritage of colonialism, 
and to restore the confidence and self -respect of the Québécois (Bouchard 
2006). It should not be denied, according to Jacques Beauchemin, that the 
goal of sovereignty for Québec is inseparable from a desire to redress the 
march of history (Beauchemin 2002, 181). From this perspective, achiev-
ing sovereignty would be the act of burying, at long last, Lord Durham 
and his Report. I shall now try to elevate the task of overcoming Lord 
15 D’Allemagne makes the connection between the failure of the rebellions, their demoral-
izing consequences, and the emergence of a deep inferiority complex. Bouthillette de-
scribes how French Canadians have become strangers to themselves, how the defeat of 
Les Patriotes remain their definitive loss, and how this fall into nostalgia has been ac-
companied by the perfumes of regret and disconsolate pain. Readers should be warned: 
if you believe that Marx, Hegel, Sartre and Fanon are too abstract and imprecise about 
alienation, try reading Bouthillette.
105
Lord Durham, French Canada, and Québec
Durham’s heritage, and all other similar heritages, to a more universal 
arena by integrating the insights of French philosopher Paul Ricoeur on 
the necessary duty to find an equilibrium between remembrance and for-
getfulness in the search for a moral way to deal with History.
For individuals as well as for groups, the fall of historical memory 
into the abyss of melancholy is simply catastrophical. It is nothing short 
of a terrible disaster. It seems to me that such is the arresting conclusion 
reached by Ricoeur (2000, 81) near the end of his productive and remark-
ably long life. Whenever any particular community closes itself to its 
own sufferings, thus becoming “blind and deaf to the sufferings of other 
communities,” history must intervene to criticize, rectify, and admonish 
the memory of this first community. Through the help of a critical histor-
ical hermeneutics, according to Ricoeur, memory meets a certain sense 
of justice for, as he rhetorically puts it, “What would be a happy memory 
which would not be, as well, a just memory?” (Ricoeur 2000, 650). The 
problem for any identity with the triumph of melancholy is a Self that suf-
fers from its own devaluation, from its own condemnation, and from the 
consequences of its own downgrading, namely depression and anxiety.
Can French Canada and Québec, under the spell of their nationalist 
and sovereigntist historians, be counted in the category of these com-
munities having followed Ricoeur’s unhappy path towards the abyss of 
melancholy? Such indeed is the argument propounded by Maclure and 
Létourneau, and such is also Ralston Saul’s view when he portrays the 
insults of Lord Durham in his Report as a wound to be scratched open 
on a regular basis. There is undeniably an element of truth in this critical 
assessment. As Jean -Philippe Warren contends, it may be that in its desire 
to focus on a psychoanalytical approach to the understanding of history, 
Dumont’s generation has nourished and possibly even generated an over-
lapping sense of anxiety (Warren 1998, 161). Université Laval sociolo-
gist Simon Langlois, closely associated to Dumont’s school of thought, 
recognizes that the author of Genèse de la société québécoise had clearly 
privileged recalling the memory of a certain French Canadian past in the 
history of Québec, neglecting the faces of diversity in the past and in 
the present of this society as well the duty of every nation to re -imagine 
the future in a new light (Langlois 2002, 11). It would however be an 
over -simplification if one were to conclude that the dominant intellectual 
characteristic of modern -day Québec is the perpetuation of such a fall into 
the abyss of melancholy, a fall that would have been inaugurated by Lord 
Durham’s narrative in his Report.
In the social sciences, in literature, as well as in philosophy, the last 
twenty -five years have been marked by a series of debates on the plural-
istic nature of Québec’s collective identity and on the need to allow much 
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greater space to these plural memories in the reconstruction of Québec’s 
national history.16 It is only fair to recognize the leading role played in this 
enterprise by Gérard Bouchard (1999), who has probably become Québec’s 
pre -eminent historian and intellectual figure since the death of Fernand 
Dumont in 1997. Echoing Ricoeur’s admonitions about the requirements 
of a happy and just historical memory, Jacques Beauchemin and Daniel 
Jacques have philosophically argued that in Québec the politics of conquest 
and of reconquest, must be replaced by a politics of concord – the kind 
of politics marked by processes of dialogue and reciprocal recognitions, 
where people steeped in their plural identities argue their way towards 
reasonable compromises.17 In the politics of concord, no vision of the col-
lective future can claim the language of historical normality. Newcomers 
to such a society must accept that they have climbed aboard a train or that 
they have joined a movie that started before their arrival (Taylor 2000, 
42). However, they should not be over -burdened by the memory of any 
particular group. In Québec as elsewhere in the world, according to Daniel 
Jacques, the wounds of the past and the duty to remember should not be the 
sole guiding principle in matters of political conduct (Jacques 2000, 83).
Maclure, following Freud, described melancholia as a sort of mourn-
ing “whose sources elude us.” I shall now venture to identify one such 
possible source of this kind of mourning, thereby re -joining Ajzenstat in 
her introduction, when she found a fundamental tension at the heart of 
Lord Durham’s Report between universalistic and particularistic dimen-
sions in the unfolding of modernity. What would have happened, in the 
1840s, if Lord Durham recommended – and if British imperial author-
ities implemented – a regime of dominion -like status or responsible self - 
government for Lower Canada? Would the French majority have acted 
despotically, ruling Lower Canada in an unconstrained, intolerant, and 
absolutist fashion? Or, conversely, would it have inaugurated an era of tol-
erance, fairness, and pluralism in the history of the modern state, establish-
ing an edifying precedent in a world that was facing, with great difficulty, 
the conflicting challenges of liberalism and nationalism, and of universal-
ism and particularism, in the middle of the 19th century? There are no guar-
antees either way, but in the humanities and social sciences we have known 
since Max Weber (1965, 290-300) that it is instructive to think through 
these options and categories of objective possibility. Lower Canada’s past 
held promises for the future in both directions. Lord Durham, with his 
16 Elbaz et al. (1996). See, also, Venne (2000), Maclure and Gagnon (2001), Seymour 
(1999), and Laforest (1995). 
17 See Jacques (2000, 71-76) and Beauchemin (2002, 182-183). These authors paral-
lel Maclure when he defines dialogue as a process of “reciprocal elucidation.” See, 
Maclure (2003, 15).
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Report, buried the optimistic pole of this sphere of objective possibility 
and I believe this is a major source of mourning that can be discerned in 
the narrative of melancholy nationalism. Remember Ajzenstat’s key ques-
tion: is universalism implacably hostile to expressions of particularity?
Political philosophers ponder such difficult questions, whereas pol-
itical communities act upon them. In his own seminal essay, Critique 
de l’Américanité: Mémoire et démocratie au Québec (Critique of 
Americanness: Remembrance and Democracy in Québec), published 
in 2002, Joseph -Yvon Thériault, a sociologist at the Université de 
Québec à Montréal, argues that this central question, which fascinates 
Ajzenstat, has always been, since the advent of Lower Canada through 
the Constitution Act, 1791, the question dominating public debates in the 
colony, and later on in French Canada and Québec. Thériault calls this 
interrogation the question of the people, suggesting that the intellectual 
and political configurations whose development stems from this question 
can best be understood as the “Durham moment” (Thériault 2002, 286-
290). This question of the people has always been of a double nature with 
a universalistic axis, envisaging the nation as a contractual community of 
individuals with liberal rights, and a particularistic one, emphasizing the 
broad cultural heritage of the national community. Lord Durham saw the 
French majority in Lower Canada as overly anchored in a destitute and 
parochial heritage to be able to lend any hope to the belief that it could 
elevate itself by its own means to the good of universality. The general 
spirit of his Report follows a rather Manichean logic: either tradition or 
modernity, either a nation of individual citizens or a community of herit-
age. Lord Durham does not integrate into his narrative the fact that ever 
since the first session of its legislative assembly in 1792, Lower Canada 
had been struggling, however imperfectly, to find its own proper balance 
between the good of universality and the good of particularity (Thériault 
2002, 294-295). In the end, there is nothing too mysterious about such a 
tension in philosophy as well as in politics. As Ajzenstat herself remarks, 
the idea of the ineluctability of this tension is generally accepted in con-
temporary political theory.18
Lord Durham’s Report still makes remarkable sense in contemporary 
Canada and Québec because its reach has extended not only to the nature 
of the emerging Canadian federal state in 1867, not only in a comprehen-
sive way to the whole intellectual history of French Canada and Québec, 
whether we prefer to look at it from Maclure’s perspective of melan-
choly nationalism or from Thériault’s approach insisting on a “Durham 
18 See Ajzenstat (2006, xxvii); see also Taylor, (1996, 357-360) and Kymlicka (2001, 
242-253).
Interpreting Quebec’s Exile Within the Federation
108
moment.” It is also because Durham’s reductive and doctrinaire view of the 
conflict between universality and particularity has exercised great influ-
ence on the philosophical make -up of Pierre Elliott Trudeau, Canada’s 
most important 20th century statesman, and the father of our 1982 consti-
tutional revision and the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Having writ-
ten about this extensively elsewhere, I do not want to belabour the point 
(Laforest 1995b, 171-184). I shall only add that regarding Trudeau’s own 
understanding of the struggle between liberal universalism and national 
particularism in French Canada, major thinkers such as Thériault (2002, 
311) and Lamonde (2001, 14-15) make an explicit connection between 
Lord Durham’s interpretation and the one propounded by Canada’s for-
mer Prime Minister. Moreover André Burelle, a friend of Trudeau who 
worked for him as a speechwriter and a close collaborator during crucial 
stages of his career, has recently documented the triumph of doctrinaire 
liberalism in his intellectual evolution, leading to the ultimate expulsion 
of any meaningful recognition of Québec’s difference and of its particu-
larity in the constitution Canada and Québec have inherited from him.19 
If we are to believe Ajzenstat, there are indeed ways to cope with the 
tension between universalism and particularism. “Politics is a matter of 
compromise; even fundamental principles must be bent sometimes – a 
little – on occasion” (Ajzenstat 2006, xxvii). If we are to believe Burelle, 
Trudeau thought otherwise with regards to French Canada and Québec. 
If the connection between Lord Durham and Trudeau holds true, then the 
spirit of the famous Report not only belongs to our past, but is also rather 
intimately related to the present and to the future of Canada and Québec.
Conclusion
Historians should not forget that the task of making history in our lib-
eral and democratic world belongs to citizens. Extrapolating from his own 
piece of wisdom about this phenomenon, Ricoeur adds that although they 
only narrate history, these historians remain responsible for what they 
say, particularly when their work applies to wounded memories (Ricoeur 
2006, 323). The existence of a link between a sense of “wounded dig-
nity” and all manifestations of national patriotism in French Canada and 
Québec is certainly not the exclusive domain of those authors normally 
associated with melancholy nationalism. How should we deal, here and 
now, with the wounded dimensions of our collective memory? Quite 
frankly, I am not an expert on this issue. My best answers, using Lord 
Durham’s Report as an edifying example for us and for people elsewhere, 
are found in this chapter. More to the point, I believe, with Ricoeur, that 
19 Burelle (2005, 68-74, 462-464).
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the memory of those who really suffered in the past must be honoured. 
Thus, Québec is right to honour the memory of Les Patriotes, particularly 
the memory of the dozen who died on the scaffolds erected by colonial 
despotism. Once this is done, I believe it is appropriate to place one’s his-
torical wounds in comparative perspective, also paying due respect to the 
wounds of the other groups and communities with whom one has shared 
parts of the past and with whom one hopes to share parts of the future. I 
use a careful expression with regards to the future, because I believe it is 
open -ended. Constructing an appropriate historical memory for any com-
munity should be done without prejudging about the “normal” unfolding 
of history, I believe this idea of normality is a blatant illusion. It is a fact, 
as Ralston Saul has argued, that Québec historians of all stripes have 
paid greater attention to the various conflicts between Francophones and 
Anglophones than to periods of greater harmony and collaboration. A 
happy and just memory requires a better balance between these two poles 
than has so far existed. A happy and just memory requires that, in a com-
plex modern society made of groups and individuals with plural identi-
ties, we should pay fair and equal attention to what we have done together, 
and to one another in the past, and to what we dream of accomplishing in 
the future. Where does that leave us with Lord Durham and his Report? 
According to Ajzenstat, Lord Durham’s lasting question is the problem 
of the relationship between universalism and particularism. In his reflec-
tions on the very same question, Joseph -Yvon Thériault called it the ques-
tion of the people in French Canada, and in another passage he called it 
the question of Québec. The question of Lord Durham is the question of 
Québec. And this very particular question of Québec carries with it a pro-




Some Reflections  
on the Bouchard -Taylor Commission
The Consultation Commission on Accommodation Practices Related 
to Cultural Differences was created in February 2007 following a series 
of incidents that received a great deal of attention in the media and that 
the Commission’s Report itself described as related to increasing iden-
tity anxiety between Québec’s French -speaking majority and its cultural 
and religious minorities. The Commission completed the essential task of 
holding public consultations, which was broadly relayed by the media in 
the fall of 2007. This was among the two or three most influential of such 
exercises over the last twenty years in Québec. A few basic statistics are 
sufficient to establish the Commission’s quantitative impact: over 3000 
people attended some twenty regional forums, its website received half a 
million hits, 901 people submitted briefs (the authors of 300 of these briefs 
were invited to testify). The opportunities to engage in interactive partici-
patory democracy offered by the Commission generated some 120,000 
responses on its website. The Commission also held four province -wide 
forums, established several expert panels, and piloted a number of major 
research projects. Its overall cost was about $3.7 million.
As it had already announced in a consultation document published 
at the end of the summer of 2007, the Bouchard -Taylor Commission 
expanded its mandate well beyond the legal dimension of reasonable 
accommodation, considered as a way of creating flexibility to counteract 
the discriminatory nature of apparently neutral norms and to face head -on 
the problems with Québec’s social and cultural integration strategy. It thus 
engaged in a deep analysis of the issues of interculturalism, secularism, 
immigration, and Québec identity (Québec 2007). In the Commission’s 
words, Québec is a “small nation” that is a cultural minority in North 
America, and thus it faces, with obvious urgency that will never go away, 
the challenge of finding ways of living together with different cultures 
within the same space and the same institutions. Since the question of fair 
management of diversity is at the heart of public debate in most modern 
societies, the two co -chairs considered that the Québécois could make the 
Commission into a strong demonstration of democracy and leave their 
mark on a major debate. The goals of this vast enterprise in consulta-
tive democracy were the following: to inform the Commission on the 
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points of view of people from different generations and origins, as well 
as from different areas of Québec, concerning management of diversity 
and Québecers shared values; to create a spirit of, and space for, dialogue 
among people of diverse origins; and, to stimulate reflection on the main 
communities concerned. Overall, the two co -chairs gave themselves three 
concrete objectives: to clarify the existing situation, to provide a frame-
work of reference to help those managing institutions, and to communi-
cate their thoughts and make recommendations concerning the future 
of interethnic relations and the integration strategy most appropriate for 
Québec society.
If I had to summarize in a single sentence the spirit of the 2008 
Bouchard -Taylor Commission Report entitled Building the Future: A 
Time for Reconciliation, I would choose the following, which is based 
on remarks made a number of times by the two co -chairs. It is an attempt 
to show that the concerns of Québec’s French -Canadian, Catholic major-
ity heritage are not dissimilar from those of the cultural and religious 
minorities so that such concerns do not create solitudes closed off to one 
another. Since, according to the Report, the crisis was fundamentally one 
of largely false perceptions, blown out of proportion by the media and 
used by political players for their own immediate and partisan ends, the 
Bouchard -Taylor Commission remains, in the end, relatively optimistic in 
so far as Québec has made progress with respect to intercultural and inter -
community reconciliation over the last forty years. The Commission advo-
cates an approach favouring continuity, while acknowledging the need to 
take strong and immediate action to calm fears on all sides. According 
to the Report, it is clear that the main share of the conciliatory work has 
to be done by the majority – French -Canadian Québécois or Québecers 
of French -Canadian ancestry – since they are still a strong demographic 
majority (over 78 percent of the population), control institutions, and 
are able to impose their will in public decision -making. The Report sug-
gests that this majority has a dual status as it is also a minority in Canada 
and North America. Paradoxically, this majority expresses its collective 
identity in the form of angst with respect to the minorities’ existential 
anxiety. In their respective works on French Canada and Québec, Gérard 
Bouchard and Charles Taylor have been exploring this theme for many 
decades (Bouchard 2003; Taylor 1992a). The following passage from the 
Report shows clearly that the two co -chairs have always remained aware 
of the tension inherent in this dual status:
It would certainly be unfair to demand of small minority nations somewhat 
mistreated by history and constrained to grow by following a perilous course 
the assurance of imperial nations. In the course of their history they have 
advanced and withdrawn and experienced surges and doubts. What we have 
occasionally witnessed over the past two years among certain individuals is 
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a nation founded on doubt and withdrawal. However, it would be wrong to 
generalize and, above all, to lay blame. Instead, it is necessary to refer to our 
analysis of the very specific coincidence that triggered and sustained the ac-
commodation crisis: situational factors in Montréal inflated by the media and 
rumours revived among a number of French -Canadian Québecers the anx-
iety experienced by minorities, already alerted by facets of the international 
situation.
All in all, it is fairer to rely on a turnaround and a forward -looking movement 
imbued with good faith and common sense, in a spirit of trust and reconcilia-
tion (Québec 2008, 243).
At the very bottom of the crisis, the Commission finds growing fears 
about identity related to the minority’s existential anxiety, the number one 
constant in Québec’s history and of the main demographic group’s col-
lective identity that the Commission calls “French -Canadian Québecers.” 
It should be noted that the second major constant in this history is the 
group’s dual status of being the majority in Québec but a minority in 
North America. Indeed, the first constant may be active or on hold, but it 
is quite real and remains key. It is a chronic feeling of insecurity to which a 
loss of ethical markers is added. I will focus on this in greater detail in my 
own diagnosis of the current state of Québec society. The Commission’s 
Report sees manifestations of this chronic insecurity in the issue at the 
very foundation of its work: the problem of reasonable accommodation 
related to integration of immigrants, and in particular fears expressed 
concerning the ghettoization of Montréal, the resurgence of doubts con-
cerning the French language, and apprehension linked to globalization 
(Québec 2008, 185-186). The Commission concludes that there certainly 
have been some excesses, which some have called unreasonable accom-
modation. However, such cases are extremely limited and we cannot 
speak of any increase. Yet, these cases crystallized negative perceptions 
in certain segments of the population, with media and political players 
fanning the flames (Québec 2008, 186-188). At this stage of its diagno-
sis, the Commission made an unusual incursion into Canadian politics, 
and admitted that Supreme Court decisions, the highest tribunal in the 
country, could have been interpreted as a kind of authoritarian federal 
trespassing into Québec politics. In large segments of the majority group, 
the overall picture of this situation has been interpreted as equivalent to 
rejection or disdain of French -speaking culture, thus awakening certain 
memories of colonized, humiliated French Canadians. This has led to 
greater anxiety and identity -related resistance, in which xenophobia and 
racism may have played roles however marginal and peripheral they may 
have been. In the section on the origins of the crisis and in another on the 
fears of the French -Canadian majority, the Commission explores many 
possible explanations. Let us take a closer look.
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Naturally, the Report frequently returns to the two fundamental con-
stants of minority existential anxiety and the dual majority -minority status 
in Québec and North America. Use is made of certain discussions in phil-
osophy and the social sciences that have been very critical of national 
identities and somewhat condescending towards displays of identity. 
The co -chairs are persuaded that, in the debate over reasonable accom-
modation, pluralist, interculturalism -oriented Québec has regressed and 
returned to conservative attitudes. Reactions have at times been dis-
proportionate in relation to the issue of accommodation, involving the 
resurgence of, and identification with, a certain French Canada that is 
“diffident” and “mistrustful of the Other” (Québec 2008, 188). Returning 
to their overall sociological approach, the co -chairs make the realistic 
observation that identity today remains a fundamental, inevitable social 
process, which may go astray but can be reformed. In the case of Québec, 
which will always be a small nation and a cultural minority in North 
America, the Report insists on the idea that, as a French -speaking place, 
it will always need a strong identity to calm its fears and be at ease as a 
peaceful majority. Here we recognize the essential premise of the histor-
ical and sociological work that Gérard Bouchard has been doing for over 
ten years (Bouchard 1999). From what we can tell based on the public 
interventions by the co -chairs and from the Commission’s internal docu-
ments (especially the annexes), Bouchard seems to have exercised the 
greatest intellectual leadership in the Commission’s work, and the Report 
can be seen as nothing less than a new discourse for the Québec nation 
on the model of Fichte’s Reden an die deutsche Nation – in English pub-
lished as Addresses to the German Nation (Fichte 1922). Some 20 years 
ago, Léon Dion, a political scientist, explicitly referenced Fichte to launch 
an appeal for national regeneration (Laforest 1992). Since Léon Dion’s 
death in 1997, which coincided with that of the great sociologist Fernand 
Dumont (who was himself the veritable Herder of Québec national and 
cultural identity), Bouchard should deservedly be considered the public 
intellectual exercising the greatest influence on reflection on Québec cul-
ture and national identity (Beauchemin 2002; Létourneau 2000). From 
this perspective, the Report’s interpretative framework, conclusions, and 
recommendations, in other words the Commission’s Report as a whole, 
is a major intellectual attempt to lead 21st century Québec towards a syn-
thesis between the universal values of liberal democratic modernity, on 
one side, and the path of its specific identity, on the other. Bouchard, 
with Taylor’s help (I will come back to this in a few paragraphs), is seek-
ing, in Fichte’s tradition, a nationalism of educability for contemporary 
Québec so as to go beyond the famous quarrel between Enlightenment 
and Romantic thinkers. Alain Renaut summarizes this Fichtean idea of a 
nationalism of educability in the following way:
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Perhaps it is not in fact impossible to see in Fichte the beginnings of a third 
perspective on the nation -state, which would be at the centre of a third polit-
ical philosophy correcting the symmetrical deficiencies of the two preceding 
ones, opening the national community to a future without completely closing 
it to its past and culture. Here we would see sketched a concept of the nation 
obeying yet a different logic, for which nationality would be thought of not in 
terms of pure and simple loyalty, not pure and simple belonging, but in terms 
of educability.
However, how should we think about this? Clearly not from the point of view 
of belonging to a national spirit, for that would risk sinking into the disastrous 
consequences of Romantic ideas, the inability of thinking of a future for the 
nation. Fichte in fact saw that the visible sign of inscribing freedom in a cul-
ture and tradition consists in the capacity to be educated, in other words, if 
one prefers, educability about the values of that freedom and that tradition. 
This explains his insistence on national education as education to the nation 
(Renaut 1999, 391-392. My translation).
The tension between the universal and the particular, and the idea 
of calling for national regeneration, can be found in the Report’s pages 
on the concerns of the Québec majority of French -Canadian ancestry. 
First, the authors speak of the importance of imposing a certain num-
ber of fundamental values in school as early as possible such as the 
primacy of the French language, secularism, and solidarity and equal-
ity among men and women. Concerning the condition of the French 
language, the Commission goes a little beyond its mandate to give a 
measured assessment of the situation. Some statistics are promising, 
while others are more worrisome. The Commission acknowledges that, 
on the linguistic front, Québec will always live in permanent tension 
and that the situation will require constant vigilance. Concerning trad-
itions and customs, the central location of ethnicity, the Commission 
shares the opinion of sociologists regarding the extent of the upheavals 
and unbridled rate of change. The majority cannot blame the worries 
raised by such transformations on cultural and religious minorities. The 
Report’s most dramatic passages are contained in these pages. The co--
chairs write that, for Québec society, it would be preferable to have a 
memory of plurality rather than a plurality of memories, which could 
only be a last resort solution. For a memory of plurality to become pos-
sible, all Québecers must have access to the meaning that flows from 
the French -Canadian past by showing what is universal in that singular-
ity. The majority has to make a strong commitment to this undertaking 
because it has the demographic and institutional strength to do so. Its 
best assets lie there, rather than on a path that would allow the ascend-
ance of “self -doubt and fear of the Other, the two stumbling blocks of 
the French -Canadian past” (Québec 2008, 212). On the cultural and 
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intercultural fronts, Québec society will always be under strong ten-
sion. When we take a comparative perspective, when we see what is 
happening in other societies living in similar situations, we find that 
Québec has many advantages. It is an old land of immigration where, 
overall, newcomers quickly integrate and acquire Canadian citizenship. 
Since it sees itself as a welcoming place, all political parties consider 
immigration as a source of wealth necessary for social and economic 
development. This is in large part because seventy percent of Québec’s 
newcomers are chosen according to their skills and a large percent-
age of newcomers are middle class. This is especially true of Arab -
Muslim immigrants, which makes them much less fertile ground for 
fundamentalism than elsewhere. Finally, on the psychological level, 
and compared to European countries, Québec faces far fewer problems 
associated with immigrants from former colonies still suffering the con-
sequences of a painful history. For all of these reasons, the Commission 
believes that the objective conditions will be met for consolidating a 
majority -minority dialogue in Québec once the pseudo -crisis of reason-
able accommodation has been defused.
According to the Commission, the very future of the Québec nation 
depends on opening French -Canadian heritage to “the creative, fruitful 
contribution of the Other” (Québec 2008, 242). It should be noted in pass-
ing that the Commission very rarely uses the expression “Québec nation” 
in the Report, preferring “French -Canadian Québecers,” “small nation 
such as Québec,” and “cultural minority.” Yet, experts have pointed out 
that the Commission’s exercise in democratic consultation and its Report 
should be considered as contributions to the Québec national undertaking 
and to Québec nation -building (Cairns 2008). From this point of view, it 
is possible that the overall operation made a more positive contribution 
to national engineering than I consider here, since I concentrate on the 
relations between Canadian and Québec nation -building, particularly on 
certain points overlooked by the Commission.
Raising themselves to the status of pedagogues for the Québec nation – 
like Fichte in Germany at the beginning of the 19th century – Bouchard 
and Taylor invite their fellow citizens to practice four civic virtues: 
equity, to prevent insistence on differences from obscuring immigrants’ 
real difficulties; receiving and meeting the Other, since the openness to 
the world of which the Québécois are so proud has to begin with bring-
ing closer together fellow citizens of all origins; moderation and wisdom; 
and, finally, patience because integration is a process that can take several 
generations (Québec 2008, 242). Bringing together the three threads of 
the Commission’s work, the Report concludes that in order to truly defuse 
the reasonable accommodation crisis, we have to:
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• be up to the challenges of integration in a small nation such as 
Québec, where creative tension and a search for balance between 
the continuity of French -Canadian heritage, on the one hand, and 
the imperatives of interculturalism and pluralism, on the other, will 
always exist;
• more clearly adopt a system of open secularism by balancing four 
principles: freedom of conscience, equality among individuals, 
reciprocal independence of church and state, and state neutrality; 
and,
• strengthen the points of reference and standards that will facilitate 
better harmonization and integration practices across Québec and, 
of course, particularly in the Montréal metropolitan area, where 
the great majority of members of cultural and religious minorities 
live.
Taylor is universally known for his philosophical anthropology 
of modernity based on his hermeneutics of modern German thought. 
In his works, Taylor has tried to reconcile the global leanings of the 
Enlightenment with the particularistic attractions of Romanticism. He has 
endeavored to understand the complexity of freedom, equality, and soli-
darity as equally important normative pillars, building bridges between 
the analytic and continental philosophical traditions. The quality of his 
work has led the late Richard Rorty to give him the title of the “New 
Hegel for Our Times.” From the perspective of the Western history of 
philosophy and Québec and Canada’s intellectual history, the encounter 
between Taylor and Bouchard is a veritable event to which I cannot render 
justice in this text, beyond a few considerations. First, I draw attention to 
a passage in the Report’s chapter on integration, where we find reference 
to Alexis de Tocqueville, a key author for Taylor in his discussion of the 
malaises of modernity. “There can be no society without shared beliefs, 
without shared ideas, for without shared beliefs and ideas, there can be no 
communal action, and, finally, without communal action, and the words 
remain engraved in the memory of every reader of de Tocqueville, there 
may be people, individuals, but not social body” (Québec 2008, 123). 
Taylor develops this reference to Tocqueville at greater length in The 
Malaise of Modernity. Here are some significant excerpts:
Governing a contemporary society is continually recreating a balance be-
tween requirements that tend to undercut each other, constantly finding cre-
ative solutions as the old equilibria become stultifying. There can never be in 
the nature of the case a definitive solution (Taylor 1991, 111).
This fragmentation comes about partly through a weakening of the bonds of 
sympathy, partly in a self -feeding way, through the failure of democratic in-
itiative itself. Because the more fragmented a democratic electorate is in this 
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sense, the more they transfer their political energies to promoting their partial 
groupings […] and the less it is possible to mobilize democratic majorities 
around commonly understood programs and policies (Taylor 1991, 113).
Some twenty years ago, at a colloquium on the theme of identity and 
modernity in Québec, where Alain Touraine and Charles Taylor were the 
keynote speakers, Taylor tried to reconcile the tension between the uni-
versal and the particular in modern identity and specifically Québec iden-
tity, without overlooking the issue of possible bases for building bridges 
between Canadian and Québec national identities. It required understand-
ing that those two identities combine cultural and political dimensions, as 
most (if not all) modern national identities do. Québec and Canada both 
aspire to be deliberative units. They need this in order to avoid the third 
malaise of modernity, which is fragmentation. In order to enable such 
national undertakings to achieve this objective of unity, great progress 
would be made if we were to recognize that this can be done while com-
bining elements of convergence and real, strong, recognized differences. 
In a passage from his 1993 talk, it seems like Taylor is addressing his 
fellow Québecers as they are engulfed in the reasonable accommodations 
crisis or in the debate over the Charte des valeurs québécoises:
The Québécois of tomorrow will have to learn to think of their society in a 
bifocal way, seeing it from different angles depending on the context, and 
sometimes insisting on convergence as a backdrop to political discussion, 
but in other circumstances focusing on the conversation among voices that 
are distinct but mutually invested in one another. Québec’s real and grow-
ing diversity prevents us from simply adopting the first point of view, while 
the considerable divide between the majority and the minority keeps us from 
entrenching ourselves without mediation in the second. We have to learn to 
combine the two perspectives, in the right proportion, and to develop a com-
plex, multifaceted identity appropriate to our shifting reality (Taylor 1996, 
361. My translation).
Regarding the Report’s overall balance, I think that major elements 
in Bouchard’s historical and sociological work were given rather more 
weight than points on which Taylor has tended to focus during his career. 
The slightly melancholic hermeneutics of the French -Canadian soul, 
linked with deep disappointment given Québec’s failure to achieve its 
modern destiny through two referendums on sovereignty and coupled 
with relative indifference to Canada, weighed more heavily than the 
entirely Tocquevillian importance of common action and integrating 
Québec’s present status into the Canadian political regime, doing justice 
to both its minority status within Canada and the priority status of French 
in Québec. I think that the main failing of the Report lies in the fact that it 
did not give itself the freedom to examine the very real consequences on 
Québec of contemporary changes in Canadian nation -building.
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Over the last years I often wondered, and still do, about the passion-
ate reactions to the Bouchard -Taylor Commission in Québec public 
opinion. While the Report rightly criticized the media for exaggerating 
and portraying reality inaccurately, and while it is unchallengeable that 
media concentration and convergence gives them a rather exceptional 
level of penetration in French -speaking Québec society, I do not think 
that this is where we should place the primary responsibility in this case. 
That politicians were slow to take action and that some used what the 
Commission called a perceived crisis also does not explain everything 
Neither does a degree of clumsiness on the part of the co -chairs, who 
initially gave the impression that their Report was written before they 
began and then closed themselves into a kind of silence that opened the 
way for a certain number of verbal excesses that were luckily without ser-
ious consequences. Yet, how can we explain the fact that the Commission 
helped exacerbate Québec’s contemporary identity malaise? I think that 
the Commission touched one or more raw nerves among the people of 
Québec at a time when, for many people, there was great worry and 
strong feelings of insecurity concerning the future of both Québec and 
their own personal destinies. It all happened after September 11, against 
the backdrop of a decade marked by security and terrorism problems 
throughout the world, and at a time when there was a strong Québec pres-
ence in a major Canadian military mission in the province of Kandahar in 
Afghanistan. There were links between that mission and problems internal 
to Québec (related to the role of religion and gender in society). Indeed, I 
think that there are five fundamental dilemmas in contemporary Québec 
that played key roles in the way the Bouchard -Taylor Commission’s work 
was received:
1) The forms of globalization dominated by the English language 
and culture exacerbate the linguistic insecurity of the Québécois, 
who are already hyper -aware of their minority status in Canada 
and North America. The Commission’s Report speaks of this, but 
not enough. The writer Jean Larose expresses this in the following 
way: “We are told that modern critical thinking, far from emanat-
ing from the national spirit, owes everything to mixing, to cul-
tural and linguistic hybridization. Certainly, but do you hear many 
different languages in the world -class culture of Planet Reebok?” 
(Larose 1994, 94. My translation)
2) The combined effects of the indebtedness of the state and public 
institutions and the ageing of the population, which produces a 
Québec that has trouble modernizing the institutional infrastruc-
ture that it inherited from the Quiet Revolution and that is haunt-
ed by the perspective of its relative decline in Canada and North 
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America and the spectre of economic decline following the model 
of the frequent crises in Argentina since the 1930s (Dufour 2006).
3) Historically, in French -speaking Québec, it was mainly reli-
gion and the apparatus of the Catholic Church that created the 
social glue. Religion and religiousness have given way to deep 
non -belief that is in many respects pathological. It is bitter, sac-
rilegious, disillusioned non -belief (Laurin 2006). Québec lacks in-
stitutions producing a social bond or, at least, for those who think 
I am exaggerating, producing the components of an ethical back-
bone in the general field of education, particularly with respect 
to civic education. According to Pierre Vadeboncoeur, in Québec 
we have liquidated our classics and replaced them with the neo -
obscurantism of relativist post -modernism, pretending that amor-
phous licence is the heart of liberty (Vadeboncoeur 2000; Caldwell 
2001). This is all hollow but real. It leaves a lot of anomie. The 
situation can be summarized in a slogan: Québec, a social fabric 
that is unravelling. For some, those who more or less no longer 
believe, those whom the Commission called Québecers of French - 
Canadian ancestry, the religion and faith of Others (minorities) is 
disturbing and poses problems. There is a lot of this in the pseudo - 
crisis of reasonable accommodation. The sociologist Jacques 
Grand’Maison has summarized this from the perspective of per-
sonalist Catholic humanism in the following way: “In this country, 
it is not the unbearable weight of religious fundamentalism that 
threatens us most, but the impoverishment of the soul and loss of 
its depth of meaning, inward regard, motivation, faith and hope” 
(Grand’Maison 2007, 89-90).
4) The Québec nation, and the modern Québec identity, has a problem 
of disillusioned historical consciousness, of a historical memory 
that has difficulty seeing the connection between French -Canadian 
cultural heritage and modern Québec in terms other than that of a 
rupture. I have spoken about this before concerning the Québec 
Historikerstreit in relation to the conflict between the interpreta-
tions of Québec’s history that Bouchard and Taylor participated 
in long before their appointments as the Commission’s co -chairs. 
There is a strong vein of melancholy in Québec thought on identity 
and nationalism. As Paul Ricoeur (2000) pointed out, it is dan-
gerous for both individuals and peoples to sink into the abyss of 
melancholy, to dwell on their wounds and historical failures. After 
two referendums in which sovereignists lost, and given the im-
probability of future success, a number of authors are now discuss-
ing moving on from the sovereigntist program to some extent and 
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reflecting on the consequences of keeping it among the commun-
ity’s aspirations when there is virtually no possibility of achieving 
it. Those consequences include the temptation to act in bad faith 
in Canadian politics, to yield to self -contempt among the younger 
generations, and to deny reality (Jacques 2007; 2008).
5) Moreover, and I insist on this quite a lot in other chapters of this 
book, Québec is poorly integrated into Canada, which, in the way 
its own identity transforms itself, feeds off of the dynamic power 
of Québec society but does not give Québec adequate legal and 
political recognition.
The Bouchard -Taylor Commission’s Report has certainly shown that 
Québec has many assets that it can use to manage its internal diversity 
in a fair and constructive manner. The Commission’s examination of the 
reasonable accommodation saga, a crisis of perceptions rather than a true 
crisis of inter -community relations, has revealed that there was in the end 
very little hatred or contempt for the “Other” or “Others” in contempor-
ary Québec. We should rejoice in this, for it is promising for the future. 
However, since, even in the most sophisticated societies of America and 
Europe, moderate voices assert the need for identity reference points that 
can facilitate democratic dialogue and deliberation on how to manage 
deep, complex diversity, it seems reasonable to me to express some dis-
appointment with the general spirit of the Bouchard -Taylor Commission’s 
Report (Dufour 2006; Goodhart 2006). As Isaiah Berlin (1998) pointed 
out, rules, principles, and values must yield to one another in specific 
circumstances. In the midst of all that, we will never be able to hope for 
better than a precarious balance. If it had more directly and more frankly 
faced the issue of the unresolved conflict between Canadian and Québec 
nation -building, which is an unavoidable aspect of the majority -minority 
issue in contemporary Canada and Québec, the Commission would have 
had greater credibility when it came to employing the ethical register of 
dialogue -openness -dignity -self -esteem -trust that is at the heart of what it 
proposes for tomorrow between Québecers of French -Canadian heritage 
and Québec’s cultural and religious minorities. The Commission’s Report 
is a noble call for compromise, listening, moderation, and patience. It 
is clear that we find in it the Aristotelian spirit of the golden mean so 
dear to Taylor. Owing to the quality of its content, and also because of 
Taylor’s international reputation, the Commission’s Report will continue 
to be the subject of abundant discussion in coming years. I think that if 
the co -chairs had been able to demonstrate greater political courage, their 
Report would have effectively brought together the two national solitudes 
of Canada and Québec, in addition to calming the inter -community fears 
specific to Québec.
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At the heart of Canadian nation -building, as at the heart of Québec 
nation -building, we find what my colleague from Vancouver, Philip 
Resnick (2005), calls “metaphysics of doubt.” The German language 
reminds us that the boundary between doubt (Zweifeln) and despair 
(Verzweifeln) can sometimes be very thin. Taking a broad reconciliatory 
approach to building the future also requires listening and dialogue, as 
well as common action uniting the majority and minorities in democratic 
practices. I think that we can also rightly criticize the Commission for 
a degree of imbalance between its inter -cultural dialogue approach and 
what it recommends in terms of political action. In this area, in Québec, 
in 2014, the foundations for the future remain to be built.
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chapter 8
More Distress than Enchantment
The Constitutional Negotiations of November 1981
The title of this chapter is borrowed from the first volume of the auto-
biography of Canada’s greatest French -Canadian writer linked to the land 
and the culture of the West. In La détresse et l’enchantement, Gabrielle 
Roy (1909-1983) delivers a powerfully moving narrative of her childhood 
in Saint -Boniface and the Winnipeg area in the early 20th century (Roy 
1984). Paraphrasing her incomparable prose, I shall argue in this chapter 
that, seen from Québec and of course without claiming unanimity, the 
constitutional negotiations of November 1981 and their legal sequel, the 
Constitution Act, 1982, represent much more distress than enchantment. 
In the political reality of those years, and in much historical lore ever 
since, the Province of Québec and its government led by René Lévesque 
were left in isolation at the end of the day. Québec’s National Assembly, 
the province’s legislative branch, withheld its consent and has remained 
steadfast in its refusal ever since. In Québec and elsewhere in Canada, 
this story has been told and retold, forming a large chunk of scholarship 
in many disciplines of the social sciences and humanities.
In this chapter, I wish to provide insightful answers to the three fol-
lowing questions:
1) What were the major causes leading to the constitutional negotia-
tions of 1981?;
2) Which share of responsibility can be attributed to the most im-
portant players involved in the negotiations, namely Pierre -Elliott 
Trudeau (1919-2000), René Lévesque (1922-1987), and the other 
nine provincial premiers?; and,
3) Thirty years later, is it possible to ascertain the most important 
political consequences of these negotiations considering that they 
led to the adoption of the Constitution Act, 1982?
My answers to the first and third questions will be reasonably brief. 
I hope they will help the readers from the enlightened public to make up 
their own minds about the significance of these fateful events. My claim 
to originality here deals with the second question. Much has been written 
in French and in English about Trudeau’s role in the whole constitutional 
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business of the 1970s and early 1980s that was, recalling the words of 
Clarkson and McCall, his “magnificent obsession.” However, it is my 
conviction that Canadian historiography in the English language has 
almost completely disregarded the insights of André Burelle, a philoso-
pher and federal civil servant who was Trudeau’s speechwriter and advisor 
from 1977 until the months following Patriation. Burelle’s books have not 
been translated and, more regrettably, his original views have been dis-
regarded. I therefore hope to fill that void by using essentially Burelle’s 
analysis to make sense of Trudeau’s involvement and behaviour leading 
up to, and during, the constitutional negotiations of November 1981. In 
addition, I try to fill a different void that can be felt in the scholarship 
provided in French by Québecers in the past thirty years. I claim that the 
role and mistakes of René Lévesque and his Parti Québécois government 
in the events of 1981 have been thoroughly neglected. In my judgment, 
the performance of Lévesque and his team during the November 1981 
conference in Ottawa was a disaster. I present a series of facts and argu-
ments to substantiate my claim.
In November 2011, I attended a scholarly conference under the aus-
pices of the Centre for Constitutional Studies at the University of Alberta. 
During the conference, a great deal of attention was accorded to the roles 
and responsibilities of the nine other premiers beyond Lévesque and 
Prime Minister Trudeau. I would like to grant a major point and at a later 
stage to repeat a normative statement. First, as Howard Leeson, Peter 
Meekison, Peter Lougheed, and Brian Peckford coherently argued at the 
November 2011 conference, at some point during the 1981 negotiations 
Trudeau and Lévesque lost the initiative and the nine other premiers dic-
tated the terms that led to the transformation of the constitution. In the 
end, far from being solely Trudeau’s deed, it was also their deed. I thus 
agree that some further work must be done, from this perspective as well, 
in rebalancing the scale of responsibilities. I shall examine the normative 
dimension of this chapter’s conclusion. But first, I turn my attention to 
an examination of the causes that, taken together, brought our top elected 
politicians to the Ottawa Conference Centre in November 1981.
I.  Causes
Countries and societies owe a lot in the crafting of their identities 
and in their political evolution to structural dimensions, to forces that 
appear distant and anonymous. At times, however, they can be mas-
sively changed through the actions of single individuals whose political 
leadership reaches the level of once -in -a -generation skills or abilities. 
Thus, I would argue that the first, crucial cause leading to the Patriation 
Negotiations Conference was Trudeau’s re -election in February 1980, 
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granting him a fourth mandate at the helm of a majority Liberal govern-
ment. Fortune provided Trudeau with one more opportunity to bring frui-
tion to his “magnificent obsession” – an opportunity he would not miss. 
It would however be a mistake to reduce the whole affair to a matter of 
individual voluntarism.
In Burelle’s words, Trudeau brought forward in the early 1980s a dream 
of Canadian nation building, built around two fundamental dimensions. 
First, he fostered a form of government -by -judges, through a national 
Charter reigning supreme over all other provincial charters, reducing the 
importance of the collective rights of various partners of the federation 
(and, first and foremost, Québec). He standardized the law and political 
culture of the country through an idea of symmetrical equality linked to 
the supremacy of individual rights. Second, he fostered a form of govern-
ment through “the people of Canada,” enabling the federal government to 
circumvent the old constitution and intrude, however indirectly, in prov-
incial powers in the name of superior national interest (Burelle 1994, 64).
The formidable pressures exercised by Québec on the Canadian polit-
ical system ever since the advent of the Quiet Revolution acted as motors 
for change. Discussions surrounding the urgency and necessity of con-
stitutional reform in the 1960s were, to a substantial extent, provoked 
by social and political circumstances in Québec (McRoberts 1997, 31). 
Trudeau’s personal decision to enter into the arena of federal politics can 
also be explained by the same logic. From the 1971 Victoria Charter to 
the failed constitutional conference of September 1980, Burelle argues in 
his books that Trudeau made sincere efforts to reconcile his views about 
contemporary Canada with the 1867 Constitution and with the goals of 
modern Québec. From 1976 onwards, these aspirations were legitim-
ately expressed by Lévesque and his Parti Québécois government. Their 
independentist drive, and much of Québec’s social dynamism was, how-
ever, exhausted by their failure to secure a majority in the sovereignty -
association referendum held on May 20, 1980. Thus, I argue here that the 
social and political evolution of Québec represents a second cause lead-
ing to the Patriation negotiations of November 1981.
Burelle identifies the third reality in my list of causes. In the 1970s, it 
dawned on many Canadians, among the political and intellectual elites, 
that the old Loyalist English -Canadian brand of Canadian nationalism 
had reached a stalemate. Technically speaking, on one crucial dimen-
sion, i.e., the ability to modify substantial elements of the constitution 
dealing with power sharing between the central and provincial govern-
ments, Canada remained a British colony fifty years after the signing of 
the Statute of Westminster. Canada became officially bilingual in 1969. 
The steady and transformative influence of immigration on the country 
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was at least partially recognized through the adoption of a multicultural-
ism policy in 1971. There was thus an appetite out there for a new kind 
of civic, Canadian nationalism, modernizing the image and the identity of 
the country at the end of the 20th century (Burelle 2005, 74).
However, the immediate cause of the November 1981 Conference was 
the late September 1981 decision by the Supreme Court of Canada rec-
ognizing the legality of the federal government’s unilateral constitutional 
initiative, but seriously questioning its legitimacy through its formulation 
of the need for substantial provincial consent. This forced all players, 
including Trudeau and Lévesque, to the negotiating table one more time.
II.  Assessing the Behaviour of Participants
Trained as a philosopher, Burelle joined the team of Prime Minister 
Trudeau’s advisors in 1977, also working as his primary speechwriter 
in French. After nominating their common friend, Gérard Pelletier, as 
Canadian Ambassador to France, Burelle’s voice provided an element of 
continuity in the evolution of Trudeau’s thinking since the early 1950s 
and his years at Cité Libre. Pelletier, Burelle, and Trudeau were united 
around the moral philosophy of Christian (Catholic) humanism, owing 
a lot to European thinkers such as Emmanuel Mounier and Jacques 
Maritain. Through the works of Denis de Rougemont, this form of 
Christian humanism inspired some federalist thinkers who played a key 
role in Europe’s intellectual reconstruction after 1945. This doctrine is 
summarized as personnalisme communautaire (communitarian personal-
ism), giving moral primacy to human beings as persons, without neg-
lecting the communities that are essential to the full development of their 
human personality. As a political philosophy of federalism, communitar-
ian personalism, as interpreted by Burelle, amounts to a combination of 
four principles: equivalence of treatment rather than symmetrical equal-
ity for persons and groups; subsidiarity as a principle for the division of 
powers; non -subordination as a principle for the division of sovereignty 
between levels of government; and, finally, co -decision as a principle for 
the management of interdependence between the partners of the federation 
(Burelle 2005, 44). Burelle’s insight shows that, until the Constitutional 
Conference of September 1980, this doctrine occupied a central place in 
Trudeau’s thought, competing with the more abstract, doctrinaire brand 
of liberal individualism, and with anti -nationalist and anti -communitarian 
leanings, that Trudeau took from his years of training in the United 
Kingdom and United States. Trudeau’s trajectory is often presented as 
showing the edifying triumph of liberal reason over nationalist passion. 
On this matter, Burelle invites us to think more carefully. According to 
him, there was indeed a struggle between reason and passion in Trudeau’s 
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mind, but it was a different and more complicated one. Having worked for 
Trudeau, and studied the evolution of his thinking throughout the years, 
Burelle concludes that Trudeau was passionately liberal -individualistic 
and therefore it was his rational side that restrained this by bringing into 
the equation the nuances of communitarian personalism (Burelle 2005, 
68). Thus, Trudeau’s own mind was the theater for a massive spiritual 
struggle between principles. Burelle is able to show in his book, through 
a careful list of quotes from the 1950s to the late 1970s, that Trudeau 
was able to maintain equilibrium in his thinking between these principles 
until September 1980. Moreover according to Burelle, there was some 
substantial room in this spiritual equilibrium for the distinctiveness and 
constitutional requirements of Québec.
For instance, as late as the Constitutional Conference of September 
1980, Trudeau was willing to propose a preamble for the new constitu-
tion that would define Canada as being first and foremost a federation, 
protecting individual and collective rights (including those of Aboriginal 
peoples) and recognizing the distinct character of Québec society with its 
French -speaking majority. Moreover, pretty much in line with such major 
documents of renewed federalism at the time like the Pépin -Robarts 
Report and the Livre Beige of Claude Ryan’s Liberals, Trudeau was also 
prepared to make room for Québec’s distinctiveness in federal institutions 
including granting Québec a right to veto future amendments. As late as 
September 1980, Trudeau was also prepared to include in the Constitution 
a more coherent and cooperative structure for intergovernmental collab-
oration and he was willing to consider forms of asymmetry on matters 
such as culture, language, immigration, and telecommunications (Burelle 
2005, 63). It is only after the failure of the September 1980 constitutional 
conference that Trudeau abandoned these elements and, more fundamen-
tally, that a break of equilibrium emerged in his own mind between the 
various sources and principles fighting for primacy in his very soul. What 
were the sources and the reasons for this change? It is here, I believe, that 
Burelle explores uncharted waters in intellectual history. Before summar-
izing his explanations, one should pay careful attention to his lament:
Why such absence of any recognition of the distinct character of Québec soci-
ety in the Constitution Act, 1982? How to justify the enshrinement of a charter 
of rights limiting, without the consent of the National Assembly, the sover-
eign powers of Québec on matters of language? How to explain the abandon-
ment by Mr. Trudeau of the requirement to extend to Ontario and to New 
Brunswick the obligations imposed on Québec by section 133 of the 1867 
constitution, in contradiction with the federal proposal of September 1980? 
How to explain the decision to withdraw the offer made to Québec to de-
centralize powers in the fields of language, culture, and telecommunications, 
while maintaining similar decentralizing offers to the Western provinces in 
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matters relating to natural resources? Why in the end did Mr. Trudeau accept 
a constitutional amending formula depriving Québec of its historic veto after 
having struggled so hard and for so long for the Victoria formula of regional 
vetoes? (Burelle 2005, 66. My translation)
In his search for explanations, Burelle seeks to distinguish between, 
on the one hand, a superficial and immediate pretext and, on the other 
hand, a wide array of personal, intellectual, and political reasons. 
According to him, the failure of the September 1980 Constitutional 
Conference offered Trudeau a pretext to change his mind and adopt a 
tougher position towards provinces and particularly towards Québec, 
and ultimately to attempt a unilateral approach. The Québec delegation 
at that conference played a key role in the formulation of a vastly decen-
tralizing inter -provincial agreement known as the Chateau Laurier con-
sensus. Four months after the referendum on sovereignty -association, 
Trudeau decoded from this document a clear strategy, on the part of 
the Québec delegation led by Lévesque and Morin, to prevent substan-
tial constitutional reform at all costs (Burelle 2005, 65). And it is in 
this context, according to Burelle, that Trudeau committed himself to a 
Jacobine, liberal -individualistic refounding of the Canadian nation. In 
the ensuing pages of his book, Burelle seeks to identify and analyse the 
more complex causes for Trudeau’s change of mind. I enumerate here, 
and discuss briefly, these various factors in the same order that Burelle 
presented them.
A.  Trudeau’s Visceral Individualism and Anti -nationalism
Had he been a Jew, according to his friend Gérard Pelletier, Trudeau 
would have much preferred leading a life of personal excellence in exile 
in New York City, rather than living in Israel and witnessing the necessary 
interventions of a nation -state on behalf of the Jewish people (Burelle 
2005, 70). There were some dark sides to French -Canadian national-
ism and to Trudeau’s own personal trajectory in the 1930s and 1940s.1 
According to Burelle, between 1948 and 1950, Trudeau went through a 
kind of passionate and very personal epiphany and self -transformation, 
moving beyond his own milieu to espouse a form of communitarian 
uprootedness (déracinement communautaire, in French). However, 
until September 1980, his more rational side preserved the idea of equi-
librium between the requirements of the individual and those of the 
community.
1 For this, see Nemni and Nemni (2006) and English (2006).
129
More Distress than Enchantment
B.  The Crisis of the Old Loyalist Nationalism  
in English -speaking Canada
As I have shown in an earlier section of this chapter dealing with the 
causes of the Patriation Conference of November 1981, English -speaking 
Canada was more than ready in the early 1980s for a self -redefinition 
as a multicultural and bilingual nation. This created political space for 
Trudeau’s new resolve to nation -build in late September -early October 
1980. Burelle laments, on this issue, Trudeau’s unwillingness in the last 
years of his life to recognize the emergence in Québec of an authentic 
civic nationalism open to the values of pluralistic modernity (Burelle 
2005, 76).
C.  Change of the Palace Guard in Ottawa
For many years, Trudeau’s dogmatic stance against (Québec) nation-
alism was balanced by the presence of figures such as Gérard Pelletier 
and Jean Marchand at his side. However, in the early 1980s, they had 
disappeared from the scene and the key players around Trudeau were 
Jim Coutts and Tom Axworthy in the Prime Minister’s Office, Michael 
Pitfield at the Privy Council Office (replacing Gordon Robertson), and 
Michael Kirby in charge of the Bureau for Federal -Provincial Relations. 
If for quite some time there were two sides to Trudeau’s thought, as 
Burelle contends, there was radical imbalance between these sides in the 
early 1980s.
D.  The Loneliness of Power
Critical of Trudeau’s actions on the constitutional front, Burelle has 
always remained faithful to the intellectual friendship he shared with 
him and Pelletier. Having worked closely with Trudeau over many years, 
Burelle is fully aware of how tough it was for Trudeau to maintain some 
balance between the principles and moral sources in play. In the end, the 
Prime Minister was alone in taking crucial decisions. Trudeau removed 
Burelle from close contact with the constitutional file in the summer of 
1980, much as he had done with Gordon Robertson, because he did not 
want to be paralysed by Burelle’s troubling memos appealing to the part 
of his thought that he had just chosen to discard from his unilateral strat-
egy (Burelle 2005, 81-82).
E.  Electoral Contingencies and the Hubris of the Resurrected
I combine here two aspects mentioned by Burelle. In the summer of 
1979, Trudeau looked like a spent force in Canadian politics. He had lost 
the federal election to Joe Clark and the Conservatives, had announced 
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his retirement from politics, and analysts commented that, despite his 
achievements, he had failed on the two issues that mattered most to him – 
reforming and patriating the constitution and fighting Québec separatism. 
However, fortune was on Trudeau’s side. The Clark government soon fell 
after losing a confidence vote on the budget in the House of Commons, 
presenting Trudeau with an opportunity to stay on and lead the Liberals 
to a majority government in the federal elections of February 1980. 
Thereafter, he would fight even more implacably than before, imbued 
with a renewed sense of historic mission (Burelle 2005, 88).
F.  The Inevitable Polarization of Political Confrontation
According to Burelle, and many other observers, Trudeau was always 
at his very best in a highly polarized political contest. The change of 
strategy starting in early October 1980 perfectly suited this aspect of his 
personality. Patriating the constitution thus became the opportunity to 
elevate Ottawa as a champion of individual rights against power -hungry 
provinces, and to win decisively not only against Lévesque and the sep-
aratists, but also against all forms of Québec nationalism. Combining 
both dimensions, as we shall see again in the conclusion of this chapter, 
would be the elevation of language rights to the status of fundamental 
individual rights removed from the bite of the notwithstanding clause 
(Burelle 2005, 85).
G.  The Good Fortune to Negotiate with the “Vanquished”  
and the Need to Avoid a Confrontation with Ryan
I also combine here two dimensions discussed separately by Burelle. 
In the Québec referendum of May 20, 1980, René Lévesque had lost, 
whereas Claude Ryan, leader of the provincial Liberals and president of 
the “No” Committee, had clearly won. As a ranking federalist in Québec, 
Ryan appeared after the referendum as the province’s rising political 
force, and for a while it looked as if Trudeau would have had to negoti-
ate constitutional reform with him as his counterpart. Trudeau and Ryan 
knew each other since the 1950s. Each respected the other’s intellectual 
force, but they never established a political rapport. Both were cham-
pions of individual rights, but they entertained substantial differences in 
their conceptions of nationalism and federalism. According to Burelle, 
Trudeau knew that negotiating with Ryan would have been extremely 
tough. Luckily, once more for Trudeau, Ryan lost the Québec elections 
of April 13, 1981, and Trudeau was able to negotiate with his old nem-
esis, René Lévesque, whom he had, at least figuratively speaking, van-
quished in the 1980 referendum. Burelle claims that Ryan made a mistake 
when he chose not to denounce the radical illegitimacy of the Lévesque 
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government to negotiate renewed federalism in the immediate aftermath 
of the referendum.
Burelle helps us to understand the causes leading to the Patriation 
Conference and to the new constitution, and he also sheds considerable 
light on Trudeau’s role leading to the overall result. In the end, Burelle’s 
most important contribution is probably a much deeper understanding 
than currently found in the literature about Trudeau’s behaviour and 
motivations. Politically resurrected in February 1980 and liberated spirit-
ually from the need to integrate the complexities of communitarian per-
sonalism after September 1980, Trudeau launched a new constitutional 
offensive aimed at founding anew the Canadian nation, and thereby set-
tling his score with Lévesque, his government, and Québec nationalism 
as a whole.
In the second part of this section, I wish to navigate more uncharted 
waters, trying to explain, at least in some detail, the role and more pre-
cisely the mistakes of René Lévesque and of his government. A word of 
caution for readers: to the best of my knowledge, more than thirty years 
after these events, no single study – whether a book -length monograph, 
chapter, or article, in either English or French – has had the primary 
objective of tackling this crucial task. Sure, Claude Morin, Lévesque’s 
Minister of Intergovernmental Affairs and right -hand man at the time of 
the Conference, has written books touching on the issue (Morin 1988, 
1994). However, his main objective was to attack Trudeau and the fed-
eral government, and to engage in critical dialogue with his counterparts 
from elsewhere in Canada (for instance, Roy Romanow) to underline and 
bemoan the fact that they had abandoned Lévesque, his government, and 
Québec. I believe it is high time for a lucid analysis of Québec’s perform-
ance in 1981-1982.2
My narrative starts the morning after the referendum of May 20, 1980. 
Lévesque and his government had just been resoundingly defeated in the 
referendum they had sponsored on sovereignty -association. In a previ-
ous chapter of this book, I made an analogy between the referendums of 
1980-1981 and the rebellions of 1837-1838, calling the latter the failed 
rebellions of the imperial age, and the former the failed rebellions of the 
democratic age. In the democratic era, as in the imperial one, leaders of a 
national minority who embark upon a major initiative to reform or break 
out of the state system, and who happen to lose in the endeavour, have 
to deal with the strategic fact that they will be weaker if they fail. Losing 
carries negative consequences. Reading the historical documents – 
the analyses, the memoirs, and the autobiographies by Québec political 
2 For a partial attempt at this endeavor, see Dion (1995, 42-43).
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leaders at the time – one is struck by the air of negativity and pessim-
ism that looms over their heads during the whole period leading to the 
Patriation Conference and to the promulgation of the new Constitution. 
They never recovered from the political defeat of May 20, 1980. As we 
shall see, they had some good days and made some tactical gains in the 
aftermath of the referendum, but at most key moments their behaviour 
was mostly characterized by improvisation. Referendums are high -risk 
affairs. They should be held, by leaders or people yielding to an ethics of 
responsibility, only when its promoters are quasi -certain of winning them. 
Lévesque and his team had no such certainty in 1979-1980. Nevertheless, 
they went ahead. The failed referendum diminished Lévesque, the stature 
of his government, and, in the end, the place of Québec in Canada.
Pierre Godin, René Lévesque’s biographer, coherently establishes 
in his narrative of the days and weeks following the referendum that 
Lévesque and his government had not carefully developed any strategy 
for the eventuality of a referendum loss. Lévesque’s first meetings with 
his top advisors, cabinet, and caucus show clearly that they simply had 
no idea at the time about their next steps. They were manifestly on the 
defensive, reacting to the initiatives of Trudeau and of his Minister, Jean 
Chrétien. Very early on, Lévesque and his colleagues decided that they 
would continue to govern Québec until the end of their mandate, and that 
their key priority would be to defeat Claude Ryan and the Liberals in the 
Québec elections that ended up taking place on April 13, 1981. Between 
1978, the year Ryan became Liberal leader, and late September 1981, 
the time of the Supreme Court Patriation Reference, no formal encoun-
ter took place between Lévesque and Ryan. These two men knew each 
other since the early days of the Quiet Revolution. In the 1960s, as editor 
of Le Devoir, Ryan was respected in Québec and throughout Canada as 
a careful thinker and éminence grise of renewed federalism. In 1979, 
Ryan’s Québec Liberal Party had published its Livre Beige, one of the 
key documents of renewed federalism in the months leading up to the 
May 1980 referendum. It was known to everyone that Ryan and Trudeau 
did not see eye to eye on the issue of reforming the Canadian constitu-
tion. Lévesque could have made much greater use of Ryan, his advice, 
and his legitimacy as a federalist leader and thinker in the negotiations 
leading up to the Patriation Conference. Quite naturally, there was some 
acrimony between these men who fought on the battlefields of the refer-
endum and a tough electoral campaign in the spring of 1981. Until the last 
minute, even during the Patriation Conference, Ryan made efforts to get 
in touch with Lévesque, who did not even return his phone call (Godin 
2005, 152). Ignoring Ryan throughout the process was Lévesque’s first 
major mistake.
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The second major mistake relates to the struggle between Lévesque 
and Ryan during the Québec elections of April 1981. Barely three days 
after the elections, Québec chose to endorse a major proposal by the 
inter -provincial front known as the Gang of Eight, which aimed to derail 
the federal government’s unilateral strategy announced by Trudeau in the 
House of Commons on October 2, 1980. On April 16, 1981, the Lévesque 
Government abandoned Québec’s historic constitutional veto (a veto that 
many observers from outside Québec, including Donald Smiley, thought 
that it had at the time) for an amending formula that required, for most 
changes, the consent of two thirds of the provinces, enriched by an opting - 
out clause with fiscal compensation. The Lévesque Government could 
have clearly explained that their agreement would remain valid only if, in 
the end, Québec deemed acceptable a full constitutional reform package, 
explicitly retaining its historic veto if such an agreement did not material-
ize. During the electoral campaign in Québec, the task of overseeing the 
constitutional file rested exclusively on Claude Morin, the Minister in 
charge, and Robert Normand, his Deputy Minister. Lévesque and the cab-
inet, overburdened by the campaign and much of the supporting bureau-
cratic team, were completely left out (Tremblay 2006, 262-263). The 
decision to abandon the veto was thus made by three people, including 
Lévesque. I believe it is fair to argue that they acted precipitously. I now 
turn to Québec’s behaviour on the judiciary front of the constitutional 
struggles.
After Trudeau announced his desire to act unilaterally, Québec joined 
two provinces (Manitoba and Newfoundland) in moving the issue to their 
respective Courts of Appeal. Decisions on these References came out in 
the spring of 1981, with the Québec government losing in front of its own 
Court, by a margin of four to one, while Trudeau’s unilateralism suffered 
a crucial defeat in Newfoundland, where it lost by a margin of three to 
two. From there the issue moved to the Supreme Court of Canada, with 
Québec joining the opposing provinces in pleading procedures heard by 
the Court. The Supreme Court rendered its judgment on September 28, 
1981. In late December and early January 1982, after the Patriation 
Conference, Québec’s government went once more to its own Court of 
Appeal, on the issue of the existence of a veto right for the province. 
Lévesque’s government was once more defeated in a judgment rendered 
in early May 1982. Finally, the Supreme Court of Canada confirmed the 
decision of Québec’s Court of Appeal in early December 1982. In the fall 
of 1980, for reasons that have remained unknown until now, Lévesque 
and Morin changed their team of constitutional lawyers, led by Laval con-
stitutional expert Henri Brun, replacing him with former Supreme Court 
Justice Yves Pratte. Although an experienced lawyer and judge, Pratte did 
not have much time to prepare Québec’s brief in the Patriation Reference. 
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As will become clear in a moment, the problem on the judiciary front 
is not what Québec pleaded – traditional arguments about duality and 
founding peoples, and historical precedents in 1964 and 1971 that sup-
ported the idea that Québec indeed had a veto right – but rather what it 
did not plead. Second, after the Supreme Court rendered its first decision 
in September 1981 in the Patriation Reference, Québec decided, probably 
out of solidarity with the Gang of Eight, not to return in a Reference to 
its own Court of Appeal about the existence of a specific right of veto for 
the province. When it chose to do so, it was more than two months after 
the Patriation Conference, when preparations were already under way for 
promulgation by the Queen in Ottawa in early April. All in all, on the 
judiciary front, Québec was indecisive throughout.
Which key argument was completely ignored by Québec’s lawyers? 
As Donald Smiley wrote at the time of Patriation – thus demonstrat-
ing that the argument was indeed legally and politically available in the 
early 1980s – the Constitution Act, 1867, known as the British North 
America Act, 1867 prior to Patriation, contained a clause allowing fed-
eral authorities to homogenize or standardize the legal space of common 
law provinces on matters of property and civil rights, provided that these 
provinces would give their explicit legislative consent. As I argue more 
fully elsewhere in this book, there was no mention of Québec in this arti-
cle, section 94 of the constitution. But considering that Québec, known 
as Canada East in the 1860s, had just codified its civil law, and taking 
into account that George -Étienne Cartier viewed section 92(13) as a tri-
umph for Québec autonomy because it secured provincial control over 
property and civil rights, it was clear to Smiley in the early 1980s, as it 
should have been crystal clear to the Lévesque’s government and its con-
stitutional lawyers, that the overall meaning of section 94 was a recogni-
tion of Québec’s particularity (Smiley 1983, 77). In 1981-1982, Québec 
should have argued that, in the very least, a constitutional reform touch-
ing provincial powers in the field of property and civil rights (something 
recognized by every court in the key judgments of the times) required its 
explicit legislative consent (see, also, LaSelva 1995, 62-63).
Although there is substantial severity in my judgment, I am far from 
suggesting that the Québec government did everything wrong between 
the spring of 1980 and the Patriation Conference of November 1981. 
First, Québec undeniably played a positive and key role in the Gang 
of Eight, the inter -provincial alliance opposed to Trudeau’s unilateral-
ism. For a while, particularly after the September 1980 Constitutional 
Conference that proved disastrous for the Trudeau government, many 
provincial premiers looked more comfortable with Lévesque than with 
Trudeau. Aside from the issue of the amending formula and the matter 
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of a veto right, as previously discussed, the Lévesque government man-
aged to act both for its own interests and for the sake of the alliance until 
the Patriation Conference. Moreover, as many analysts have recognized, 
the Québec Delegation in London, led by Gilles Loiselle, played a cru-
cial role in the manoeuvres of the provincial alliance wishing to inform 
British authorities about their arguments, which ultimately prevailed in 
the Report of the Parliamentary Committee (British North America acts: 
the role of parliament: first report from the Foreign Affairs Committee) 
led by Anthony Kershaw submitted in early February 1981 (Clarkson and 
McCall 1990, 320).
I have argued that there was much improvisation on the part of 
the Québec government at the beginning of the process that led to the 
Patriation Conference in November 1981 during the immediate aftermath 
of the May 1980 referendum. The same remark applies to the behaviour 
of the Québec delegation during the Conference itself. Québec arrived 
in Ottawa with a rather weak team, featuring, beyond Lévesque, Morin 
and Normand, two experienced people in charge of the file since the ref-
erendum. More surprisingly, two other Ministers completed the delega-
tion: Marc -André Bédard, who was there in his capacity as the Minister 
of Justice, and Claude Charron, at the time the Parliamentary Leader 
of the Government and who was included mostly because Lévesque 
liked his dynamism and appreciated his presence at such meetings 
(Godin 2005, 152). Senior Ministers of the Québec government, such 
as Jacques Parizeau, Bernard Landry, and Pierre -Marc Johnson (all of 
whom would later become Premiers of Québec) were left out. Amazingly, 
Parizeau invited himself to the Conference, was brought in for a day, 
but returned home totally distressed by the chaotic atmosphere surround-
ing the Québec delegation (Godin 2005, 159).3 All observers, including 
those like Martine Tremblay who was quite sympathetic and loyal to the 
Premier, note that during the conference Lévesque often looked tired, 
confused, enraged at times, and even depressed.
The greatest and most fateful instance of improvisation took place 
late in the morning of November 4 when Trudeau publically proposed to 
Lévesque to change the paradigm or model for the whole constitutional 
business, suggesting that the matter should be submitted to the people 
in a referendum. Amazingly, without consulting anybody, Lévesque 
seemed to indicate that this was a very good idea and that he was will-
ing to explore this in greater detail with Trudeau. Notwithstanding all 
the other projects that were being discussed in the heated atmosphere of 
the Conference, involving among others the federal delegation (including 
3 For a dissident view on this, see Tremblay (2006: 268-269).
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Jean Chrétien) and provincial delegations from Ontario, Saskatchewan, 
and British Columbia, this amounted to an acknowledgment, on the part 
of Lévesque, that he was willing to go his own way beyond the agree-
ments between the members of the Gang of Eight. When the Conference 
reconvened that afternoon and Trudeau rendered public the details for 
his prospective referendum, it soon became clear to Lévesque and the 
Québec delegation that this new deal or project was unpalatable to them. 
Apparently, the day ended with an impasse and with the members of the 
Québec delegation retiring to their hotel on the other side of the Ottawa 
River where they would spend the night with no communications what-
soever with their allies or with their adversaries at the conference, except 
a short phone call from Bill Bennett to tell them that breakfast would 
take place half an hour later the next morning. The rest is history. And 
the rest, as Howard Leeson explains in his useful book, involves the nine 
other premiers taking matters into their own hands, seizing the initiative 
which had belonged for so long to Trudeau, or Lévesque, or both, and 
agreeing in the end on a constitutional package that suited their interests 
(Leeson 2011, 81). A compromise was found with Trudeau on the night 
of November 4, but a compromise was never reached with Lévesque 
and his government. Thirty years later, no such compromise has been 
arrived at with a Québec government, and none appears to be looming. 
For Lévesque and his delegation, the Patriation Conference turned out to 
be a catastrophe of the greatest magnitude. As a political actor, and pos-
sibly as a human being, Lévesque never recovered.
Weakened by his referendum defeat and disheartened by the disaster 
of the Patriation Conference, Lévesque would learn, a couple of weeks 
after the Conference, that his main constitutional advisor, Claude Morin, 
had accepted money and acted as an RCMP informant before and after 
the election of the Parti Québécois government in November 1976. Morin 
had twenty -nine meetings with RCMP officials between 1975 and late 
1977 (Godin 2001, 460, 612). After that, Lévesque was indeed a broken 
man, and this explains why he could never convince himself to try to 
use the democratic and referendum card to prevent the Patriation of the 
Canadian Constitution without Québec’s consent. Trudeau had his own 
reasons not to present “the people’s package” to the Canadian people, but 
they do not need to be discussed here. Insofar as Lévesque is concerned, 
he appears to have been simply too discouraged to even consider this 
option.
Without Trudeau’s forceful actions and willpower, there certainly 
would have been no Patriation Conference and no meaningful consti-
tutional reform for Canada in 1982. However, contrary to hegemonic 
interpretations in English -speaking Canada, Trudeau’s behaviour on 
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constitutional affairs, and particularly his approach towards Québec, 
showed clear contradictions. Burelle sheds much needed light on some 
of Trudeau’s complex motivations. The nine English -speaking premiers 
were key constitution -makers, although they only seized the initiative 
very late in the process, on November 4, 1981. In the end, they were 
not just bystanders. They jointly shared responsibility with Trudeau for 
imposing a constitutional reform on Québec. Upon closer examination, 
it is also fair to say, at least in my judgment, that Lévesque and his gov-
ernment must also be held responsible for Québec’s constitutional isola-
tion. I now turn to an examination of the consequences of the Patriation 
Conference of November 1981.
III.  Consequences
The constitutional negotiations of November 1981 led to the adoption 
of the Constitution Act, 1982 in the following spring. I wish to explore 
here, however briefly, six consequences of these fateful events.
(1) Judicialization of Canadian politics. In the equilibrium between 
the executive, legislative, and judiciary branches of government, the 1981 
negotiations led to a constitutional reform that considerably reinforced 
the role of tribunals, and particularly the role of the Supreme Court, in 
our system. The Supreme Court has become much more than the umpire 
of federalism. It sees itself as our primary constitutional guardian, stew-
ard of the actions of governments, and protector of the rights of citizens. 
Kelly and Manfredi see four major factors at work here: “constitutional 
provisions explicitly authorizing judicial participation in public policy; 
judicial approaches to governing with the Charter; changing approaches 
to governance by parliamentary actors; and finally, greater recourse to 
the courts by citizens seeking policy changes denied by parliamentary 
politics” (Kelly and Manfredi 2009, 6).
(2) Securing a strong constitutional anchor for the rights of Aboriginal 
peoples. Paradoxically, Québec’s societal and political energy fuelled con-
stitutional reform in the late 1970s, but it came out of it with reduced pow-
ers and no constitutional provision explicitly targeted to its requirements. 
Aboriginal peoples, on the other hand, were left out of the processes of 
constitutional dialogue, but came out of the business of 1981-1982 with a 
strong legal anchor through section 25 of the Canadian Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms and section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982.
(3) Transforming Canadian national identity and reinforcing the alle-
giance of citizens to the federal government and the Canadian state. This 
consequence relates to André Burelle’s work and his analysis of Trudeau’s 
political and intellectual trajectories. Burelle believes that the reforms of 
1981-1982 amounted to the abandonment of the social contract flowing from 
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the 1867 Constitution and its understanding of Canada as a multinational 
polity (Burelle 2005, 440-441). The following excerpts by Alan Cairns and 
Sujit Choudhry provide further ammunition for Burelle’s interpretation:
Put differently, the Charter was a nationalizing, Canadianizing constitutional 
instrument intended to shape the psyches and identities of Canadians. The 
Charter, accordingly, was a constitutional weapon analogous to disallowance, 
with its objective of constraining the diversities that federalism both reflects 
and sustains. (Cairns 2011, 370).
The Charter relies on both the regulative and constitutive conceptions of 
a bill of rights to serve as an instrument of nation building. In regulatory 
terms, the Charter imposes legal restraints on minority nation building by 
Québec, through the rights to inter -provincial mobility and to minority lan-
guage education for children […] However, the Charter was also intended to 
function constitutively as the germ of pan -Canadian constitutional patriotism. 
(Choudhry 2009, 239, 241).
(4) Greater Québec alienation. In recent years, many political col-
umnists, including Chantal Hébert and Jeffrey Simpson, have frequently 
commented about the gradual estrangement of Québec and Québecers 
from Canadian political life. This idea is in the air, but it should be stud-
ied more empirically. In the federal elections of May 2, 2011, Québecers 
abandoned the Bloc Québécois and voted en masse for Jack Layton’s 
New Democratic Party. I believe that the two global societies of French - 
speaking Québec and English -speaking Canada are more indifferent to 
one another than thirty years ago, but I recognize that this should be veri-
fied beyond the assertions of media pundits and beyond my own aca-
demic perceptions.
(5) Greater hardship for constitutional change. The 1981-1982 saga 
left us with a complex amending formula, rendered even more rigid by the 
idea of regional vetoes introduced by the Chrétien government, by some 
requirements for provincial referendums in order to ratify reforms, and by 
the need to secure the involvement of all concerned including Aboriginal 
peoples stemming from the 1998 Supreme Court Reference re Secession 
of Québec. Our Constitution remains amendable (for instance, Ottawa 
and Québec agreed on a modification to section 93 of the Constitution 
Act, 1867), but it is legally and politically now extraordinarily difficult to 
secure and ratify changes.
(6) Reduction of the importance of federalism within our political 
regime. Finally, it can be argued that the principle of federalism – the idea 
of equilibrium between self -rule for provincial communities and shared 
rule across Canada, granting substantial policy autonomy to provinces 
while preserving solidarity and interdependence – has been weakened 
by the 1981-1982 reforms. The thrust of the constitutional reform was 
139
More Distress than Enchantment
deliberately (see my third consequence) centralizing and standardizing. 
On the issue of language rights, Burelle has always believed that justice 
and fairness belong to an ethics of equivalence of treatment rather than to 
an ethics of symmetrical or standardized treatment (Burelle 2005, 446). 
José Woehrling has also explored the consequences of this for Québec:
In so far as rights protection through a constitutional instrument is an anti -
majority mechanism, it limits the political autonomy of minorities that con-
trol territorial entities. A minority controlling such an entity sees its political 
power restricted for the benefits of its own minorities. The most problematic 
situation occurs when ‘the minority within the minority’ is part of the major-
ity at the national level, as is the case for minority English speakers in Québec 
who are part of the English -speaking majority in Canada. The majority at the 
national level can then give in to the temptation to use its power to impose on 
its minority compliance with excessive guarantees benefiting ‘the minority 
within the minority’ (Woehrling 2009, 243-244).
Conclusion
In the end, in the fall of 1981, the English -speaking Canadian majority 
abused its powers. This is based on the actions of its leaders both at the 
federal and provincial levels, through the institutions of executive feder-
alism, the lack of a referendum or elections to give democratic legitimacy 
to the so -called people’s package, and no legislative debates or ratifica-
tions in all but one (Alberta) of the provincial legislatures. It has proven 
to be an operation that has, in many ways, challenged the understanding 
of Canada as a fundamentally federal community. The primary respon-
sibility for this belongs to Prime Minister Trudeau but also, in truth, to all 
the premiers involved. This is the normative point that I alluded to in this 
chapter’s introduction. The nine premiers knew there was a risk involved 
in going without Québec, but individually and collectively they were and 
remain to this day, or so it seems, willing to accept it. Smiley considered 
the whole affair a dangerous deed, for the following reason:
In my view, the first -line protection of the rights of the francophone com-
munity of Québec is and has been since Confederation among the powers of 
the Legislature and government of that province, and on this basis Canadian 
constitutional convention dictates that these powers should not be restricted 
without Québec’s assent (Smiley 1983, 86).
Nevertheless, as I have shown, there were mitigating circumstances. 
First, Trudeau came from Québec, which meant his voice carried huge 
legitimacy, and in the vote that took place in the House of Commons 73 out 
of 75 of Québec’s Members of Parliament voted in favour of Patriation. 
Technically speaking, it did not authorize them to reduce without their 
consent the powers of their counterparts in Québec’s National Assembly, 
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but for many people in the public this can be seen as an obscure normative 
point, particularly when the federal element in the political culture of the 
land carries less traction than before. Second, Québec authorities played 
very poorly. Lévesque and people associated with his government must 
accept a greater share of the responsibility than has been admitted up to 
now. Third, in the political and symbolical circumstances of the time, 
many people sensed that, in the late 1970s, Patriation offered Canada a 
glorious opportunity to found anew its idea of nationhood. Fourth, we 
should not forget that the Patriation experiment was draped in the lan-
guage of rights, the dominant idiom of moral and political philosophy in 
the world after 1945. In their seminal study, Clarkson and McCall cap-
tured this aspect very clearly, also targeting its major flaw as seen by 
many in Québec:
The notion of an entrenched charter of rights and freedoms would appeal 
to the legal establishment and civil libertarians among the country’s liberal - 
minded intellectual elite […] With all these favorable aspects of the pack-
age diverting attention, the ‘constitutionalization’ of the official languages 
law and the entrenchment of minority -language education rights would be 
camouflaged. While this canny move to outwit Lévesque and the separatists 
was well understood in Québec, it was not perceived as deceptive in English 
Canada, where the idea of citizens’ rights was so popular that it overrode 
other considerations (Clarkson and McCall 1990, 187).
I have attempted to demonstrate that in 1981-1982, aided and abetted 
by the turpitude and missteps of Lévesque and his government, Trudeau 
and the premiers of the majority English -speaking provinces joined 
forces to transform Canada’s constitutional order and national identity 
without Québec’s consent. As in all complicated social phenomena, there 
were many causes, responsible agents, and consequences. As Burelle 
(2005) indicates in the conclusion of his book, there are ways to act pol-
itically beyond the legacy of the 1981 Patriation Conference and of its 
legal consequences. Until now, Canadians, and Québecers in their midst, 
have failed to embark on such a journey. In the end, the enchantment of 
Burelle’s prose brings precious little consolation for the political and con-




The Canadian State and the Political Freedom  
of Québec
The Ideas of James Tully and Michel Seymour
Philosophical and political debates concerning the nature of the 
Canadian state, Québec’s right to self -determination, and the legality and 
legitimacy of a secessionist approach have lost much of their intensity in 
Québec and Canada generally over the last decade. All across Canada, 
constitutional issues have been relegated to a very secondary role in polit-
ical life, partly owing to the extreme rigidity of the amending formula.1 In 
this chapter, I consider the works of philosophers James Tully and Michel 
Seymour on the topic of Québec’s political freedom within the Canadian 
state, being fully aware that I am engaging in hermeneutic work in polit-
ical thought belonging to the history of ideas. I cannot imagine how my 
reflections could have any political influence in the country where I live in 
the short or medium term. However, it seems that, as Scotland prepared to 
hold a referendum on September 18, 2014, and while Catalonia attempted 
to convince the Spanish government to let it organize a consultation process 
on its future in early November 2014, interpreting Tully and Seymour’s 
thoughts on the Canadian -Québec situation could shed instructive light in 
contexts where there is institutional blockage and strong political tension.
Tully is a leading political philosopher in contemporary English - 
speaking Canada. A similar remark can be made about Seymour in 
French -speaking Québec today. Both thinkers published major works in 
2008. Tully published the two -volume Public Philosophy in a New Key 
(2008), which placed him at the cutting edge of a global political theory 
fighting against imperialism in all its forms, and in very close contact 
with the civic practices of freedom and dialogue. Seymour published De 
la tolérance à la reconnaissance (2008), an analysis based on the second 
Rawls, the Rawls of political liberalism, aiming to go beyond moral indi-
vidualism and its predilection for autonomy, arguing in favour of sub-
stantial recognition for stateless peoples (more precisely, peoples that do 
not have completely sovereign states), which would take the form of a 
system of collective rights. In this chapter, I do not perform an in -depth 
1 See Réjean Pelletier (2009: 76). See, also, Brooks (2009: 146-152).
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comparison of these two recent analyses. Instead, the focus is on texts 
that are on the whole less important, in which Tully first came to conclu-
sions diametrically opposed to Québec’s political freedom in Canada. In 
a 1999 text written in the wake of the famous Supreme Court of Canada 
decision concerning the secession of Québec, translated by Jocelyn 
Maclure and published in the journal Globe, Tully said things that were 
extremely critical of Canadian constitutionalism. His comments have 
since often been repeated by Québec intellectuals, especially by thinkers 
in favour of the sovereigntist cause:
Canada, since its constitution is in fact a straightjacket, in other words, a 
structure for domination, is thus in this respect not a free society. The recog-
nition of an internal right to self -determination for a people struggling for a 
form of recognition is one of the necessary conditions for overcoming this 
impasse (Tully 1999b, 17. My translation).
Less than a year later, at a conference that he gave in the Québec 
Studies Program at McGill University, directed by Alain -G. Gagnon at 
the time, Tully came to a radically different conclusion. Expanding his 
vision of the radically revolutionary nature of the Supreme Court’s deci-
sion in Reference re Secession of Québec, a judgment that he considered 
among the most important in all of the history of democratic constitution-
alism, Tully argued that Canadian constitutional democracy, as re -inter-
preted by the highest court in the land, gives Québec all of the guarantees 
it needs to enjoy its right to internal self -determination within Canada 
(Tully 2000, 31). In so far as Tully is both one of the leading thinkers on 
pluralism and political freedom in Canada and a pioneer in the theoretical 
study of multinational democracies, such a reversal in his interpretation is 
highly significant. Whatever the reason, it seems to me that, for a number 
of years, Tully’s substantial reversal was largely received with deafen-
ing silence by intellectuals in French -speaking Québec. That was until 
Seymour, first in an essay published in 2001 and then in a recent text, 
struck up a critical dialogue with Tully concerning both the nature of the 
right to internal self -determination of non -sovereign political commun-
ities in encompassing states and also on the specific situation of Québec 
in Canada. There has not yet been a debate between Tully and Seymour 
in that Tully has not yet responded to Seymour’s criticism. I hope that this 
chapter will pave the way for such a debate in the near future. In multi-
national federations, open, rigorous, and respectful critical exchanges are 
always preferable to silence and mutual indifference.
I will begin with a brief review of the broad lines of Canada’s recent 
political -constitutional history, which has been strongly influenced by 
Québec’s attempts to either expand its autonomy or achieve full political 
sovereignty. Next, I will provide an overview of Tully and Seymour’s 
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respective careers in political philosophy. In the third stage, I will perform 
a synthesis of the two texts in which Tully first endorses and then rejects 
the thesis that Canadian constitutionalism is equivalent to a straightjacket 
for Québec. This will be followed by an examination of Seymour’s criti-
cisms of Tully’s approach, leading to the formulation of my own inter-
pretation, which involves moderating the positions on both sides and 
providing some keys to a better understanding of Tully and Seymour’s 
arguments employing current work in political philosophy, political soci-
ology, and the history of ideas.
I.  Canada’s Political -Constitutional Identity  
and Québec’s Situation
In political science publications and works on Canadian and Québec 
studies, there is no lack of high -quality scholarly work on the issue of 
the Canadian state in modernity and Québec’s history within it. When 
Canadian diplomats go abroad, they take with them the official portrait 
of the country, which is quite similar to that painted in 1998 by the high-
est court in the land in its famous decision on Québec’s secession. This 
Canada is a constitutional monarchy in the British tradition, a representa-
tive liberal democracy, a state in which there is rule of law paired with a 
parliamentary system, and a federal multination -state that is independ-
ent, bilingual, and multicultural. This country of over 34 million people is 
made more complex by the presence of Québec, the only province in which 
there is a French -speaking majority. (More than 80 percent of Québecers 
are of French or French -Canadian heritage, and 97 percent of the 8.1 mil-
lion Québécois speak French). Québec made substantial contributions to 
Canada’s original historical and political configuration. Canada is often 
considered around the world as being on the cutting edge of civilization 
based on its toleration of difference and openness to a multiplicity of iden-
tities, though it owes this largely to Québec (Kymlicka 1995; 1998).
Moreover, like Canada as a whole, Québec is composed of three layers 
of profound diversity: a national minority that is concentrated in Montréal, 
Aboriginal peoples, and a large section of the population resulting from 
immigration. Nearly fifteen years ago, Michael Ignatieff tried to identify 
how the panoply of rights that exist in Canada makes it a legal environ-
ment that is unique in the world. According to him, this is a result of a 
combination of four types of rights: relatively avant -garde liberal rights 
on complex moral issues such as abortion; a generous conception of 
social democracy, visible in wealth redistribution programs for under-
privileged individuals and communities; collective rights for groups; and, 
finally, in the wake of Reference re Secession of Québec, the possibility 
for a member -state to leave the federation in full legality (Ignatieff 2001, 
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25-26). In its 1998 decision, the Supreme Court summarized in its own 
way the political -constitutional history of the country, highlighting four 
implicit or underlying principles that complement the major constitutional 
documents specifying Canada’s identity: federalism, democracy, constitu-
tionalism and rule of law, and, finally, respect for minority rights. As will 
be seen here, Tully gives special importance to the court’s interpretation 
in its decision. I shall complete this brief overview with a list of four prin-
ciples taken from a text by Alain -G. Gagnon and myself (2009, 16-20).
A.  The Role of the State in Building a Strong,  
Distinct Canadian Nation in North America
In the history of Canada, the state has always been a strong identity 
marker for distinguishing Canada from the United States. In 1867, the 
federal Dominion of Canada was created to promote peace, order, and 
good government. The tone was set. Erected as a protector of individuals 
and communities, the state took concrete form in a desire to expand across 
the continent, from east to west, and this was renewed through five major 
national policies: the establishment of an economic policy behind a tariff 
wall; the construction of the railroads in the 19th century; the immigration 
policy designed to populate the Western provinces and then the rest of 
the country; the consolidation of a welfare state after 1945; and, finally, 
the identity -related legal system associated with the Canadian Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms since 1982.
B.  British Heritage from Yesterday to Today
Canada’s parliamentary and state system stems from its historical gen-
esis under the control of the British Empire. To this was added a political 
culture of evolution or, in other words, gradual change, including con-
stitutional amendments. This was done without neglecting the reproduc-
tion, in the relations between the political and bureaucratic elites of the 
Canadian federation, of a hierarchical vision of relations between the cen-
tre and the periphery similar to that prevailing when the British Empire 
played a greater role in our affairs.
C.  The Federal Principle (or Autonomy Principle)
The question of the federal or autonomy principle’s nature, as well as 
that of fine -tuning its real role in balancing political -constitutional princi-
ples, is at the heart of my thinking in this chapter. As in most multinational 
federations, the historiographical traditions of the majority and minority 
nations in Canada – which remain more complex and pluralist than is gen-
erally acknowledged – tend to diverge widely on these issues. In Québec, 
as a general rule, political leaders, intellectuals, and academics who are 
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interested in studying federalism and how it is practised tend to give it 
greater moral and existential importance than do their colleagues else-
where in Canada. In other words, when one leaves Québec, the substan-
tive dimensions of political identity in Canada are to be found elsewhere 
than in federalism. François Rocher has showed this in a convincing man-
ner. He recently pointed out that the dominant interpretative tradition in 
Québec concerning the genesis of Canadian federalism and its evolution 
has taken the form of a contractual, dualist prism, maintaining the idea of 
a pact designed first and foremost to preserve Québec’s autonomy, having 
in mind the greater end of preserving and promoting what makes Québec 
different (Rocher 2006). In contrast, in the rest of Canada, the dominant 
perspective has tended to avoid giving federalism too much moral value, 
and has focused on functional and instrumental aspects. It has employed 
the language of performance and efficiency. Of course, all of this has been 
in the service of a greater end, namely first and foremost preserving the 
unity of the nation -state.
D.  Québec’s Contribution to Maintaining Canada’s  
Originality and the Indispensable, Crucial Role of  
the State in Shaping Québec’s Difference
For the Canadian government and its nation -building project, there 
is a Québec that is reassuring. It is the one in which the simple pres-
ence of a huge French -speaking population living in the modern age in 
a language other than English gives the country a strong means of dis-
tinguishing itself from the United States. This reassuring Québec is the 
one that has fuelled and continues to fuel a Canadian dualism that can 
be found in the bilingual nature of the country, the equally primordial 
status of two systems of law (common law and civil law), two complete 
societies integrating immigrants, the complex associative fabric of two 
civil societies, two communications and technological networks, and 
two research communities that are both independent and linked. Next to 
this reassuring Québec, there is of course another, which is much more 
worrying to Canadian nation building. The worrisome Québec needed to 
strengthen its own state structures in the second half of the 20th century 
to accompany and give direction to the deep processes of social modern-
ization known as the Quiet Revolution. The dynamic energy of Québec 
society during the time of the Quiet Revolution thus fuelled the idea of 
Québec nation building, competing with Canadian nation building. The 
clash between the two nation -building undertakings was expressed in 
plans designed to deeply reconfigure the structure of Canada but without 
challenging its unity or integrity. This was the goal of renewing Canadian 
federalism, especially in the years 1965-1968 and 1977-1979, as well as 
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during the time of the Meech Lake and Charlottetown Accords between 
1987 and 1992. However, this clash was also expressed in the dreams 
of the pro -independence and sovereigntist movements in Québec, which 
sought to bring to completion a certain idea of nation -state normal-
ity for Québec and to redefine relationships with Canada in the 1980 
and 1995 referendums on, respectively, sovereignty -association and 
sovereignty -partnership.
Across Canada, but in a more heightened manner in Québec, the post -
referendum years were characterized by very tense political climates and 
deep bitterness in the political classes and civil societies on both sides. 
In August 1998, the Supreme Court of Canada changed the atmosphere 
by giving arguments to both the sovereigntists and the federalists, as we 
shall see. A year later, in December 1999, the federal government, led by 
Jean Chrétien, introduced Bill C -20 into Parliament. This bill (hereinafter 
the “Clarity Act”) implemented the clarity requirement formulated by the 
Supreme Court in its Reference re Secession of Québec. At the same time, 
the Québec government, led by Lucien Bouchard, introduced Bill 99 into 
the Québec National Assembly, noting the Québec people’s fundamental 
right to determine its future through its institutions and in compliance 
with the democratic rule of fifty percent plus one.
To give an idea of the atmosphere at the time, I will juxtapose two texts, 
respectively written by Alain -G. Gagnon and James Tully during a period 
when, in parallel with their own personal research, they were directing 
pioneering reflection on multinational federations around the world:
The Canadian condition seeks to force Québec to be nothing more than a 
province like the others in the federation […] Breaking with the founding 
constitutional order through the 1982 repatriation, Québec -Canada relations 
have entered a phase of non -recognition and impoverishment of democratic 
practices. The Supreme Court’s opinion on Québec’s right to secede expanded 
the field of possible scenarios, but was immediately placed in a framework 
and limited by the federal government, which clearly wants to avoid a deep 
debate on the federation’s future […] In short, the Canadian federal experi-
ment will be worth continuing only if the member states are free to endorse 
the federation and any form of domination structure is prohibited (Gagnon 
2003a, 174-175).
Alongside their strong sense of belonging to Canada, the members of the 
English -speaking minority in Québec have developed a strong sense of be-
longing to and identification with Québec society over the last forty years by 
virtue of their participation in the public debate over Québec’s future. This is 
because they have taken part in the discussions and have played a participa-
tory role in the demands for renewed federalism. The moment they are shut 
out of the discussions, however, as during and after the referendum of 1995, 
and their demands for recognition as a minority fall on deaf ears, this sense of 
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Québec citizen belonging and identification dissipates, many leave the prov-
ince, and the hardline demands of those who remain increase, such as parti-
tion in the event of secession (Tully 2008, vol. I, 211-212).2
II.  The Philosophical Approaches of James  
Tully and Michel Seymour
James Tully is established at the University of Victoria, where he 
is a Distinguished Professor of Political Science, Law, Indigenous 
Governance, and Philosophy, after having spent around 20 years as a 
professor of political science and philosophy at McGill University in 
Montréal. His principal works are on modern and contemporary polit-
ical philosophy, Canadian political thought, and constitutional theory. I 
suggest that three stages can be seen in his intellectual career. First, he 
deepened the methodological and hermeneutic approaches of his mentors 
at Cambridge, John Dunn and Quentin Skinner, by focusing on 17th and 
18th century political thought, and in particular, through detailed research, 
on the philosophy of John Locke.3 Second, unquestionably inspired by 
the political and constitutional crisis in Canada and Québec, with which 
he was in close contact while at McGill University, Tully suggested a 
critical interpretation of the traditions of thought associated with mod-
ern constitutionalism in the hegemonic political undertaking of a sover-
eign nation -state oriented towards cultural homogeneity. The work that 
he did during this period made him, along with Charles Taylor and Will 
Kymlicka, a key player in a truly Canadian school of research on identity 
and recognition policies. That school promotes differentiated citizenship 
that is able to expand its categories to the rights of all minorities, and 
that indeed seeks to identify the theoretical and practical conditions for 
achieving justice and stability in multinational democratic federations.4 
According to Tully, every struggle for recognition is a way of participat-
ing in a fundamental quest for freedom and for the self -determination that 
consists in being able to change the complex rules of governance that 
characterize our political life in all its forms. At the junction of theory and 
practice, political philosophy accompanies these struggles for recognition 
and freedom by revealing the conditions of possibility, which are simul-
taneously material, institutional, and intellectual systems of governance 
that apply to citizens today.
2 Here, Tully re -employs a passage from the introduction to Multinational Democracies 
(Tully 2001).
3 In particular, see Tully (1993).
4 See, in particular, Tully (1995).
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In the second stage of his career, Tully gave primary importance to 
Aboriginal peoples’ worldwide struggles for recognition in the face of 
the “empire of uniformity,” hegemonic nation -state building, and mod-
ern constitutionalism. Without abandoning the theoretical and methodo-
logical achievements of earlier periods, and influenced in particular by 
his dialogue with thinkers such as Foucault, Habermas, Skinner, Taylor 
and Wittgenstein, Tully now seeks to go beyond the horizon of struggles 
for recognition by defining a theoretical undertaking that is both more 
global and more ambitious. He seeks to accompany, with the weapons 
of critical lucidity, the civil approaches and resistance to imperialism 
in all its forms around the world since the beginning of the 21st century 
(Tully 2008). The inter -related resistance movements form what Tully 
calls a crisis of global citizenship confronted with the problems of world 
wars and militarization; the ecological crisis and climate change; deep-
ening inequality, poverty and exploitation in countries in the Southern 
Hemisphere; and, finally, disrespect and distrust of the diversity of civil-
izations and peoples. In the field of political theory, Mark Wenman has 
suggested using the expression “agonistic pluralism” to describe Tully’s 
undertaking, associating it with the approaches of Chantal Mouffe and 
William Connolly (Wenman 2003, 174-176). Tully considers that, more 
than ever, the multifarious faces of imperialism require theoretical vigi-
lance and practical commitment from people seeking to deepen the spaces 
in which they are free. The following excerpt gives a good idea of the cur-
rent orientation of Tully’s research in the third stage:
If all the millions of examples of civic and global citizenship practices could 
be taken in a single view, as the tradition of modern citizenship and globaliza-
tion presents its inexorable progress, perhaps this would help to dissipate the 
sense of disempowerment and disenchantment the present crisis induces. But, 
from the situated standpoint of diverse citizenship, this cannot be done and 
the attempt would overlook the very diversity that the civic approach aims to 
disclose, keep in view, learn from and work with. Civic empowerment and 
enchantment do not come from grand narratives of universal progress but 
from praxis – actual participation in civic activities with others where we 
become the citizens we can be (Tully 2008, 308).
Michel Seymour is Full Professor (in French, professeur titulaire) in 
the Department of Philosophy at the Université de Montréal. His primary 
work concerns theories of justice and recognition in multinational dem-
ocracies, philosophy of language, and theories of nationalism and fed-
eralism. He writes in both French and English, and, like Tully, his work 
has brought him many awards and distinctions in Québec and across 
Canada. In terms of politics, Seymour is ultimately a sovereigntist. He no 
longer believes that Canada can become a true multinational federation 
able to make adequate room for Québec’s difference and its aspiration 
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for political freedom. Seymour is in particular the author of two major 
works on the rights of peoples and minorities. The first, concerning more 
specifically the Canada -Québec dynamic, was published in 2001 and is 
entitled Le pari de la démesure: l’intransigeance canadienne face au 
Québec (Beyond moderation: Canadian intransigence towards Québec). 
Discussing all of the sensitive issues in the Canada -Québec relationship 
that were debated in the 1990s, such as the Supreme Court’s Reference re 
Secession of Québec, the Clarity Act, and partition, his work nonetheless 
begins with a description of the historical framework for these relations. 
According to Seymour, it is clear that these relations have been character-
ized by constant rejection of Québec’s demands for recognition and, in 
the end, Québec itself (Seymour 2001, 102). The rejected demands led, 
moreover, to the 1995 referendum on sovereignty, which was linked with 
the above -mentioned issues discussed by Seymour. In the book, Seymour 
suggests an approach for acceding in the future to sovereignty associated 
with an offer of partnership with the rest of Canada. If Canada accepts, 
Québec would win a sovereign state with a fair, sustainable partnership 
relationship with Canada. If Canada refuses, Québec could then legitim-
ately declare complete sovereignty (Seymour 2001, 294-306). It is thus 
clear to Seymour that the path to sovereignty is not conceived of as an end 
but rather as a means for Québec to employ its right to self -determination. 
In Le pari de la démesure, Seymour takes a clearly partisan, and often 
controversial, point of view (Seymour 2001, 11). His essay is a reaction to 
the earlier publication of a book entitled Straight Talk (published in French 
as Le pari de la franchise) by his former colleague at the Université de 
Montréal, Stéphane Dion, who was then the Minister of Intergovernmental 
Relations and President of the Privy Council in Canada’s federal govern-
ment under Jean Chrétien. All work in political philosophy offers a bal-
ance between specificity and universality. While the former carried more 
weight in Seymour’s 2001 essay, it is clearly the latter that is dominant in 
his 2008 book though he never loses sight of Canada -Québec relations.
The book that Seymour published in 2008 is extremely ambitious. 
Kymlicka tried in his 1995 book, Multicultural Citizenship, to deepen 
the deontological philosophical liberalism of the first Rawls by making it 
more hospitable to minority rights, whereas Seymour sought in 2008 to 
justify a collective rights regime for peoples without completely sover-
eign states based on the second Rawls, the one of Political Liberalism and 
The Law of Peoples (Rawls 1993; 2001). It is difficult to render justice 
in only a few lines to Seymour’s ambition and toil in a work of nearly 
700 pages. Like Tully, Seymour is indebted to Charles Taylor, founder of 
the Canadian school of pluralism, dialogue, and recognition. Indeed, the 
first chapters of his book belong to the philosophical anthropology dear 
to Taylor. Before formulating his own liberal theory of collective rights, 
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Seymour also discusses at length Kymlicka’s work, which he considers 
too dependent on moral individualism to provide recognition and a legal 
framework adequate for stateless peoples. The philosophical perspective 
presented in his 2008 work is that of political liberalism with a universal 
vocation. It is not more closely related to the Canadian situation than 
is Tully’s theoretical approach, although Québec and Aboriginal nations 
are regularly cited as examples of possible subjects of collective rights, 
like other minority nations (for example, Catalonia and Scotland) within 
nation -states elsewhere in the world. Endorsing, like Tully, the import-
ance of recognizing minorities within states, Seymour thus challenges the 
dominant model of the modern, normal nation -state, which he considers 
obsolete. Although groups such as minorities resulting from immigration 
and contiguous diaspora communities can, according to Seymour, make 
certain demands for recognition, he advocates the need for nation -states 
to mainly recognize the rights of the nations within their borders, and to 
thus adopt a more multinational system. In this, he is in line with theorists 
and thinkers such as Tully, Gagnon, and Requejo.
His arguments are based mainly on Rawls’ later philosophical work, 
and he takes up some of Rawls’ parallels between individual rights and 
the rights of peoples. According to Seymour, the value of tolerance and 
the ideal of self -determination that apply to persons in an individualist 
framework can be applied to the issue of peoples in a form of axiological 
pluralism that postulates that the rights of individuals and peoples are of 
equal importance (equally primordial) and are not to be ranked (Seymour 
2008, 270). According to him, recognition of peoples flows equally 
from a moral principle based on justice as from instrumental reason that 
calls for recognition of minority nations as a means of ensuring polit-
ical stability. Seymour takes a direction similar to that found in Gagnon 
and Tully’s pioneering 2001 work on multinational democracies, which 
sought to delve deeper into the twofold quest for justice and stability. The 
stability in question can be seen at both the domestic level, thus within 
the state, and the global level, since a nation -state’s rejection of recog-
nition demands from a minority nation increases tension and justifies, 
even for Seymour, a right to secede in virtue of the people’s right to self -
determination (Seymour 2008, 470).
Unlike Tully, Seymour is not opposed to modern constitutionalism as 
such, but rather to the nation -state framework that has resulted from it. 
This is to say that today’s constitutions could prove capable of recognizing 
the diversity of nations and cultures if they were amended in certain ways. 
The changes that are required, according to Seymour, go far beyond simple 
symbolic recognition. In fact, what is in question is a system of collective 
rights understood as “rights that a community has and that make it possible 
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for the integrity, development and promotion of institutional, collective 
and identity -related goods to be politically guaranteed within a given ter-
ritory” (Seymour 2008, 481). In summary, from Seymour’s point of view, 
peoples – and this applies both to stateless peoples and to those that are 
identified with sovereign states – can be valid sources of moral claims. 
Moreover, this translates into a collective rights regime co-existing, in an 
equally primordial way, with an individual rights regime. Neither Seymour 
nor Tully believes that political philosophy can rank or establish a lexical 
order of these types of rights in a disembodied manner, sheltered from the 
practical judgment of a community of citizens engaged in dialogue.
III.  From a Straightjacket to a Reworking of Democratic 
Constitutionalism with Universal Scope
Tully has always indefatigably insisted on the complexity and divers-
ity of struggles for recognition of difference in culture and identity. To 
take only the example of cultural and national struggles, far from oppos-
ing fixed entities that would be separate and uniform seeking a classical, 
definitive, permanent form of recognition, such clashes instead involve 
groups containing plurality and complexity within themselves, against 
a background of interwoven identities. The field of these struggles will 
thus be that of an unceasing, permanent dialogue the outcome of which 
can always be challenged:
An identity negotiated in these human, all too human, circumstances will not 
be fixed or authentic, but it can still be well supported rather than imposed, 
reasonable rather than unreasonable, empowering rather than disabling, lib-
erating rather than oppressive. That is, it will be a construct of practical and 
intersubjective dialogue, not of theoretical reason on one side or immediate 
ascription on the other (Tully 2003, 519).
I think that this approach, which places the accent on the complexity 
and diversity of struggles concerning identity and constitutional issues, can 
be found in the two texts that Tully devoted largely to the topic of Québec’s 
political freedom within the Canadian state. The 1999 article, entitled 
“Liberté et dévoilement dans les sociétés multinationales” (Freedom and 
disclosure in multinational societies), and the spring of 2000 conference 
held at the Québec Studies Program at McGill University, “The Unattained 
yet Attainable Democracy: Canada and Québec Face the New Century,” 
are thus in line with his overall philosophical approach. As shall be further 
developed here, in these two texts, Tully places great importance on the 
notion of political freedom understood as the self-determination of peoples. 
In both instances, he believes that the Supreme Court of Canada did pion-
eering, even revolutionary, work in the 1998 Reference re Secession of 
Québec, particularly with respect to the fundamental dimension of peoples’ 
Interpreting Quebec’s Exile Within the Federation
152
freedom. However, between the two texts, Tully strengthened his under-
standing of the meaning and scope of the decision to completely reject the 
thesis of the first text, which was that the Canadian constitutional frame-
work had become a shackle or straightjacket for Québec.
The intersubjective action of competition for a certain form of recognition (an 
activity that should not be confused with the final outcome of the struggle) 
can be understood as mutual unveiling and acknowledgement. Struggles for 
recognition are also actions in which one reveals oneself […] The primary 
stake is thus not recognition, but freedom. The freedom of the members of 
a society to change the constitutional rules of mutual recognition in concert 
with the changes that occur to their own identity […] This is why groups 
with claims now demand that this intersubjective activity be enshrined in the 
basic structure of their society. Indeed, a multinational society will be free 
and respectful of the right to self -determination in so far as the constitutional 
rules governing association among different nations are open to challenge 
and amendment […] At the dawn of the new millennium, the shift between 
freedom and domination will be the primary political issue in multinational 
societies (Tully 1999b, 14-16).
As his article progresses, Tully deepens his understanding of the 
struggles for recognition, which leads him to the views of the second 
stage of his philosophical career. He links his approach with crucial 
political -constitutional events in Canadian -Québec history since the Parti 
Québécois’ first victory in 1976 and with the main aspects of the Supreme 
Court’s 1998 decision. According to his approach, the various parties 
involved in demanding recognition have to see themselves as legitimate 
interlocutors participating in discussions and negotiations. Tully sees the 
idea of mutual reciprocity as the key principle of recognition policy. He 
believes that the Supreme Court’s Reference, by setting aside the unilat-
eral aspect of a secessionist approach, was clearly following the logic 
of this principle (Tully 1999b, 19). At the different stages that consti-
tute a demand for recognition, the stakeholders reveal to themselves and 
others their own identities by formulating the demand, and their partners 
are obligated to listen and to take into consideration the content of the 
demand. On this issue, Tully also finds that the decision, since it recog-
nizes an obligation to negotiate with all members of the Canadian pol-
itical union in the wake of a referendum on a clear question resulting 
in a clear majority, respects the broad lines of his theoretical approach. 
It is important to note that, for Tully, both the association member that 
demands recognition and those that respond have to respect their internal 
diversity at all stages in the process. Tully – who for some ten years has 
been co -leading with Alain -G. Gagnon research on the political regimes 
of Great Britain, Belgium, Spain and Canada – considers that in contem-
porary multinational societies recognition of members’ national identity 
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is a free, democratic activity with four characteristics: it is intersubjective 
and does not claim authenticity because it is constantly being formed and 
reformed; it is multilogical, bringing into contact a wide range of stake-
holders with identities that are also plural and shifting in their exchanges 
among negotiation, persuasion, deliberation, questioning and other forms 
of rhetoric; it is continuous, full of too much complexity and unpredict-
ability to lead to something final or definitive; and, finally, it is agonistic 
in so far as exchanges related to recognition are also forms of compe-
tition. Globally, demands for recognition are thus part of open, partial, 
indefinitely revisable processes that can enable members to challenge and 
transform the rules that define the way they live together in their political - 
constitutional association. Despite all the respect owed to the Supreme 
Court and the quality of its decision, Tully nonetheless considered, in 
1999, that the Canadian constitutional regime was a straightjacket for 
Québec. His reasoning was based on the three following arguments:
There are three reasons why Québec is not free within the Canadian fed-
eration. First, the other members of the federation can impose constitutional 
amendments on it without its consent. They can also arbitrarily block any 
negotiations designed to give Québec the constitutional status of nation. In 
1982, a constitutional amendment, namely, the Constitution Act, 1982, was 
introduced and imposed on Québec without its consent and despite its clearly 
asserted dissent. This manoeuvre not only violated a constitutional conven-
tion (Quod omnes tangit), as the Court ruled at the time, but also violated the 
new amending formula established by the Constitution Act, 1982 […] The 
Supreme Court found that Québec is nonetheless bound by the Constitution 
Act, 1982, and, consequently, by the amending formula it contains […] 
However, the Court added, this time rightly, that this general rule applies only 
when the constitutional rules that are adopted can themselves be amended. It 
is this aspect that is now in question.
The second reason that Québec is not free within the Canadian federation 
lies in the fact that the content of the amending formula introduced in 1982 
entails that it is virtually impossible, in practice, to amend the Constitution in 
such a way that Québec is recognized as a nation. Third, the Court holds that 
phase two of the negotiations, triggered by a clear majority in a referendum 
on a clear question, should be governed by the present amending formula. 
Yet, owing to the first reason mentioned above, Québec is not bound by this 
amending formula (Tully 1999b, 31-32).
Shackle, straightjacket, domination, and deprivation of political 
freedom are the terms that summarize this view. Since the beginning of 
modern times, these words and others belong to the register of negativ-
ity and indignation in the semantics of political thought and action, and 
this could not have escaped such a renowned interpreter of Locke as 
Tully. This language belongs to arguments proclaiming the illegitimacy 
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of a political relationship and inviting people to contemplate alternatives 
in complete theoretical freedom in order to recover practical freedom. 
Indeed, it always has to be possible to challenge and change the political - 
constitutional rules for living together in order to claim a free political 
life. In the months that followed the writing of this article and in condi-
tions that it will perhaps one day be possible to elucidate for the benefit 
of Canadian intellectual history, Tully re -analyzed the entire August 1998 
Supreme Court decision, and thereby gained a better grasp of its structure 
and revolutionary scope. This led him to conclusions that, according to 
his altered perspective, are more promising for Canadian constitutional 
democracy and for a means of promoting a form of diversity compat-
ible with preserving the country’s unity. I will now follow the path of his 
arguments at the March 2000 conference in Montréal: “The Unattained 
yet Attainable Democracy: Canada and Québec Face the New Century.” 
In order to simplify the reading of this chapter, I shall use the expression 
“Montréal conference” to refer to this text.
In a decision with revolutionary scope and that could have univer-
sal consequences on deepening the goals of freedom and recognition 
in modern political aspirations, the Supreme Court seems to have sig-
nificantly influenced the way that we must understand the Canadian 
constitutional regime by defining it as a system of rules and principles 
favouring reconciliation of unity and diversity through ongoing pro-
cesses of democratic discussion, deliberation, negotiation, and change 
(Tully 2000, 4). Here we find a reading that is entirely compatible with 
Tully’s theoretical approach concerning struggles for constitutional and 
identity -related recognition in today’s world. According to Tully, the 
Supreme Court’s interpretive prism opens a path to deepen and consoli-
date democracy in Canada. In other words, according to Tully, the deci-
sion enables Canadians and Québecers to continue to hope. We can still 
advance towards achieving democracy and freedom. Not all avenues are 
blocked. The Canadian constitutional system is not a straightjacket for 
Québec (Tully 2000, 6-7). This conclusion is the one that the Court itself 
formulated in its decision, and this time Tully makes it his own with great 
enthusiasm. From his point of view, in order to agree with the Court, we 
have to accept that constitutional negotiations are an unceasing, perma-
nent activity, and thus abandon the illusion that definitive recognition is 
an end in itself.
As a general rule, according to Tully, those who have analyzed the 
Supreme Court decision have focused greatly on paragraphs 83 to 147, in 
which the justices apply the historical -constitutional principles that they 
identified in paragraphs 1 to 82 in order to answer the specific questions 
that the federal government referred to it. In that second part, the Court 
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concluded that Québec has no unilateral right to secede under Canadian 
constitutional law or international public law. However, the Court also 
concludes that if there is a clear majority on a clear question concerning 
secession (but not only secession), then the members of the Canadian 
political association should enter into a complex process of negotiation 
with one another. By doing this, according to Tully, the decision already 
had a revolutionary aspect in the history of thought and modern polit-
ical life: “No other court of a contemporary constitutional democracy has 
brought the process of secession under the orderly rule of law and dem-
ocracy” (Tully 2000, 8). However, during the Montréal conference, Tully 
wanted to focus his attention on the first part of the decision, in which the 
Court redefined the Canadian constitutional framework by highlighting, 
in addition to the major written documents such as the Constitution Act, 
1867, Constitution Act, 1982 and the texts, customs and conventions 
associated with Canada’s British heritage, a series of four underlying 
principles that are implicit, inter -related, equally primordial, and at the 
very foundation of our political -constitutional system: federalism, dem-
ocracy, constitutionalism and rule of law, and, finally, respect for minor-
ity rights. The Court found, and Tully is in complete agreement, that the 
partners always have to act in compliance with these principles, entirely 
banishing any recourse to unilateralism. They have to do so when they 
initiate constitutional changes, including secession, and they have to do 
so when they negotiate among themselves and continue to do so through-
out any specific phase in the ongoing process of discussion and delibera-
tion. To participate in such discussions while complying with written law 
and respecting the underlying principles is to advance in practice toward 
reconciliation of member diversity with the requirements of unity (Tully 
2000, 9). In the end, the Court ruled that unilateral secession is impractic-
able for Québec because, as Tully says, it “would violate each of these 
four principles to which Québec has bound itself as a member of Canada” 
(Tully 2000, 9).5
Legal interpretation, as an integral part of hermeneutics in the sense 
of, for example, Gadamer’s philosophy, always contains an applied ele-
ment. Tully tries to render justice to the Court’s interpretative work by 
noting that it sought to identify a non -exhaustive, non -definitive list of 
underlying principles, with an eye to application in situations requiring 
reconciliation of diversity with unity, as well as to the three fundamental 
sources of law: constitutional texts, historical context, and all relevant 
case law. The four principles that the Court identified are those that it 
5 Here, Tully cites paragraphs 91 and 149 of the decision.
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felt were especially relevant in the specific context in which the decision 
would be applied.
Tully said during the Montréal conference that the Supreme Court of 
Canada initially considered that the four underlying reconciliation prin-
ciples bound Québec and the other members because they had consented 
to those principles and those principles had been employed constantly 
between 1867 and 1998. Canadian constitutional democracy binds mem-
bers because it is the house that they have built together, a complex pro-
cess of creating and recreating themselves (Tully 2000, 13).6 Next, the 
Court focused on the task of understanding the principle of federalism, 
showing that it can be understood as both the governmental autonomy of 
the members and protection of their identity -related distinctions, includ-
ing recognition of collective rights for a linguistic and cultural minority 
concentrated in an area, such as Québec (Tully 2000, 14).7 According to 
Tully and the Court, it is precisely because this underlying principle is 
real and fundamental that it has made possible an evolution of Canadian 
law going beyond the centralizing tendencies of the Constitution Act, 
1867. In its interpretation of the democratic principle, the Court insisted 
on the idea, dear to Tully, of a political -legal regime understood as an 
ongoing process of discussion, recognizing that there will always be dis-
agreement, but that it is important to always remain open to transforming 
rules from a stance of institutional modesty. The joint operation of these 
first two principles protects Québec’s freedom and identity (through the 
logic of empowerment) while enabling it to participate in the creation 
and evolution of Canada as a whole (through the logic of integration). 
In relations between the different principles, neither can be used as a 
trump permitting one of the principles to be given priority and placed in 
a dominant position over the others. Indeed, it was in its discussion of the 
democratic principle that the Court felt that negotiations concerning the 
secession of Québec should be conducted by the elected representatives 
of two equal, concurrent majorities: a clear majority of Québec’s popula-
tion and a clear majority of Canada as a whole, without either being able 
to dominate the other a priori (Tully 2000, 18).8 In the overall discussion 
about whether the Canadian constitutional framework is a straightjacket 
for Québec, these passages were crucial for Tully’s conclusions at the 
Montréal conference.
During the Montréal Conference, Tully more quickly goes over the two 
other principles: constitutionalism and rule of law, and minority rights. 
6 Here, Tully interprets paragraphs 49 to 54 of the decision.
7 Here, Tully interprets paragraph 59 of the decision.
8 Here, Tully interprets paragraphs 66 and 93 of the decision.
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However, like the Court, he believes that neither Québec nor Canada can 
take action without deep respect for its internal pluralism. Moreover, the 
Québec that resists unilateral actions at its expense should be willing to 
accept that the principle of constitutionalism prohibits it from taking any 
unilateral secessionist action.
The idea that Canada and Québec would have come to a constitu-
tional impasse seems to Tully to be the result of a major misunderstand-
ing. In the first part of its decision, the Court did indeed formulate a 
profoundly original understanding of Canadian constitutional democ-
racy “as a flexible and continuous process of reconciling diversity with 
unity (among other problems) by means of negotiations in accordance 
with the appropriate written and unwritten constitutional principles” 
(Tully 2000, 20). The heart of the problem concerns the repatriation of 
the Constitution in 1982, culminating in a new fundamental text that 
includes the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. According to 
an initial perspective endorsed by the Court and by Tully, the condi-
tions (Tully writes: “the evolving conditions”) that made possible the 
Court’s original, novel vision came to maturity in 1982. However, many 
people have committed the mistake of reducing the Canadian constitu-
tional framework to only the text of the founding act of 1982, to only 
the procedures employed in the repatriation operation, and to the special 
way that a specific ranking has been made concrete with respect to the 
underlying principles that are now set forever. If we look at things in 
this way – and while Tully does not say so, this is how he saw things a 
few months before in an article published in Globe – the Constitution 
can be seen as a straightjacket and the entire political situation comes 
to an impasse. Tully wants to continue the Court’s work by liberating us 
from this deep misunderstanding. In the last part of his conference, he 
discusses examples that provide greater detail concerning the idea that 
the Canadian constitutional framework should absolutely not be seen as 
a straightjacket (see, paragraph 150).
Tully subscribes with enthusiasm to the Court’s idea that the Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms is not a straightjacket for Québec. He 
defends a vision of the Charter that makes it a protector of individual 
rights, minorities, and majorities, thus promoting the duality of the lin-
guistic communities across Canada while also respecting the distribution 
of powers among the provinces and under the aegis of a combination of 
amending formulas sufficiently flexible to make possible all sorts of serene 
intergovernmental and constitutional negotiations (Tully 2000, 23).9 All 
9 The following excerpt is found there: “In particular, the Charter recognizes and pro-
tects the equality of the two official -language communities throughout Canada. This 
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of these ways of reconciling diversity and unity make the Charter just as 
popular in Québec as in the rest of Canada, according to Tully. Based on 
the Court’s new interpretation of the Canadian constitutional framework, 
Tully believes that we can skip over the fact that Québec did not consent 
to the Charter and that the text does not recognize a fundamental aspect 
of its diversity, namely its identity as a distinct society. With respect to the 
first issue, Tully notes that the Court defended the ideal of legal continu-
ity, and recognized in its decisions at the time the concept of a qualified 
majority, without overlooking the fact that Québec’s representatives in 
the federal Parliament did indeed, by a very large majority, give their 
consent to the Charter coming into force (Tully 2000, 24). Regarding the 
second issue, Tully concludes that, despite the lack of explicit recogni-
tion, some aspects of the Charter indirectly protect Québec’s identity as 
a distinct society (in particular the fact that the Charter does not alter the 
distribution of powers or the possibility for Québec to have recourse to 
the notwithstanding clause). The events of 1982 were characterized by a 
series of compromises, negotiations, and deliberations. As always, dissent 
was inevitable (see, paragraph 68). What was essential, according to both 
the Court and Tully, lay in the openness to change and flexibility with 
respect to the future of the constitutional framework. We will be able to 
change the Charter in the future. The ranking of the underlying principles 
that made it possible to repatriate and bring into force the Constitution 
Act, 1982 does not make it a cage for the future. We thus have to see 
the repatriation process, the content of the Charter, and later democratic 
efforts to change it as representing the Canadian constitution in action, a 
continuing process of discussion and evolution with respect to rules and 
in compliance with rules.
Remember that, in the article published in Globe, Tully strongly 
insisted on the inflexibility of the amending formula’s text and practi-
ces (in fact, a combination of amending formulas sometimes requiring a 
qualified majority of members and sometimes unanimity) and had con-
cluded that the Canadian constitution was a straightjacket for Québec. 
At the Montréal conference, Tully rereads the relevant paragraphs of 
the decision (i.e., paragraphs 84, 88, 93, 94, 96, and 101) to show that 
possible negotiations concerning secession have to be carried out by 
representatives of both majorities (see, paragraph 93) and in a manner 
consistent with the four underlying principles. A possible impasse owing 
to excessive inflexibility in the constitutional text’s amending procedures 
non -territorial and post -modern imagined community of Franco -Québecers, Acadians, 
Franco -Ontarias, Franco -British Columbians, and so on, with its deep historical roots, 
may, for all we know, turn out to be as strong as, and complementary with, Québec’s 
territorialized nationalism. Only time will tell.”
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cannot thus be considered a lock sealing the door from opening to nego-
tiations and flexibility. In sum, Tully thinks that Québec is not deprived 
of political freedom in the functioning of the Canadian state. Its right to 
self -determination is not hobbled. This theme was the last one that Tully 
discussed in depth during the Montréal conference.
In its 1998 decision, the Court considered that, within Canada, Québec 
was not prevented from making significant use of its right to internal 
self -determination. It was able to achieve its economic, social, cultural, 
and political development. It was also entirely possible for it to take the 
democratic initiative to try amending the constitutional framework. Tully 
recognized that he himself had succumbed to a deep misunderstanding in 
an earlier text – when reading this passage, we have to understand that 
he is alluding to his Globe article – in which he limited the constitutional 
framework to the fundamental 1982 legislation alone and consequently 
mistakenly interpreted the issue of Québec’s formal recognition and pow-
ers (Tully 2000, 30). The difficulties encountered in attempts to amend 
part of the constitutional arrangements in force in Canada – for example, 
the Meech Lake and Charlottetown failures – do not entail a negation of 
Québec’s right to internal self -determination. Québec can work towards 
changing the rules and, if it does so in a manner consistent with the con-
stitutional framework, its partners will have to listen to it and negotiate, 
which can even include negotiations concerning secession:
Whether or not Québecers constitute a people, they possess the powers of pol-
itical, economic, social and cultural development associated with the right to 
self -determination and their distinct character as a diverse people, or peoples, 
is recognized by the Court in the fundamental principles and procedures of 
the constitution (Tully 2000, 31).
IV.  Michel Seymour’s Criticism
In his essay published in 2001, Le pari de la démesure: l’intransigeance 
canadienne face au Québec, Seymour had already addressed a series of 
critical comments targeting the interpretations of Canadian democratic 
constitutionalism proposed by Tully. To my knowledge, no one in our 
research communities has yet tried to examine in detail the hermeneutic 
and political differences between these two philosophers. More recently, 
in “L’autodétermination interne du Québec dans la fédération cana-
dienne” (The internal self -determination of Québec within the Canadian 
federation), at a conference given in Montréal in 2009, Seymour revisited 
his differences with Tully. I begin with a review of Seymour’s main criti-
cisms in the 2009 text.
Seymour begins by providing a very useful theoretical distinction 
between substantial internal self -determination and procedural -deliberative 
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internal self -determination. He thinks that Tully’s approach belongs 
to the latter category. Of course, internal self -determination has eco-
nomic, cultural, and social dimensions, though I do not have enough 
space here to discuss the lively debate between federalists and sover-
eigntists as it relates to these three dimensions of Québec’s internal self - 
determination in Canada. Like Seymour and Tully, I focus more on the 
political dimension of substantial internal self -determination. Seymour 
proposes three stages. First, he begins with substantial internal self -
determination in the weak sense. A people has this when it can choose its 
representatives freely within the encompassing state – the Supreme Court 
insisted strongly on this dimension in paragraph 136 of the Reference re 
Secession of Québec. The next stage is the canonical meaning. This is the 
ability to enjoy an autonomous government by, for instance, possessing 
a federated state within a federation. Finally, the third stage is the strong 
sense. This is when the encompassing state offers differentiated rules of 
operation including various systems of asymmetrical federalism, tax poli-
cies adapted to internal national pluralism, and specific rights concerning 
international representation (Seymour 2009, 4-5). What kind of substan-
tial internal self -determination does Québec have in Canada? Seymour’s 
judgment on this is very severe. He thinks that such self -determination, 
such political freedom, is seriously hobbled. I shall come back to this in 
the next section. Indeed, Seymour approaches Tully’s interpretative work 
from another point of view, that of procedural or deliberative internal self 
-determination. Here is the essential point in Seymour’s reading of this:
According to Tully, the Supreme Court showed in its opinion on the secession 
of Québec that the 1982 constitutional order was not a shackle or straight-
jacket but on the contrary a living organism that authorizes the provinces to 
initiate action to amend the Constitution. The 1982 constitutional legislation 
would be a living organism because the constitutional conversation can con-
tinue […] According to Tully, “struggles for recognition are struggles of dis-
closure and acknowledgment.” Even if the process does not come to a happy 
end, you still have to be happy (Seymour 2009, 13-14).
The following is a list of Seymour’s main objections:
(1) Tully’s interpretative framework leads to an unbalanced process of 
reciprocal recognition between a majority people -nation and a min-
ority people -nation within the encompassing state. Québec enters 
into the dialogue by accepting the idea that it is part of the Canadian 
political community, which is equivalent to recognizing that there 
is a Canadian people, and even that it has a right to external self - 
determination. However, Québec has to put up with the fact that 
recognition of its right to substantial internal self -determination is 
constantly being put off, since it has to be satisfied with seeing its 
claims simply considered or taken into account.
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(2) Despite the fact that he promotes deliberative democracy, Tully 
seems to have nothing to say against the 1982 imposition of a con-
stitutional regime on Québec without its consent. According to 
him, as re -interpreted by the court, the 1982 constitutional regime 
even enshrines Canadian deliberative democracy.
(3) Seymour also enters into a debate with Tully concerning the in-
flexibility of the 1982 Constitution’s amending formula. Tully’s 
defensive strategy is to support the Court’s idea that a way around 
such inflexibility will be found in possible post -referendum ne-
gotiations by employing a simplified amending procedure leading 
to negotiations between representatives of the two majorities (a 
Canadian majority and a Québec majority). Seymour thinks that 
this idea is completely unrealistic given contemporary Canadian 
politics.
(4) Expanding upon the second criticism above, Seymour believes that 
Tully contradicts himself by supporting the idea of negotiations 
based on a simplified procedure of two majorities for Québec’s 
secession since he does not extend, in theory, application of such a 
rule to the 1982 repatriation of the Constitution without Québec’s 
consent.
(5) According to Seymour, in Canada between 2000 and 2010, the 
constitutional conversation dear to Tully was not continued. “It 
was repeated to us ad nauseam that the time was not ripe and the 
ground not fertile for constitutional discussions” (Seymour 2009, 
17).
(6) Given that Tully delivered his conference entitled “The Unattained 
yet Attainable Democracy” in Montréal a few weeks after the fed-
eral parliament adopted the Clarity Act, Seymour reproaches him 
for his silence on the legislation and its consequences for the ad-
missibility of his interpretation:
[…] the lack of determination concerning what should count as a clear major-
ity, the abandonment of the principle of a simple majority as the interpretation 
of the democratic principle, the veto that the Canadian government gives it-
self over what constitutes a clear question, the possibility of interfering in the 
process for adopting the referendum question in the National Assembly, the 
obligation to negotiate the partition of Québec, all of that does not upset him 
in any way. In short, through his silence on this issue, Tully seems to think 
that the Clarity Act in no way violates Québec’s ability to initiate a constitu-
tional amendment (Seymour 2009, 17).
(7) Seymour believes that by reassuring Canadians concerning the 
granting of a deliberative procedural right to self -determination for 
minority peoples and nations, Tully gives them reasons to postpone 
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deepening and substantial internal self -determination, “taking us 
away from effective recognition rather than bringing us closer to 
it” (Seymour 2009, 17).
(8) By attributing to the Supreme Court of Canada great original-
ity on the international scene for being, in 1998, the first court 
of both an advanced democracy and of a multinational society to 
acknowledge this condition of freedom and to formulate an ap-
propriate account of democratic constitutionalism, Tully, accord-
ing to Seymour, places the principles of deliberative democracy at 
the service of a nationalist apology for the Canadian constitutional 
regime.
I will complete this enumeration of the main differences between 
Tully and Seymour by returning to the chapter written by the latter on 
the Supreme Court’s Reference re Secession of Québec in his 2001 essay, 
Le pari de la démesure: l’intransigeance canadienne face au Québec. 
In the end, Seymour does not share Tully’s enthusiasm concerning the 
revolutionary nature of the decision and its capacity to be a springboard 
for real reforms that will strengthen federalism. Seymour argues that 
the Court’s justices, far from having been above the fray, acted instead 
as veritable promoters of the Canadian constitutional regime, including 
the one that was established in 1982. According to Tully, the underlying 
principles that complement the major written constitutional documents 
are true instruments of flexibility. Seymour thinks that such “interpreta-
tive flexibility” can just as easily be used to set obstacles in the paths 
of reformers as it can serve the cause of advocates strengthening the 
federal principle (Seymour 2001, 154). Tully delivered his conference in 
Montréal in March 2000, only nine days after the Parliament of Canada 
adopted the Clarity Act (known as Bill C -20 at the time). In the legis-
lation, as I noted in the second section of this chapter, the Canadian 
government invited Parliament to implement the clarity requirements 
formulated by the Court. In 2001, Seymour felt that it would have 
been useful if Tully had compared his interpretation of the Reference 
with that underlying the legal intervention by the central government 
of the Canadian federation. Finally, Seymour criticized Tully for trans-
forming into a minor problem the absence of strong, effective recogni-
tion of Québec. As we know, the philosopher from Victoria relies on the 
dynamic, flexible nature of the constitutional regime, including the 1982 
reform, and he points out that the courts already take Québec’s specifi-
city into account in their decisions. In sum, he suggests that implicit rec-
ognition of the Québec difference is an addition to the four underlying 
principles of the Canadian political -constitutional order. According to 
Seymour (2001, 156), this encourages Quebecers and Canadians to be 
satisfied with the status quo.
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V.  Overall Consideration of the Theses  
in Light of Seymour’s Objections
A. An Unbalanced Process of Reciprocal Recognition
The fundamental idea of multinational federalism is that majority 
and minority national aspirations can co -exist in the same state in con-
ditions that are favourable to both justice and stability. By insisting on 
revealing identities through ongoing, reciprocal, bilateral, and multilat-
eral discussions, Tully implies that such deliberations occur in a kind of 
ideal linguistic situation in which the interlocutors are required to take the 
others’ arguments into consideration in exchanges that are both agonic 
and playful, and that lead to outcomes that are the point of departure for 
the next meeting. As Alain Noël nicely puts it, according to Tully, par-
ticipants are moved principally by the strength of arguments, whereas 
appeals to force (the arguments of strength) are also part of the reality of 
multinational societies (Noël 2006, 433). The imbalance in power and in 
governance relations between majority and minority nations is part of the 
nature of multinational societies. Caught in the Wittgensteinian metaphor 
of language games, Tully tends to obscure the cold reality of power so 
that the interests of the Canadian state and its nation building in terms 
of unity can be compatible with taking into consideration, certainly, but 
also with indefinite postponement, Québec’s interests in advancing its 
political freedom and promoting its distinct identity – interests that are 
curiously confined to the logic of diversity from Tully’s point of view. In 
short, although being a great theoretical partisan of agonism, Tully is not 
agonic enough.
B.  Tully’s Silence on the 1982 Imposition  
of a Constitutional Order on Québec
On this issue, I have to qualify Seymour’s remarks. During the 
Montréal conference, Tully did not completely overlook this dimension. 
He considered that, in so far as dissidence is always inevitable in a con-
stitutional democracy and the Canadian framework is interpreted in the 
sense of the Supreme Court’s decision by insisting on the four underlying 
principles, Québec does in fact retain complete freedom to change the 
rules of the game in the future, while enjoying the non -negligible benefits 
associated with the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The aspect lacking 
in Tully’s thought on this issue, in my judgment, is the absence of an 
attempt to reconcile these remarks during the Montréal conference with 
those he made in his 1995 book, Strange Multiplicity:
No constitutional amendment touching Québec’s political culture was put 
through without the consent of the provincial government until 1982, when 
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the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms was enacted with the express 
dissent of the Québec Assembly. The amendment transferred considerable 
jurisdiction over property and civil rights from the provinces to the federal 
courts, whereas this jurisdiction was guaranteed to the provinces by the 1867 
constitution, and in the case of Québec, by the Québec Act of 1774 […] The 
objections the Québec government raised in the Courts, as we can now an-
ticipate, were that the amending procedure violated the convention of consent 
and the amendment violated the convention of continuity, the very principles 
on which the federation and the consent of the Québec people to it, rests 
(Tully 1995, 162-163).
In his political philosophy, Tully insists strongly on the agonic free-
dom of individuals and peoples or, to put it differently, on their capacity 
to change the rules of the game. Partners have to be able to change the 
rules. This is part of the very nature of political freedom. Reformulating 
a question by Mark Wenman, we can wonder whether there should not be 
limits placed on this ability since partners could change the rules to such 
a point that the very nature of the political -constitutional game would be 
transformed (Wenman 2003, 177).
C.  Negotiations on Secession or Constitutional Change 
Governed by the Two -Majority Rule: Realistic or Not?
Given this chapter’s limitations, I cannot fully discuss this issue. I 
would say that this idea is no less realistic than that of the Québec sover-
eigntists who thought, and still think, that after three centuries or more 
than five hundred years, depending on the perspective taken, of living 
with Québec and Quebecers – not to mention the fact that Québec occu-
pies a central geographical location and has made substantial contribu-
tions to many cycles of reconfiguring identity in Canada – the Canadian 
government and people who endorse Canadian nation -building would 
enter into negotiations on secession focusing essentially on their eco-
nomic and instrumental interests, and that such negotiations would occur 
without turbulence under the aegis of cold rationality.
D.  Tully’s Contradictions: Comparing Secessions  
and Constitutional Reforms.
Tully bases his thought on the idea that, in constitutional hermeneut-
ics, each situation is different. In both 1998 and 1981-82, the Supreme 
Court of Canada sought to apply its understanding of the country’s con-
stitutional framework and the four underlying principles to a specific 
situation requiring the reconciliation of quests for diversity and the 
requirements of unity. In 1998, the combined interpretations of the prin-
ciples of democracy and federalism resulted in the idea of two majorities, 
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in Québec and in Canada, responsible for possible negotiations on seces-
sion and providing a means of getting around the excessive inflexibility 
of amending formulas. At the Montréal conference, Tully develops the 
idea that the relative importance of the four principles can vary over time, 
depending on the situation. He also finds this idea in the Court’s decision, 
and he agrees with its interpretation. However, in passing, he criticizes 
the justices who dissented from the famous 1981 Reference re Resolution 
to amend the Constitution for giving great, permanent, and definitive 
importance to the principle of federalism (Tully 2000, 21). In the same 
passage, he recognizes that this principle has become less important in 
the Canadian system since the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms 
came into effect. The nuances in Tully’s argumentation do not seem very 
persuasive to me. In order to get out of Canada, a Québec majority would 
have to go through a complex dialogue with the Canadian majority in 
strict compliance with the constitutional texts and underlying principles 
or, in other words, under extremely difficult practical circumstances if we 
are to believe Tully himself.10 However, in order to substantially trans-
form the Canadian constitutional framework, it was possible in 1982 for 
the Canadian majority to do so without Québec’s consent. This is in line 
with the interpretation that Tully offers of Canadian constitutional dem-
ocracy on the basis of the 1998 decision and the theory of the flexibility 
and equally primordial nature of the underlying principles. I remain quite 
perplexed by this reading.
E.  The Lack of Motivation to Continue the Constitutional 
Conversation Over the Last Decade
Certainly, Seymour is right to point out that there is virtually no appe-
tite for serious discussions about important constitutional changes in pol-
itical debates in Canada today. This is true of the parties and their leaders, 
the media and intellectual elites, and the general public and civil society. 
However, it is just as true to say that over the last decade Québec govern-
ments have done very little to instigate discussions in this direction. As 
André Burelle, an old federalist sage from Québec, says:
10 See the following passage in Tully (1999, 26), my translation: “For example, to obtain 
this international recognition, a sovereign Québec would have to engage in discussions 
with the eleven First Nations of Québec (which would appeal not only to Canada’s 
constitutional duty to protect their interests but also to international law on Aboriginal 
peoples), with English -speaking districts that may have voted against secessions 
(which would campaign for partition or for the preservation of their current rights 
under the new constitution), with French -speaking minorities in the rest of Canada 
(which would demand that their rights be protected under the new Canadian constitu-
tion), with Canada concerning the new political and economic relationship and the 
conditions for joining NAFTA (over which Canada has a veto).”
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Québec’s federalists are so afraid that Ottawa and the ROC (“Rest of 
Canada”) will say “NO” to them that they do not dare ask the Québécois for a 
clear strong mandate to obtain unequivocal recognition for Québec’s right to 
national difference and to open themselves, in compensation, to joint decision 
-making between sovereign partners to engage in European -style manage-
ment of the interdependence of the federation’s two orders of government in 
the face of the growing challenges of globalization (Burelle 2005, 468, my 
translation).
Indeed, as François Rocher has noted in trenchant research on the 
interpretation of Canadian federalism in Québec, the latter is not blame-
less in this affair. While federalism stands for a balance between auton-
omy and solidarity -interdependence, the first aspect has always taken 
precedence in Québec’s historiographical tradition (Rocher 2006, 117-
122). This lends a degree of credibility to a point of view that is relatively 
widespread in English -speaking cottages in Canada today, suggesting that 
Québec always wants more of everything: more money, more recogni-
tion, more power, more autonomy.
F.  Tully’s Silence on the Clarity Act
In this chapter, my reflection has focused mainly on the diverging and 
contradicting interpretations that Tully has given concerning Canadian 
constitutional democracy and the Supreme Court’s 1998 Reference re 
Secession of Québec, as well as on Seymour’s criticism of the new under-
standing Tully suggested during his Montréal conference. At the begin-
ning of the last decade, the Canadian government took the initiative to 
introduce legislation permitting Parliament to rule on the clear nature of 
a referendum question before the Québec National Assembly finished 
debating it, and authorizing the Canadian Parliament to assess, after a ref-
erendum, whether the majority vote obtained also meets clarity require-
ments. For this, the Canadian government specified that consideration 
had to be taken not only of the referendum results, but also of changes in 
Québec’s situation after the referendum. It is difficult not to see this action 
by a key player in political -constitutional life as a unilateral move similar 
to those that were heavily criticized by the Supreme Court in 1998 and in 
Tully’s interpretative work. In this context, Tully’s complete silence on 
this legislative intervention seems surprising to say the least.
G.  The Practical Consequences of Tully’s Procedural -
Deliberative Approach
Philosophers sometimes take themselves too seriously. Empirically, 
it is true that, to employ Seymour’s terms, substantial internal self -
determination has progressed very little in Québec over the last decade. 
167
The Canadian State and the Political Freedom of Québec 
There are many complex explanations for this, and I believe that the core 
reason lies in a certain fatigue in Canada and Québec’s political classes 
after two decades during which much political debate has been devoted 
to the issue.11 While it is certainly important in theoretical circles, Tully’s 
analysis has played only a very minor role in postponing effective recog-
nition for Québec. However, it is true that things could have been differ-
ent if important figures in English Canadian intellectual life, such as him, 
had taken a strong public stance on the Clarity Act. Incidentally Tully’s 
colleague for two decades at McGill, Charles Taylor, published an op -ed 
piece in 2013 reaffirming that, with a clear question, fifty percent plus 
one should be enough in a future sovereignty referendum (Taylor 2013).
H.  Tully and the Nationalist Apology  
for the Canadian Constitutional Order
On this aspect, Seymour’s criticism seems exaggerated. There is no 
denying that the reading Tully proposes does indeed make Canada a nice 
but strange multiplicity, able to accommodate a wide range of belong-
ings and to offer a framework of freedom, justice, and stability to all of 
its members, both individually and collectively. In the end, Tully gives 
arguments to imagine a Canada -Québec reconciliation that would be 
sufficiently generous to permit each of them to maintain both unity and 
identity. Tully’s high praise for the Supreme Court and the considerable 
importance he gives it with respect to both understanding the Canadian 
constitutional framework and acting as a beacon for later changes in 
multinational societies in which there is complex or profound diversity, 
makes him a representative of the neo -idealist school that sees Canada as a 
“civilization of difference” able to exercise leadership to deepen the polit-
ical education of humanity in the 21st century. For members of this school, 
Canada is a “global exemplar,” a “shining prototype” of the unity that 
must be maintained for the good of humanity.12 Over the last two decades, 
growing tension has often characterized the relations between Canadian 
nation building and Québec nation building. These relations cannot be 
summarized as a playful narrative jousting about recognition of identity 
and its indefinite postponement. Power plays have regularly interrupted 
and made more complex the flow of reasonable rhetoric and argumenta-
tion. In all camps, this has left traces of bitterness and resentment. I think 
that no one is safe from this, and attentive readers will have no trouble 
finding passages where such emotions emerge in my interpretations of 
Tully and Seymour (after all, I was a student of Tully and remain a friend 
11 See, Laforest (2007, 95-97).
12 See, Millard (2008, 151-159).
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of both thinkers). The consistency in Tully’s overall approach, both in 
the theoretical progression of the second and third stages, insisting on the 
struggles for recognition but also on citizens’ freedoms and virtues in our 
world and in his interpretative work on the Supreme Court decision, can 
be found in the idea that Canadian -Québec constitutional conversations, 
against a backdrop of profound diversity and multiple identities overlap-
ping one another, favour the emergence of a richer, more sophisticated 
form of citizenship. Gregory Millard summarizes this in a very intelligent 
manner:
It is enough to reiterate that integrating internal diversities within these separ-
ate forums is already a considerable challenge; debates raging around ethno-
cultural pluralism show this. But going further, and sustaining a richly shared 
institutional space across these parallel forums, with the formidable difficul-
ties of understanding that entails, magnifies that complexity to a considerable 
degree. Now the greater the constitutive complexity of the polity –or, better, 
the deeper its diversity – the richer the demands it must place on the imagina-
tive and empathetic horizons of citizens. And in train come greater opportun-
ities for the realization of a maximally developmental vision of citizenship 
(Millard 2008, 214).
Conclusion
Beyond Canada and Québec, 2014 promised to be a dramatic year 
in the long quest for self -determination, either internal or external, in 
Scotland and Catalonia. In this context, I have considered it useful to 
examine in greater depth Tully and Seymour’s respective views. My con-
clusions will be brief and preliminary.
As one of the leaders in English -speaking intellectual life and aca-
demia in Canada, Tully has kept his distance from the Canada -Québec 
constitutional conversation over the last decade. This is unfortunate. A 
partisan, like Tully, of multinational federalism and reciprocal recogni-
tion, Seymour has written at length on the many symbolic and institutional 
consequences that should flow, for Canada, from the veritable recognition 
of the existence of a Québec nation (Seymour 2001, 95-96). In so far as 
he is also one of the leaders of intellectual and academic life in French -
speaking Québec, it would have been useful if he had abandoned a certain 
ultra -autonomist stance and specified the meaning and consequences of 
membership in Canada for Québec, in particular against a background of 
reciprocal recognition.
Words have weight in political -philosophical debates, and they should 
be handled with care. Canada and its constitution are not straightjackets 
for Québec. Québec’s political freedom has not been completely blocked 
by the 1982 constitutional reform. However, it seems clear to me that it 
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has been substantially or seriously hindered to degrees that remain to be 
evaluated, against a backdrop of circumstances that could still change and 
about which no one can claim to have privileged foresight. The future 
remains open.
No matter what the depth of the state of tension or the breadth of 
institutional blockage in multinational societies, the first responsibility 
of intellectuals is to promote a culture of dialogue and recognition of 
the Other or Others: their identities, histories, doubts, fears, and hopes. 
This is based on a certain ethics of concern for, and hospitality towards, 
the Other, which is refractory to stances of condescension, disdain, and 
indifference (Gagnon 2011). When conflicts and tensions mount, this can 
prove very difficult. As a political virtue, courage can be demonstrated 
by leaders in very public actions and by anonymous citizens in a myriad 
of daily activities. In times of political crisis, academics and intellectuals 
have a clear responsibility to think and act courageously. This is a call 
to all of us, not only Seymour and Tully, and it is a call that is likely to 
challenge our colleagues in Scotland and Catalonia, as well as in Great 
Britain and Spain, in the near future. As I finish revising this chapter, the 
September 18, 2014 referendum campaign is about to start in Scotland 
and Catalans still do not know if they will be allowed to vote legally on 
the nature of their constitutional future. As a foreigner, albeit sympathetic 
to the cause of greater autonomy for Scotland and for Catalonia, I can 
claim no certainty about the pluses and minuses of the various options in 
Scotland. I remain convinced that the October 2012 agreement regarding 
the conduct of the referendum signed by the Cameron and Salmond gov-
ernments was an edifying and quite remarkable achievement.13 For the 
future of Catalonia, and for the future of Spain, it would make great sense 
for Catalans to be allowed to vote in a legal manner.
13 The document can be downloaded at the following internet address: http://www.
scotland.gov.uk/About/Government/concordats/Referendum -on -independence. The 
last paragraph of this agreement, reproduced here, should be compulsory reading for 
everybody in the governments of the countries where such issues emerge, including 
Canada and Spain: “The United Kingdom and Scottish Governments are committed, 
through the Memorandum of Understanding4between them and others, to working 
together on matters of mutual interest and to the principles of good communication 
and mutual respect. The two governments have reached this agreement in that spirit. 
They look forward to a referendum that is legal and fair producing a decisive and 
respected outcome. The two governments are committed to continue to work together 
constructively in the light of the outcome, whatever it is, in the best interests of the 




Trust and Mistrust Between Harper and Québec
This chapter explores the complex and evolving relationship of trust 
and mistrust between Stephen Harper, Canada’s current Prime Minister 
first elected in 2006 and returned to power with a majority government 
in 2011, and Québec. Trust and mistrust are already complex affairs for 
contemporary political science and federalism studies. I further compli-
cate matters by considering, qualitatively and quantitatively, different 
partners in the relationship between one human being, who happens to be 
the most important political leader of a sophisticated federal democracy 
and, on the other side, a geographical entity which happens to be a distinct 
national society within this federation. Québec, for the purposes of this 
chapter, will encompass the following realities: the Province of Québec, 
Québec Francophones, Québec nationalism and Québec nationalists, and, 
finally, Québec’s political leaders, which essentially refers here to Jean 
Charest, former Premier of Québec from 2003 to 2012. Although trust is 
relational, and requires levels of reciprocity, I shall look at this phenom-
enon mostly from Harper’s perspective, exploring his political and intel-
lectual trajectory. I do not completely ignore the other perspective, which 
can be glimpsed for instance by Harper’s electoral fortunes in Québec 
in federal elections since 2004. My focus nevertheless remains on the 
factual, historical, and perceptual elements which, taken together, have 
shaped Harper’s cognitive perspective of Québec, over time leading to 
various degrees of trust and mistrust.
The chapter will start with an exploration of these two primary con-
cepts, trust and mistrust, in contemporary political science literature. It 
will then proceed to critically assess Harper’s intellectual and political 
trajectories, concentrating on dimensions that relate to Québec, as previ-
ously and broadly characterized. This part will be further divided into 
three periodic sub -sections: 1986-2005, 2005-2008, and 2008-2012. In 
the conclusion, I wish to explore some alternatives for the future concern-
ing the relationship between Harper and Québec.
I.  Some Reflections on Trust and its Derivatives
Until recently, political theorists have been rather neglectful of the 
concept of trust, although this very idea is quite central in John Locke’s 
liberal philosophy of sovereignty, explaining the relationship between 
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the people and their elected representatives. Trust, following Locke, is 
always a limited affair. It can never be blind. It is revisable and con-
sequentialist, depending on how our representatives behave when we 
“entrust” them with power. Before exploring in greater detail trust’s 
cognitive dimension, I show its relevance for our topic – Harper and 
Québec – by quoting Ronald Watts and Wayne Norman, two Canadian 
academics who have respectively analyzed the role of trust in the pol-
itical culture of federal regimes and its place in the context of multi-
national societies:
The necessary conditions for a federal solution: A first precondition is the 
existence of a will to federate. Federal political systems depend on consensual 
support and therefore are unlikely to succeed as imposed solutions. Second, 
since federal systems involve both self -rule and shared -rule, without some 
basic underlying shared values and objectives, the basis for long -run shared 
rule will in the end be impossible to achieve. Third, trust is necessary to make 
federal arrangements work. An essential condition is the development of mu-
tual faith and trust among the different groups within a federation and an 
emphasis upon the spirit of mutual respect, tolerance and compromise (Watts 
2010, 339).
From the point of view of the majority, the collective assent of federal part-
ners cuts both ways: it constitutes a form of commitment and loyalty to the 
federal project by the national minorities and the majority alike, one that 
cannot be easily shirked. If minorities want assurances that the fundamental 
terms of partnership will not be violated without their consent, majorities will 
expect no less from minorities. The language of loyalty or solidarity is also 
likely to figure in the wording of a fair multinational constitution […] There 
are tremendous benefits to trust in a federal partnership and a demonstrated 
commitment to anti -assimilationism is essential to secure the trust of minor-
ities (Norman 2006, 164-165).
Watts and Norman’s combined perspectives provide us with insights 
about the complexity of trust and mistrust in multinational regimes. 
François Rocher, Alexandre Pelletier, and Richard Simeon have attempted 
to build on these insights without neglecting the more general literature 
on trust in political sociology. The following remarks attempt to syn-
thesize their main contributions. Rocher builds on the work of Russell 
Hardin (2006) and attempts to go beyond the confusion between trust 
and trustworthiness. He considers that trust is relational, whereas trust-
worthiness deals with the quality of the person or group to whom trust 
has been granted (Rocher 2012, 2). Trust comes from the positive evalua-
tion that one makes of the Other’s trustworthiness. Trust, for Rocher, 
is the result of a calculation, of an evaluation. I believe that this is very 
important to keep in mind when dealing with such a Cartesian political 
figure as Stephen Harper. If trust is about calculating and evaluating, it is 
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endowed with a major cognitive dimension. This involves a stable rela-
tionship between partners, tested by experience and basing itself on a 
substantial knowledge of the Other or Others. Enriched by his survey 
of the political sociology literature, Rocher wonders about the challen-
ges at hand whenever scholars attempt to apply the dynamics of trust/
mistrust in multinational contexts when the insights of most of the work 
on trust emphasizes interpersonal dyadic relationships. In multinational 
contexts, social relations will involve a variety of actors including major-
ity and minority national groups, political parties wishing to represent 
them, political leaders, intellectual communities, governments, and state 
institutions. These various entities deal not only with those of the same 
social “family” (i.e., parties with parties, governments with governments, 
and so on). They also interact with other groups or entities in a crosscut-
ting way. Harper, for instance, as a political leader, not only deals with 
the Province of Québec, with the Government of Québec, with Charest 
as the Premier of Québec and key political interlocutor, but also, even if 
less systematically, with Québec nationalism and Québec’s intellectual 
community.
Trust, however, is not exclusively a cognitive affair. It has to translate 
into reality in a political space, which happens to involve in multinational 
federations asymmetrical power relationships between majorities and 
minorities. Noël has written intelligently about this dimension, inviting 
scholars of multinational regimes, and particularly political theorists, to 
integrate in their reflections “the arguments of power as well as the power 
of arguments” (Noël 2006, 438). The existence of a power disequilibrium 
means that, generally, as Rocher suggests, the most important or influ-
ential group does not require the same degree of trust in its relation with 
minorities as the other way around. This is because its interests are more 
easily preserved or safeguarded. The cognitive and power dimensions of 
trust, as well as some others, are summarized in Table I (taken directly 
from Rocher 2012).
Table I: Trust-Mistrust Dynamics in a Plurinational Context Marked by 
the Asymmetry of Communities
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In their own work on trust relations in civil society associations in 
multinational contexts, Pelletier and Simeon provide a nice supplement 
to Rocher’s typology and reflections. With regards to types of trust, they 
also suggest four variations: 
Rocher Pelletier and Simeon
Unconditional Trust Substantial Trust
Moderate Trust Instrumental Trust
Moderate Mistrust Cooperation Without Trust
Radical Mistrust Absence of Cooperation
Pelletier and Simeon (2012) also insist, like Rocher, on the need, in 
such complex federal contexts, for an equilibrium between autonomy and 
interdependence. They suggest that trust always involves a combination 
of strategic (instrumental) and moral dimensions requiring good faith and 
reciprocity (Pelletier and Simeon 2012, 4). The domain of trust is always, 
or almost always, the realm of uncertainty. Reflecting on the two typ-
ologies of trust offered by Rocher, on the one hand, and Pelletier and 
Simeon, on the other hand, I wonder if it is at all theoretically or empiric-
ally possible to find such a thing as unconditional trust in a multinational 
context. Therefore, I prefer, prima facie, a political sociology that places 
substantial trust at the apex. I doubt, however, that substantial trust, in 
multinational contexts, can be devoid of instrumental dimensions. The 
logic of interest, as both Rocher and Noël insist, cannot be discarded. 
Therefore, I believe that Rocher’s notion of moderate trust is, prima facie, 
more helpful than Pelletier and Simeon’s category of instrumental trust. 
I will now consider the evolving relationships concerning trust and mis-
trust between Harper and Québec.
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II.  Harper and Québec
A. The Contours of Deep Mistrust, 1986-2005
Stephen Harper is, arguably, the most important figure in Canadian 
politics in the new millennium. In the 2000 Canadian federal elections, the 
Liberal Party, led by former Prime Minister Jean Chrétien, won its third 
consecutive majority government. In the election’s aftermath, Stockwell 
Day, leader of the Canadian Alliance Party, resigned. Along with the 
Canadian Alliance, the longstanding and other right -wing party, the 
Progressive Conservative Party of Canada, was easily defeated. Consider 
Harper’s achievements since these events: in 2002, he became leader of 
the Canadian Alliance Party; in 2003, he was instrumental in merging 
the two right -wing parties and becoming leader of the new Conservative 
Party of Canada; in 2004, he and his party successfully reduced the 
Liberal Party, now led by Paul Martin, to the status of a minority gov-
ernment; in January 2006, Harper became Prime Minister of Canada as 
his party formed a minority government; and, in October 2008, Harper 
won a second mandate at the helm of a minority government. In May 
2011, the day of his greatest triumph so far, Harper and his party won 
the Canadian federal election and formed their first majority government, 
while thoroughly demolishing two opposition parties – the Liberals led 
by Michael Ignatieff and the Bloc Québécois led by Gilles Duceppe. Both 
of these leaders were defeated in their own ridings. In the spring of 2012, 
the Bloc Québécois chose a new leader, Daniel Paillé, but the party was 
relegated to the margins of the House of Commons without official party 
status and the resources that go with it. The Liberals had an interim leader 
in Bob Rae before choosing Justin Trudeau as their new party leader in 
April 2013. And the New Democrats, fresh from taking most of the seats 
in Québec for the first time ever, chose Thomas Mulcair as leader fol-
lowing the death of the previous one, the much esteemed Jack Layton. 
Harper, in this context, reigns supreme in Canadian politics.
Born in Ontario in 1959, Harper moved to Alberta in his early twen-
ties. He became involved in federal politics at that time, supporting Jim 
Hawkes, his local Conservative candidate who was elected in 1984 when 
Brian Mulroney became Prime Minister of Canada. He became estranged 
from Mulroney’s government and from the Progressive Conservative 
Party of Canada over his disappointment with their treatment of Western 
Canada, their conduct of federal -provincial relations and constitutional 
politics during the Meech Lake saga (1987-1990), and their support of 
interventionist, statist economic and social policies over such matters 
as unemployment insurance. He sided with Preston Manning’s Western 
populist movement, making a major speech at the founding congress of 
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the Reform Party in late October 1987. Soon thereafter, he became a sen-
ior policy advisor to Manning who was selected as the Reform Party’s 
first leader. The contours of Harper’s deep mistrust and suspicion of 
Québec were already well established at that time. I insisted in the pre-
vious section on the fact that trust is endowed with a major cognitive 
dimension. This is created over time, through a multiplicity of experi-
ences. In Harper’s case, many of these experiences were shared with one 
major significant Other, John Weissenberger, with whom he developed a 
deep personal relationship in his first years in the West.
Weissenberger spent the first part of his life in Québec, as part of 
Montréal’s Anglophone minority, during the eventful years of the October 
Crisis in 1970, the language laws of 1974 and 1977, and culminating 
with the victory of René Lévesque’s sovereigntist Parti Québécois in the 
1976 election. With Weissenberger, Harper came to develop a vision of 
Québec’s language regime as curtailing freedom of expression and the 
primacy of individual rights. As William Johnson, Harper’s biographer, 
argues, both developed a profoundly conservative understanding of 
Canada and of the world (Johnson 2005, 43). With regards to their philo-
sophical understanding of modernity, they came to support a strongly 
individualistic liberal vision, considering the state as a mere instrument 
to support the goals and projects of individuals. Owing much to Friedrich 
Hayek’s vision of spontaneous order, they sided with the free market and 
remained immensely suspicious of the state’s interventions in economic 
and social affairs. This played a role in Harper’s vision of Québec. Ever 
since the Quiet Revolution of the early 1960s, an upper middle -class aca-
demic and intellectual political elite used the state to serve the interests 
of the French -speaking majority. René Lévesque’s Parti Québécois could 
be seen as pursuing this project. Ever since that time, Harper has sided 
with at least a soft libertarian approach to economic and social policies, 
attempting to limit the interventions of the state as much as possible 
(Johnson 2005, 47). Also at that time, Weissenberger and Harper were self 
-proclaimed conservatives in the Burkean sense, placing greater value on 
traditions and conventions following the British experience, emphasizing 
reformist gradualism and remaining deeply suspicious of radical, revolu-
tionary change. This dimension heightened Harper’s distrust of Québec. 
During the Quiet Revolution, statist Québec elitism had opted for radical 
change, and in the mid -1970s it appeared to become even more revolu-
tionary with the Parti Québécois’ sovereigntist project aimed at securing 
Québec’s secession from Canada. On language matters, Weissenberger 
and Harper considered Québec profoundly disloyal.
On the one hand, according to them, Québec and Francophones from 
Canada benefited from Pierre Elliott Trudeau’s symmetrical pan -Canadian 
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language regime of official bilingualism, whereas Québec enforced 
within its borders a regime of official unilingualism that was detrimental 
to the rights of Anglophone Québecers. To make matters worse, Québec’s 
political culture of interventionist statism was considered by them to be 
thoroughly entrenched in Canada, with the domination of the Liberal 
Party in general and Trudeau’s vision in particular. Even worse, in the late 
1970s, Trudeau’s federal government embarked on a collision course with 
Alberta and other Western provinces over the control of natural resour-
ces. Along with Weissenberger, Harper was profoundly ill at ease with 
Québec’s perceived attacks on Hayekian economic and epistemological 
conservatism, on Burkean’s political conservatism, and on a principled 
conservative defence of the rule of law in the British tradition of which 
Canada is considered to be one of the most important heirs in the world. 
According to his biographer, Harper has always shown a lot of respect for 
Trudeau’s 1982 vision of patriating the Canadian constitution, enriching 
it with a Charter of Rights and Freedoms and attempting to consolidate 
Canada as one nation. At the same time, philosophically, he was pro-
foundly opposed to Trudeau’s policies on such issues as languages and 
resources as well as policies that imposed Québec’s culture of nation-
alistic statism on the whole of Canada. Trudeau and the Liberal Party, 
according to Harper in the mid -1980s, were obsessed with the question of 
Québec, neglecting the higher purposes of individual and regional justice 
for all Canadians.
Beyond Hayek and Burke, Weissenberger and Harper were also quite 
influenced in the 1980s by a book written by Peter Brimelow (1986), 
which looked strategically at the future of Canada in North America and 
in world from a rather Churchillian perspective strongly prejudiced in 
favour of English -speaking peoples and their contribution to the history 
of humanity. Brimelow offered a view of Québec’s importance and role 
in the history of Canada. Weissenberger and Harper read the following 
passage about a decade after Lévesque’s first victory, five years after 
the failed sovereignty referendum of 1980, and just as Brian Mulroney, 
Robert Bourassa, and other Canadian politicians were about to agree on 
the terms of the Meech Lake Accord, recognizing Québec as a distinct 
society within Canada and granting the government and the National 
Assembly of Québec – the State of Québec, from Harper’s perspective – 
constitutional authority to protect and promote Québec as a distinct soci-
ety through legislation:
The history and politics of Québec are dominated by a single great reality: the 
emergence of the French -speaking nation. The process has been slow, com-
plex and agonizing. There have been false starts, reversals and long periods 
of quiescence. But for over two hundred years its ultimate direction has been 
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the same: towards ever greater self -expression, as the growing plant seeks the 
light (Brimelow 1986, 180).
From the first signing of the Meech Lake Accord in 1987, includ-
ing its demise in 1990, to the Canadian and Québec referendums of 
1992 over the Charlottetown Accord, Harper, alone or in solidarity with 
Preston Manning and the Reform Party, acted on his principled conserva-
tism and on the cognitive and normative dimensions of his mistrust of 
Québec to strongly oppose the constitutional transformations that these 
projects offered Canada. In essence, Harper was strongly opposed to real 
or perceived special status for Québec, adhering to a vision of individual, 
provincial, and regional equality under the umbrella of Canadian rule of 
law. As a Westerner and as a Canadian historical conservative, he did 
develop an understanding of federalism that allowed for strong provinces 
and substantial decentralization. Meech Lake and its distinct society pro-
visions were not only at odds with his vision of provincial equality, they 
also meant that the state of Québec could become even more intervention-
ist, endowed with the constitutional authority to preserve and promote 
such a distinct society. Moreover, by granting Québec a veto right, Meech 
Lake meant that the Reform Party’s cherished project of a Triple -E Senate 
(equal, effective, and elected) would probably never see the light of day 
because Québec would oppose it. Interestingly, it seems relevant while 
discussing trust and mistrust in multinational contexts to remark that 
Harper, during the Meech Lake era, thought that Québec was not asked 
or did not propose to grant a significant concession of its own, which 
could have been “surrendering a clean option to secede” (Johnson 2005, 
83). Obviously, from opposite perspectives developed at the time in the 
Québec government or in Québec’s political and intellectual circles, the 
Meech Lake Accord was of course interpreted in a very different light. It 
was linked to the radical transformation of the Canadian constitution in 
1982 without the consent of Québec, and thus seen as necessary to re--
establish trust in the Canadian federal project. However, my focus in this 
chapter insists on the significance of Harper’s trajectory and of his per-
spective. His angle on matters of trust and mistrust remains my primary 
concern.
From the Charlottetown Accord to the end of the decade includ-
ing the fateful months before, and after, the 1995 Québec referendum, 
Harper was steadfast in attempting to maintain, coldly, analytically, and 
precisely, the coherence of his vision of politics and of Canada. Harper 
had epistemological and philosophical misgivings about the conduct of 
statist politics in Québec. From Brimelow, he carried strong prejudi-
ces about the historical inevitability of Québec’s quest for ever -greater 
forms of political self -expression with its strong Québec nationalism. 
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Moreover, he did not like the ambiguities surrounding Québec’s strug-
gles for sovereignty and self -determination and their relationships with 
the rule of law in Canada and the primacy of the Canadian constitu-
tion. With Manning and the Reform Party, but also acting on his own, 
he sought a greater commitment to Canada as one nation on the part 
of Québec, and he sought greater clarity with regards to the legality 
of any secessionist enterprise. After the 1995 Québec Referendum, in 
Parliament and elsewhere, Harper initiated a variety of measures seek-
ing greater clarity and the primacy of the rule of law. The 1998 Supreme 
Court of Canada Reference re Secession of Québec, and the law passed 
by Parliament in early 2000 under the initiative of Jean Chrétien and 
Stéphane Dion known as the Clarity Act, can together be regarded as 
offering substantial satisfaction to Harper, his actions, and his vision in 
the early 1990s. Taken together, the Supreme Court judgment and the 
Clarity Act reiterated the underlying principles of the Canadian constitu-
tion (federalism, democracy, constitutionalism and the rule of law, and 
respect for the rights of minorities), establishing a legal framework for 
the secession of a Canadian province within the categories of the consti-
tution – following a referendum on a clear question translated into a clear 
answer leading to negotiations where all parties should show good faith 
and respect for the principles of the constitution – and specified under 
which conditions Parliament would consider that the question and the 
answer would be equally clear.
Two excerpts, quoted below, come from a motion submitted at a 
Reform Party Congress during the Charlottetown saga, and from an indi-
vidual Member’s Bill that Stephen Harper submitted to the Canadian 
House of Commons in 1996 in the aftermath of the second Québec ref-
erendum. These two excerpts reveal a lot about the context of the times, 
which was, using Rocher’s typology, characterized by radical mistrust 
(absence of cooperation in Pelletier and Simeon 2012) of Québec nation-
alists and secessionists from the perspective of Harper and a broad section 
of Canadian opinion. Taken together, these two excerpts are, for me, the 
intellectual predecessors of the Canadian central government’s “Plan B” in 
the Chrétien -Dion years and the Supreme Court’s Reference re Secession 
of Québec and the Clarity Act itself. They contributed, possibly, to a 
transformation of the climate of politics in Canada in the late 1990s, from 
radical mistrust to moderate mistrust (Rocher) or from absence of cooper-
ation to cooperation without trust (Pelletier and Simeon). This move from 
radical mistrust to moderate mistrust obviously characterizes here, if I 
am not mistaken, public opinion in the majority nation of a multinational 
federation. Beyond these excerpts, however, I believe nothing had really 
changed regarding Harper’s deep mistrust of Québec.
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Whereas concessions made on account of this separatist threat are, for many, 
proving to be costly, ineffective, a source of deepening friction between 
Québec and the rest of Canada, and a barrier to the development of national 
purpose for the country as a whole […] Be it resolved that the Reform Party 
state clearly its belief that Confederation should be maintained, but that it 
can only be maintained by a clear commitment to Canada as one nation, in 
which the demands and aspirations of all regions are entitled to equal status in 
constitutional negotiations and political debate, and in which freedom of ex-
pression is fully accepted as the basis for language policy across the country 
(quoted by Johnson 2005, 147).
A unilateral declaration of independence by the government of Québec or the 
legislature of Québec, or the refusal of either to submit to any Canadian law 
that applies in Québec is unlawful and of no force and effect with respect to 
the Constitution of Canada and the general laws of Canada and does not af-
fect: (a) the jurisdiction of Parliament to pass laws that have effect in Québec; 
(b) the ability of the Government of Canada to govern Québec as a province 
of Canada; (c) the jurisdiction of the courts to apply the law of Canada in 
Québec; or (d) the continuance of Québec as a part of Canada under Canadian 
law (quoted by Johnson 2005, 255).
Evaluating Harper’s relationship with Québec, I believe nothing of 
substance really changed between 1996, the year Harper submitted this 
Member’s Bill to Parliament, and late 2004, sometime after his first 
federal electoral campaign as leader of the new, reunited right -wing 
Conservative Party of Canada. In 2004, struggling against the Liberal 
Party led by Paul Martin, Harper’s Conservatives elected 99 members of 
Parliament, and reduced the Liberals to the status of a minority govern-
ment. However, their performance was dismal in Québec, with less than 
9% of votes and no elected representatives. From 1996 to 2004, Harper 
remained adamant that Québec needed no form of special status, no new 
substantial or symbolic recognition, and that it was legally fully integrated 
in Canada. In essence, the only fundamental difference between his group 
and their Liberal adversaries was that the Conservatives espoused a form 
of federalism that appeared more respectful of the powers of provinces. 
If nothing of substance really changed, some signs indicated that Harper 
could reconsider, at least in part, his own vision and approach given his 
understanding of Québec and of Canada. I shall consider these signs in 
the introduction of the next section, which deals with the period from 
2005 to 2008.
B.  The Promises of Thin Trust, 2005-2008
Harper’s conservative vision privileges market libertarian values over 
the welfare state and the political culture that supports it. It promotes 
individual rights and family values against the hedonism and nihilism of 
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much of late modernity in the West. It nurtures a politics of conflict that 
favours taxpayers from the private sector over welfare recipients. It har-
bours huge suspicions as we have seen vis -à -vis the nationalistic statism 
of Québec and its perceived absence of commitment vis -à -vis Canada. 
Lastly, it promotes an understanding of Canadian federalism that grants 
at least equal value to federalism and the founding of 1867 than to the 
refounding accomplished by Trudeau with Patriation and the Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms in 1982. Harper’s mind fully integrates a vision of 
politics that sees it as primarily conflictual. In order, therefore, to secure a 
lasting presence for his vision with all its elements in 21st century Canada, 
he believes that the Conservative Party must attempt the Herculean task 
of displacing the Liberal Party as the dominant party in the political sys-
tem. From 1996 onwards, ever so gradually, Harper acted on the premise 
that in order to securely anchor his vision, to displace the Liberals, the 
Conservatives had to make their peace with Québec. I use the expres-
sion thin trust to characterize the shift that occurred in Harper’s approach 
and which can be clearly seen at work in speeches he made in Québec 
City and Montréal in December 2005 and January 2006, respectively, in 
the midst of the federal electoral campaign that led to the formation of a 
Conservative minority government. In these speeches, and in some pro-
nouncements thereafter, Harper coined a new doctrine called fédéralisme 
d’ouverture, which can be translated as open federalism or federalism 
of openness (Pelletier 2008; Hébert 2007). It is clear that fédéralisme 
d’ouverture as a form of thin trust towards Québec corresponded to what 
Pelletier and Simeon called instrumental trust. Once again, this is not 
necessarily negative or pejorative. Everybody has interests: political 
leaders, governments, and nations. Thin or instrumental trust represents 
progress from the inferior categories in our two typologies of moderate 
mistrust (Rocher) or cooperation without trust (Pelletier and Simeon). 
Over time, because trust is endowed with a cognitive dimension that 
integrates the meaning and consequences of experiences, thin or instru-
mental trust can restabilize as moderate trust. I wish to argue that how-
ever we interpret the promises of fédéralisme d’ouverture between 2005 
and 2008, they failed to cement moderate trust, therefore leading to more 
recent relations between Harper and Québec characterized by renewed 
mistrust from 2008 to 2012.
The seeds of thin or instrumental trust between Harper and Québec 
were already planted in 1996 when Harper established, at a philosophic-
ally conservative policy convention in Calgary, the conditions that would 
allow the Canadian political right to re -establish itself as a major force in 
order to compete with, and eventually displace, the Liberal Party as the 
primary party in the country. At that time, Harper believed that whenever 
conservative forces had coalesced to win an election, they included people 
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from three groups: people from Ontario and Atlantic Canada who had 
traditionally supported the old Conservative Party; people from Western 
Canada who had historically supported various populist parties stem-
ming from the West, which in the late 1990s was the Reform Party; and, 
finally, people linked with the nationalist tradition in Québec who had not 
completely abandoned the idea of a federal Canada as a political project 
(Johnson 2005, 264). In 1996, Harper had precious little to say about the 
ways in which such a coalition could be formed again in the future. In the 
ensuing years, events unfolded to create some preconditions for the real-
ization of this project. Following Chrétien’s three consecutive majority 
governments, the Liberal Party was becoming more and more engulfed 
in a fratricidal conflict involving Chrétien’s supporters and those of his 
internal archrival, Paul Martin. The latter would ultimately prevail and 
replace Chrétien in the winter of 2004. In Québec, things began to change 
in 2003, when the Québec Liberal Party, under Jean Charest’s leadership, 
won the April 14 election and propelled the sovereigntist Parti Québécois 
into opposition.
Charest and his Liberals were committed federalists and sympa-
thetic to Canadian nationalism while remaining autonomist nationalistic 
Québecers. They developed a coherent approach towards Canadian fed-
eralism, wishing to improve the quality of horizontal intergovernmental 
relations through creating new institutions of cooperation between prov-
inces and territories such as the Council of the Federation established in 
late 2003. Rapidly, Charest and Harper were successful in changing the 
climate of federal -provincial relations by agreeing, with other provin-
cial leaders in the fall of 2004, to a new ten -year deal to jointly finance 
Canada’s health system, completing this agreement with a parallel, 
asymmetrical accord between the central government and Québec. Paul 
Martin and his Liberal government were less successful in Québec with 
the creation of a Commission of Enquiry led by Justice John Gomery. 
The Commission explored the ways in which the regulations of many 
federal administrative departments were violated, while irregular means 
were employed to finance the federal Liberal Party in a vast scheme 
trying to reinforce a sense of Canadian allegiance in Québec in the 
aftermath of the 1995 referendum. The electoral fortunes of the federal 
Liberal Party in Québec, already weakened in 2004, would be fatally 
wounded because the situation was properly exploited by their adversar-
ies. All in all, these events provided Harper with an opportunity that he 
began to seize during the early weeks of the federal electoral campaign 
in December 2005 and January 2006. This is when he expounded the 
major aspects of his new doctrine of fédéralisme d’ouverture, summar-
ized here in point form:
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• beyond domineering and paternalistic federalism, show greater re-
spect toward constitutional provincial jurisdiction and division of 
powers;
• foster better collaboration and coordination with provinces and cir-
cumscribe Ottawa’s spending power;
• recognize the existence of a vertical fiscal imbalance between 
Ottawa and the provinces and show willingness to act on this 
problem;
• recognize the special cultural and institutional responsibilities of 
Québec, attributing a significant role to the government of Québec 
in the Canadian delegation at UNESCO;
• in Canada -Québec relations, offer a noticeable change of tone, of-
fering hope that the federation would be modified for the better 
(see, Pelletier 2008; Caron and Laforest 2009).
It could be argued that Harper’s surprising new flirtations with Québec 
was the key element that led to the Conservative victory in 2006, thus 
enabling him to become Prime Minister of Canada (Hébert 2007, 10). 
In 2006, Harper and his party made more than a modest breakthrough in 
Québec. They won ten seats in the province, compared to none in 2004, 
and garnered 24.6% of the votes, compared with 8.8% in 2004. Between 
Harper and Québec, from 2005 to 2008, things were far from perfect. 
Harper was, and remains, far too conservative and anti -statist for Québec’s 
left -of -center general public opinion and for its political elites. Under the 
circumstances, it would have been totally unreasonable to expect uncon-
ditional or substantial trust between Harper and Québec. However, for at 
least two years, it looked as if Harper and Québec were jointly navigating 
the waters of instrumental and moderate trust.
Although the Harper -led Conservative government has failed to 
deliver on its promise to establish a so -called Charte du fédéralisme 
d’ouverture, I believe there is some consensus in Québec that Harper did 
make significant progress on most items of this agenda between 2006 and 
2008. Considering, moreover, that Harper moved through the House of 
Commons in late 2006 a resolution recognizing that the Québécois form 
a nation in a united Canada, that he generally showed great respect for 
the French language in his speeches, and that he has highlighted here and 
abroad the role of Québec in general and of Québec City in particular, in 
Canada’s founding, it is somewhat surprising that he did not make sub-
stantial gains in Québec in the 2008 federal election. In October 2008, 
Harper’s Conservative won the election yet again, once more forming a 
minority government and once more with ten seats in Québec, but with 
a reduced voter support of 21.7%. Analyzing these matters must be done 
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carefully. In truth, the engine of fédéralisme d’ouverture had been losing 
part of its energy since 2007 because of a variety of issues: statements 
about the need to circumscribe the spending power have been timid at best; 
moreover, some ambiguities remain concerning what Harper really meant 
in the nation resolution. One must add to this various Senate reform pro-
jects, coupled with the desire to establish more provincial equality in the 
House of Commons by giving more seats to Ontario, Alberta, and British 
Columbia (reform ideas met with resistance in Québec), and the idea of 
an Ottawa -based national securities regulator have been met with equal 
resistance in Québec City by sovereigntist and federalist governments. 
Moreover, between 2006 and 2008, Harper has shown no enthusiasm for 
streamlining coordination through regular and more rational conferences 
with provincial and territorial leaders. It is also clear that he has stayed 
away from the idea of re -opening the constitutional file in order to, among 
other matters, formally recognize Québec’s national identity. Add to this 
the rift between Harper and Québec Premier Jean Charest dating back 
to the Charest’s decision to reduce income taxes in the aftermath of a 
2007 federal budget addressing the fiscal imbalance issue, and you get a 
more realistic portrait of the relationship between Harper’s government 
and Québec. Somewhere between 2007 and 2008, the engine of thin or 
instrumental trust between Harper and Québec derailed. I shall explore 
the psychological dimensions of this reality in the next section.
C.  Renewed Mistrust, 2008-2012
In the 2011 federal election, Harper saw his Conservative Party win 
comfortably, garnering 166 of 308 seats with 39.6% of the votes (see 
Table II ). In the days thereafter he formed his first majority cabinet. 
However, he did this with considerably reduced support in Québec, drop-
ping from 10 to 5 seats and from 21.7% to 16.5% of voter support (see 
Table III ). During the election, seismic political changes occurred in 
Québec, with the New Democratic Party led by Jack Layton moving from 
a single seat to 58 seats, garnering 42% of voter support. Both the sover-
eigntist Bloc Québécois led by Gilles Duceppe and the Liberal Party led 
by Michael Ignatieff collapsed. In the campaign leading up to the elec-
tion, it became clear that Harper and the Conservatives applied a differ-
ent strategy than the one they had used in 2006 and 2008, placing much 
less emphasis on everything related to fédéralisme d’ouverture. Instead, 
the Conservative’s priorities in 2011 were creating jobs, supporting fam-
ilies, eliminating the deficit, providing increased security to Canadians, 
and protecting Canada here and abroad by strengthening the Armed 
Forces, and investing in the development and security of the North. They 
had nothing particular to offer Québec voters. Clearly the richest and 
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best -organized political party in Canada, the Harper -led Conservatives, 
attempted to secure a majority by making gains in Ontario, the Maritimes, 
and British Columbia, strategically selecting potential seats and cleverly 
segmenting the electorate. In the months following the election, the new 
majority government made good on its campaign promises.





Liberal NDP Con. Green Ind. Other Total
2000 % of valid 
votes
25.5 10.7 40.8 8.5 12.2 -- -- 2.2 --
2000 # of seats 66 38 172 13 12 -- -- 0 301
2004 % of valid 
votes
-- 12.4 36.7 15.7 29.6 4.3 0.3 1.0 --
2004 # of seats -- 54 135 19 99 0 1 0 308
2006 % of valid 
votes
-- 10.5 30.2 17.5 36.3 4.5 0.5 0.5 --
2006 # of seats -- 51 103 29 124 0 1 0 308
2008 % of valid 
votes
-- 10.0 26.3 18.2 37.7 6.8 0.6 0.4 --
2008 # of seats -- 49 77 37 143 0 2 0 308
2011 % of valid 
votes
-- 6.1 18.9 30.6 39.6 3.9 0.4 0.5 --
2011 # of seats -- 4 34 103 166 1 0 0 308
*   The Canadian Alliance Party, earlier the Reform Party, fused with the Progressive Conservative 
Party to form the Conservative Party of Canada in 2003.
**  In 2003, the number of seats in the Canadian House of Common, the Lower House of Parliament, 
grew from 301 to 308.
Table III: Votes Obtained by the Alliance-Reform- 
Progressive Conservatives, and later by the Conservative  
Party in Québec, 2000-2011






The government’s blueprint, as it appeared in the throne speech deliv-
ered by the Governor General on June 3, 2011, included the following 
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priorities: supporting growth and employment, eliminating the deficit, 
supporting hard -working families, protecting Canada, helping law -abiding 
Canadians, helping communities and industries, and promoting integrity 
and responsibility. The last priority included ideas such as Senate reform, 
more equitable representation in the House of Commons by granting more 
seats to Ontario, Alberta and British Columbia, and eliminating state sup-
port for the financing of political parties. All these elements put Harper 
on a collision course with Charest’s Liberal Government in Québec and 
with mainstream public opinion in the province. Cooperation did exist 
between Harper and Charest’s governments, as was demonstrated by 
the agreement on sales tax harmonization devolving two billion dollars 
to Québec on September 30, 2011, though I would argue that this is an 
example of cooperation without trust. Moreover, Harper was forced after 
the election to reshuffle personnel in the Prime Minister’s Office with the 
resignation of his press secretary, Dimitri Soudas, who also happened to 
be his top Québec advisor. He replaced him with Angelo Persichillli, a 
veteran of the ethnic media in Toronto who does not speak French and 
made disparaging comments about Québec’s role in Canada in the recent 
past. Considering all these events, the following question needs to be 
asked: what really went wrong between Harper and Québec in 2007-2008 
to explain this move from instrumental or thin trust to renewed mistrust?
Whenever partners in a relationship move from deep mistrust (radical 
mistrust, absence of cooperation, cooperation without trust, in the typolo-
gies used here) to instrumental or thin trust, the whole matter remains 
quite fragile. I believe that in the era of fédéralisme d’ouverture and thin 
trust, Harper’s stance towards Québec started to change in the spring of 
2007, in the context of the Québec electoral campaign that ultimately 
saw Charest’s Liberals reduced to the status of a minority government 
and Mario Dumont’s Action démocratique du Québec replacing the Parti 
Québécois as the province’s Official Opposition. Prior to the election, 
Harper’s government in Ottawa announced that it would settle the fiscal 
imbalance between the central government and the provinces, which had 
for many years been a priority for the Charest Government. As a result, 
Québec received over one billion dollars. Charest had always said that 
Québec needed this money in order to face rising costs in its two most 
important jurisdictions of health and education. However, at the end of 
a difficult first mandate, Charest chose instead to use these subsidies to 
offer Québec’s voters substantial income tax reductions. Obviously, the 
Québec government is perfectly entitled to do whatever it wants, within 
the rule of law and within its jurisdictional ground in the federation, with 
its revenues. Harper, however, who had spent some political capital in 
the rest of Canada to recognize the legitimacy of the fiscal imbalance 
issue, must have been quite surprised and deeply disappointed by the 
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move. Charest made matters worse, in 2007-2008, not only by disagree-
ing with Harper’s government policy on environmental issues such as 
climate change, but also by vigorously expressing himself about this dis-
agreement in a number of important international forums. Fédéralisme 
d’ouverture remained an important theme in the Conservative electoral 
platform going into the elections of October 2008, and it figured among 
the elements that were mentioned in the throne speech following the re--
election of Harper’s Conservatives with a minority government. Although 
the words remained there, the spirit did not. Harper’s Conservatives did 
not lose seats in Québec in 2008, but they did not gain ground either. In 
terms of voter support, they suffered a marked loss, moving from 24.6% 
to 21.7 % after a lacklustre campaign where they were cleverly attacked 
by the Bloc Québécois for intended federal reductions of governmental 
support for culture. By the end of 2008, in the weeks following Charest’s 
third election win and second majority, with Marion Dumont and Action 
démocratique du Québec suffering an election disaster, and with whom 
Harper had established good personal relations and with whom he shared 
some ideological traits (e.g., suspicion vis -à -vis welfare statism and broad 
support for greater individual responsibility), the window of opportunity 
for fédéralisme d’ouverture, for instrumental or thin trust between Harper 
and Québec, appeared to be closing.
Conclusion
Trust and mistrust are cognitive affairs. They are experience -based, 
dynamic, fluid, and evolving with changing historical and political cir-
cumstances. In multinational federations, between majorities and min-
orities at the level of civil societies as well as between political leaders 
and governmental representatives, trust will always be something fragile 
and inherently unstable. Majorities and minorities, and their respective 
leaders, do not exclusively seek the same objectives. Some objectives 
might be commonly shared: security, social peace, economic prosperity, 
the crafting and preserving of a liberal polity enhancing individual rights, 
the normal functioning of representative and deliberative institutions of 
democracy, and the establishment of a pluralistic public sphere. Still, in 
a multinational democracy, the majority nation, as Simeon coherently 
showed, will put greater priority on national integration at the state -wide 
level, and on securing solidarity and interdependence for all individuals 
and groups throughout the state. On the other hand, minority nations 
will put greater focus on national empowerment for minorities, through 
increased powers, expressions of distinctiveness and asymmetry, and 
securing forms of symbolic and substantial recognition by the majority 
nation and by the state.
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In this general context, to come back to the categories explored in this 
chapter, unconditional trust is unimaginable. At best, majorities, minor-
ities, and their respective leaders will reach a reasonably stabilized order 
hovering between what Rocher has called moderate trust and moderate 
mistrust, between the broader spectrum suggested by Pelletier and Simeon 
from cooperation without trust, to instrumental trust, to substantial trust. 
As suggested here, an element of instrumentality will always exists.
In order to stabilize a form of moderate trust, two lessons can be learnt 
from examining the relationship between Harper and Québec between 
1986 and 2012. Harper’s trajectory helps us understand that, when moder-
ate or instrumental trust has been achieved, in a personal context steeped 
in historic mistrust and deeply -held prejudices, top elected leaders must 
act coherently and honour their promises. Jean Charest failed to do this 
in the spring of 2007 when he used the money Québec had received as 
a form of compensation for vertical fiscal imbalance in the federation to 
instead reduce provincial income taxes. Second, although they may have 
substantial policy differences, leaders of majorities and minorities should 
not act at the international level as if to widen these policy differences, 
without any appearance of communication on maters of mutual concern. 
On environmental issues, Charest showed a kind of lack of respect for 
Harper in a variety of international forums.
In theory at least, I believe the categories explored in this chapter can 
be useful to understand the relationship between leaders representing 
majority and minority nations in a complex federation, between their 
respective governments, and between the peoples and societies they rep-
resent. Unconditional trust should not be sought as it is simply beyond 
reach. Discussions should be frequent. Each side should understand the 
hierarchy of the other’s objectives. Whenever possible, common speeches 
and deeds should be pronounced and accomplished to build up the edifice 
of relative trust. Promises, whenever expressed, should be kept at all costs. 
Finally, whenever conflicts are unavoidable, which is bound to happen 
considering the essence of politics in a multinational federation, channels 
of communication and interpersonal respect should be maintained. The 
rest, as ever, will be cognitive, experience -based, and revisable.
One final note is worth mentioning. All signs point to the return of 
deep mistrust in the relations between Harper and Québec during Pauline 
Marois’ brief stewardship at the helm of a Parti Québécois minority gov-
ernment between September 2012 and April 2014. The advent of a major-
ity Liberal and federalist government under the leadership of Philippe 
Couillard may change the situation. It is my belief that the analysis pro-
vided in this chapter, and its conclusions, apply to the new and evolv-
ing Harper -Couillard relationship, with the likelihood of instrumental 
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flexibility on the part of Harper in the context leading up to the federal 
elections scheduled to be held on October 19, 2015. The examination of 
these matters will be one of the tasks of the Groupe de recherche sur les 
sociétés plurinatonales (Research Group on Plurinational Societies), of 
which I am a proud member, during the next few years. We will remain 
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